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ABSTRACT
In its chronic form silicosis had always been 
been taken for granted as one of the occupational 
hazards of mining. But both during and shortly after 
the Anglo-Boer War it manifested itself in a new 
accelerated form amongst former Witwatersrand rock 
drillers. Despite the appointment ii7 the Transvaal of 
a commission of enquiry in 1902 and the promulgation 
of dust precaution measures, by 1912 the prevalence of 
and mortality from the disease amongst the 
Witwatersrand miners had not diminished. This finding 
suggests two of the purposes of the study: first, the 
reasons for the continued prevalence of the disease; 
and second, the extent of the mortality from silicosis 
amongst the miners. Because of the apparently low 
prevalence of and mortality from the disease amongst 
Africun mineworkers, the disease was ironically 
nick-named the "white death". Therefore another aim 
of the study is to examine the validity of the medical 
claim that the short contracts of African migrant 
workers safeguarded them from contracting accelerated 
si 1Icosi s.
As the subject is complex, the study uses a 
thematic approach. Chapters two to nine deal with 
significant themes: first, the growing medical 
knowledge concerning silicosis, the mining and medical 
precautions against the disease and the age-old 
disregard for the occupational illness in its chronic
form; second, the industrialists* need to reduce 
working costs, the development of mass-production 
technologies and the resort by management to "speeding 
up"; and third, the miners' needs for job and wage 
security, the encroachment of African competitors in 
semi-skilled and skilled spheres of mining and the 
introduction and the extension of the colour bar. 
Chapter nine deals with underground health 
conditions. Chapter ten explores the awareness of the 
new form of the disease, accelerated silicosis, and 
the establishment in 1902 of the first Transvaal 
commission on silic'" is. Chapter eleven discusses the 
failure to implement remedies. Finally, chapter 
twelve explores the prevalence of and mortality from 
silicosis and tJae impact of the disease on the 
workforce of the mines. In chapters ten, eleven and 
twelve a synthesis is offered of the themes and 
findings of the previous chapters. The project is 
based almost entirely on contemporary primary and 
published sources. Apart from silicosis, a unifying 
theme throughout the discrete sections is the 
perceptions of miners of their vocation in general, 
and of this occupational disease in particular.
The study requires periodisatiott. As silicosis 
is a slow-developing disease the starting point of the 
investigation is 1886, when gold was discovered on the 
Rand. The study ends in 1910 because the establishment 
oi Union in 1910 and the legal award of compensation 
in 1911 heralded a new era in the history of silicosis 
on the South African gold mines.
The following are the conclusions. First, almost an 
entire generation of overseas miners, most of whom 
remained migrants and whose skills pioneered the South 
African gold mining industry, died from silicosis. 
Second, for reasons of self-interest, some of which 
they shared with one another, both the Transvaal state 
and the Randlords did virtually nothing to remedy the 
occurrence of the disease. Both parties were culpable 
for the neglect of the health of the industry/''s 
v/orkforce: using only perfunctory dust safeguards,
management intensified production through the 
deployment of both modern technology and labour 
intensive practices, peculiar to the Witwatersrand; 
and most of the. state's interventionist initiatives 
were the result of pressure from the British House of 
Commons. Third, the fear and anger of miners at being 
the victims of a preventable occupational disease, 
provided the catalyst for their militancy during the 
period. Fourth, the industry's power was partly 
responsible for causing both the press and medical 
profession to be sil mt about the problem until 1910. 
Finally, the mineowners both seized and promoted the 
unsubstantiated medical orthodoxy, namely that the 
short contracts of African iiiineworkers protected them 
from accelerated silicosis, as an important rationale 
for perpetuating the migrant labour system.
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CHAPTER i
INTRODUCTION
"Such a. death rate C-from miners' phthisis] 
is a disgrace to the richest mining field in 
the world"-- an anonymous miner, 1910.^
"The primary fact is forgotten that we are 
face to face with the great danger of 
metalliferous mining - a disease Cminers' 
phthisis] which is far more fatal than 
accidents, which is the one complaint which 
besets an otherwise health occupation which 
is readily avoided by..^simple 
precautions."-- Mining Journal , 1912.'^
In his yeaf— end report, in December 1901, the 
Transvaal Sovernment Mining Engineer stated that 
during the period between the beginning of the 
Anglo-Boer War, in October 1899, and the resumption of 
mining on the Reef, in May 1901, 227 pre-war 
Witwatersrand rock drillers, or 16,5 per cent of the 
rock drillers, had died from the occupational disease, 
silicosis.’-' Fifteen months later the Weldon 
Commission, which investigated the causes and the 
occurrence of the silicosis, reported that the disease 
was prevalent amongst 2’2,6 per cent of the white 
underground workforce on the Witwatersrand mines: of
the 4 403 white underground mineworkers 15,4 per cent 
were definite silicotics, while 7,2 percent had
symptoms which probabl/ indicated the disease.'^
In 1912 the Van Niekerk Commission, also known as 
the Medical Commission, concluded that neither the 
death rate -from silicosis nor the prevalence o-f the 
disease amongst white underground mineworkers on the
nrWi twatersrand gold -fields had diminished." As
important, in 1912 the average age of death of rock
drillers was thirty-three years and the commonest age
was twenty-nine.“ Miners on the Witwatersrand who
specialised in rock drilling had an average working
1life of only seven to nine years.'
In other metal mining centres the position was 
different. In Bendigo, for instance, the average age 
of death for miners was fifty years.^ In Cornwall the 
rapidly progressive form of silicosis amongst rock 
drillers had been reduced. By following the
recommendations of the Haldane Commission, which 
reported at almost the same time as the Weldon 
Commission in the Transvaal, the Cornish mining 
industry improved miners' health. It was asserted 
that by 1910 the working lives of Cornish tin miners, 
particularly rock drillers, had been extended by ten 
years.'
At the turn of the 20th century silicosis was not 
a new disease amongst metal miners, as it had a 
history which spanned centuries. In its more usual
chronic form it caused premature death or severely 
crippled miners at, an average age o-f -fi-fty and after 
they had worked for appro;:imately thirty years. 
Employers and governments had taken it for granted as 
one of the occupational hazards of mining. The 
miners, too, were inured to the disease and 
anticipated short working lives. But the disease 
manifested itself in a new way amongst rock drillers 
on the Witwatersrand and in Cornwall. Its form was so 
rapidly progressive that it caused miners to die when
they were young men 11
Constant and continuous exposure to excessive 
ai ounts of respirable silica dust caused "dense 
fibrous nodules" to replace the spongy lung tissue. 
When removed from the body and placed in water, such a 
silica-damaged lung sank "Hke a stone", its weight 
being three time as great as that of an average 
lung« Also, such a fibrotic lung was "very difficult 
to cut with a knife, and practically impossible to cut
with a razor' 13
Because of the size of the Witwatersrand gold 
fields and the large number of underground workers, it 
is to be expected that, if inadequate preventive 
measures against the inhalation of dust were taken, a 
huge crude prevalence of silicosis would occur. Even 
so. and despite the disclaimers of certain doctors to 
the contrary, in relative terms the prevalence of 
silicosis was higher on the Witwatersrand than at 
other metalliferous mining centres. Also, both its
incidence and -fatally incapacitating development were
•far more rapid on the Rand gold mines than
elsewhere. In 1916 J. Pratt Johnson. a doctor who
was more candid and outspoken than most o-f his
colleagues, summed up the extreme dimensions o-f the
disease on the gold mines: "The mortality from miners'
phthisis Con the Rand3 is unequalled in any part of 
1 *7the world. "
Johnson's chil.ing message suggests two of the 
purposes of this study. One is to explore the reasons 
that the Witwa-tersrand miners were more vulnerable to 
silicosis, particularly accelerated silicosis, than 
their counterparts at any other hard rock mining 
centre in the world. Another is to uncover the extent 
of the mortality from the occupational disease amongst 
both rock drillers and general miners.
By 1910 the standard South African nick-name for 
silicosis was the "white d ea t h " . T h e  name was ironic 
because health officers regarded silicosis as a 
•serious health problem for white mineworkers only. 
Although they did not regard Africans as being immune 
to the disease, its incidence, prevalence and 
mortality amongst Africans were viewed as being so 
slight as not to warrant concern. Medical opinion 
held that the relatively short and intermittent 
contracts of most African mineworkers, which usually 
did not last for more than "seventeen to eighteen" 
months, did not give the black workers the "same 
opportunities Cas Europeans! of contracting Miners'
Phthisis".-^ *'* Also, health o-fficers claimed that, a-fter 
the African had returned to their rural homesteads, 
they were able "to shake off that tendency"' tc
7^ 1silicosis and "get back to normal conditions"."" 
Therefore another aim of this study is to to explore 
the validity of this medical belief.
There are very few academic studies of the 
nistory of silicosis on the Witwatersrand. Apart from 
the articles and papers which I wrote twelve years 
ago, only four historians have tackled the problem. 
Most of these studies are brief surveys and lack 
detailed analysi"-' of the many . complex issues."""^  
Another defect of these studies is the organisation of 
information. The subject is complex requiring the 
exploration of many themes which provide solutions to 
a large number of apparently unrelated issues. When 
an attempt is made to discuss these themes in 
parallel, the strands of the argument remain separate 
and are not unified .i n a sythesis of inextricably 
related issues and events. For this reason I have 
chosen a thematic approach. Chapters two to nine deal 
in depth with significant themes so that in the final 
chapters, without the need for digression, the 
connections between the themes can be woven together.
Apart from silicosis, a unifying theme throughout 
the discrete sections is the perceptions of miners of 
their vocation in general, and of this occupational 
disease in particular. We must use historical data to 
interpret the experiences of workers. 3y exploring
the perceptions o-f miners we gain an understanding at 
their needs and -feelings: their -fear o-f the disease; 
their need to distance themselves -from the realities 
of disablement and death; and their desires for job 
security and for danger pay.
The scope of this study does not permit an 
intensive exploration of the debate as to whether the 
Transvaal state dominated the mining houses or whether 
the reverse was true.'^ '"' All the same, another unifying 
theme in this project is the connection between the 
state and the gold mining industry. We examine this 
relationship under three consecutive, but distinct, 
governments: first, the South African Republic under 
President Paul Kruger in tne era 1S86 to 1B99; second, 
the British administrati on's crown colony government 
from 1902 to 1907; and third, responsible government, 
with Louis Botha and Jan Smuts at the helm, under Het 
Volk's rule during the period 1907 to 1910. Such 
analysis will enable us to understand the responses of 
the state and the mining houses to the prevalence of 
and the mortality from silicosis.
In 1983 David Yudelman argued that during the 
period 1902 to 1936 there was a "growing symbiosis" 
between the state and the industry. Also, both before 
and after Yudelman published his work, Pieter C. 8rey, 
Peter Richardson and Alan Jeeves provided supportive 
evidence for this author's hypothesis. We will 
therefore test whether this state-capital alliance, 
the theory posited by all these historians, helped
shapr- the reactions of the various Transvaal 
governments and the mining houses to the problem of 
the occupational disease, silicosis, which manifested 
itself on a huge scale on the Witwatersrand gold 
mines.
In addition to a thematic approach there is a 
need for periodisation. As silicosis is a 
slow-developing disease, its manifestation in an 
accelerated form on the Witwatersrand in 1901 was not 
the result of mining techniques then in use. Rather, 
at that time the huge crude prevalence of silicosis on 
the Reef reflected the existence, of excessive dust 
levels on the Witwatersrand gold mines, which had 
prevailed for a numbef- of years before the turn of the 
20th century. This explains why the starting point 
for this study is 1BB6, when gold was discovered on 
the Rand. Until 1910 this occupational health hazard 
was an issue confined to the Transvaal. With Union in 
1910 the Botha-SmutS ministry manipulated the issue of 
silicosis so that the financial burden of compensation 
would be borne not by the Transvaal alone, but by the 
new state, the Union of South Africa. In 1911 
legislation for the award of compensation heralded a 
new era in the history of silicosis on the 
Wi twatersrand gold mines.
Through the detailed exploration of an 
occupational disease, silicosis, new insights are 
gained into the medical and health, demographic, 
socio-economic, and political impact of the mining
industry on ths -fabric o-f Transvaal and ultimately 
South African society. Unlike several of the studies 
of silicosis on the Witwatersrand mentioned in the 
review which follows, my study does not set out to 
describe, but rather to interpret the available data 
and to solve the many problems that they pose.
This study investigates a number of unresolved 
issues which require solutions that differ from those 
offered in the historical accounts published in the 
reports of various health officers and of successive 
commissions of enquiry up to 1937. It is these 
historical narrations that most pf the popular and 
academic studies have slavishly followed. Some of the 
fresh issues on which my study focuses include the 
nature of management's mining methods on the 
Witwatersrand during the eras both before and after 
the Anglo-Boer War. The study questions the orthodox 
view that technology, particularly machine drills, was 
solely responsible 'for promoting the incidence of 
accelerated silicosis amongst miners. I therefore 
examine labour intensive practices, peculiar to the 
Witwatersrand gold mines, to determine the extent to 
which they were liable for creating conditions under 
which general miners, as distinct from rock drillers, 
could also contract a rapidly progressive form of the 
disease.
I tackle the question of why more than one-third 
of the overseas miners died from the disease abroad 
and not on the Witwatersrand. In so doing I explore
a -
the reasons that most professional miners chose to 
remain migrants rather than become permanent Transvaal 
residents. Further, the study analyses the processes 
by which the skills of the Witwatersrand miners were 
fragmented and it shows how the miners' fears of job 
displacement by semi-skilled African mineworkers 
promoted their demands for the extension of the colour 
bar and the legal prescription of a fixe.:- ratio of 
white to black mineworkers. Even so, this study will 
show that an additional reason that strongly 
reinforced the growth of miner militancy, which 
characterised the period 1902 to 1910, was the 
vulnerabi13ty of miners to a preventable occupational 
disease, silicosis.
I also explore the reasons for the silence until 
1910 in the Transvaal of the public, the press and the 
medical profession concerning the ravages of the 
disease amongst the professional miners. Next, I 
question the conventional wisdom that Alfred Milner,, 
the Sovernor of the Transvaal, by appointing in 1902 a 
commission of enquiry into the disease, acted with 
promptitude to remedy the problem of silicosis. 
Finally, I re-examine the claim of orthodox historical 
summaries thait during the period 1902 to 1910 the 
state and the mineowners were not able to reduce the 
prevalence of and mortality from the disease for 
reasons beyond their control, including the miners'
so-called wilful neglect for their health 28
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These are the details of the scope ot the study. 
Chapters two to nine deal in depth with significant 
themes. First, I examine the disease itself, the 
mining and medical precautions against the disease and 
the age-old disregard by governments, health officers 
and employers for silicosis in its chronic form. Then 
follows an analysis of the industrialists' need to 
reduce working costs, the development of 
mass-production technologies and the resort by 
management to "speeding up". Although modern 
technology helped the mineowners to increase the 
industry's productivity, it will be argued that their 
labour-intensive practices were also important in 
increasing dust densities underground.
The next set of themes, those of job security, 
which was emeshed with African competition and the 
institution and extension of the colour bar, and of 
wages, throw light on the emergence of the concept of 
danger pay. The miners' needs for job and wage 
security together with the threat of silicosis help 
explain their militancy, particularly in the mine-wide 
strike of 1907.
Chapter nine deals specifically with underground 
health conditions. Chapter ten describes the 
realisation of the existence of the nevM form of the 
disease, accelerated silicosis, and the establishment 
of the Weldon Commission, the first commission on 
silicosis in the Transvaal. Chapter eleven discusses
-  10
the -failure of the state and of the industry to 
implement change. Finally, chapter twelve evjplores 
the prevalence of and mortality from silicosis amongst 
both white and black mineworkers and it analyses the 
responses of each of these sections of the workforce 
to the ravages of the occupational disease. In* 
chapters ten, eleven and twelve a synthesis is offered 
of the themes and findings of the previous chapters.
As Sebastian Valentyn van Niekerk, tne Medical 
Inspector of Mines, explained in 1914, all undesrground 
workers on the Witwatersrand gold mines were 
vulnerable to silicosis:
r
Miners' Phthisis is a disease which affects 
all classes of underground workers from the 
very humblest to those in the highest 
positions, not even the managers themselves 
being safe.^*^
But miners, particularly rock drillers, were more 
prone to the disease than the other underground 
workers. It is therefore clear that this study 
requires a clear and unambiguous use of the terms 
"mineworkers“, "miners" and "artisans", as their 
indiscriminate and interchangeable use has led to 
mistaken or distorted historical findings.
"Mineworkers" is the generic term for 
wage-earners on a mine. In the past it was customary 
for specialists in South African history to apply the 
term solely to white wage-earners on the mines. 
Currently it is also used to denote the African 
workforce, but together with suitable adjectives which
11
serve to distinguish this racially distinctive body 
•from its white counterpart. The adjectives., "black" 
and "white", describe only the race of the job 
holders; their occupational class fication, even if it 
is only a linguistic one, is identical for both racial 
groups. Contemporary colloquialisms for African 
mineworkers included ‘^irs", "niggers" and "boys"
The phrase "native labour" was, until fairly recently, 
a standard expression used to denote the black 
workforce on the mines.
During the 19th century and the first half of the 
20th century African mineworkers were officially 
called "natives", “labourers", and "boys"; and the 
Chamber of Mines used these official tags too.'-^  ^ The 
state and management also referred to black 
mineworkers as ”Coloureds". But this was an 
ambiguous term. Sometimes it denoted only Africans. 
On other occasions, however, it was .^ ised as a generic 
term for all mineworkers who were not classified as 
whites and therefore embraced the Indians and coloured 
workers - and later the Chinese. Instead of 
"Coloureds", this study uses the term "non-whites" as 
a collective noun for Africaris, Indians - Chinese and 
coloured persons. "Non-whites" is used purely as a 
descriptive term.
The coloured workers, generally referred to on 
the gold mines as "Cape boys",’^'“' were a racial group 
comprising persons of mixed descent. The Indian and 
coloured mineworkers, both singly and combined,
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constituted only a tiny proportion of the total gold 
mining workforce. In contrast to Africans, the vast 
majority of whom were migrant workers, Indians and 
coloured persons were often, though not always, freely 
employed without indentures. Also, they were usually, 
like whites, considered permanent members of the 
workforce,^^ Their role and relative importance on the 
gold mines has not yet been researched. For these 
reasons, unless otherwise noted, the calculations in 
this study, which are based on contemporary 
statistics, refer only to African mineworkers.
Both officially and colloquially, contemporaries 
referred to the white wage-earners on the gold mines 
simply as "mineworkers", "workers", "workmen" and
'men. 36 These nouns had unambiguous European
connotations, just as blackness was implicit in the 
terms "natives", "labourers", and "boys". As is the 
custom in similar historical works, this study follows 
contemporary convention with respect to white 
mineworkers. The terms "workmen" and "mineworkers", 
when used on their own and without racial 
qualification, denote wage-earners on the mines of 
European descent. In this way white wage-earners are 
also distinguished from the salaried "class" of white 
mine employees. The latter comprised the clerical, 
professional and technical staffs and included 
draughtsmen, doctors, engineers, assayers, 
electricians, surveyors, samplers, managers, foremen, 
mill and cyanide overseers, mine captains and shift
-  i;
bosses. In this study the term "mineworkers" 
embraces a wide spectrum o-f wage-earners on the mines: 
the skilled professional miners tAnd the nominally 
semi-skilled gangers together with the skilled artisans 
and the semi-skilled machine operatives:
"Mineworkers" is a convenient word for conveying 
general quantitative data, such as average numbers, 
vjages, percentages and ratios. It is also a collective 
noun which can be helpful in differentiating workers on 
the mines from bodies of workers in other industries, 
for instance railway workers. In other respects, 
however, its use is limited. As the term "mineworkers" 
encompasses different categories of workers each with 
distinctive interests and goals, it cannot be used to 
convey subtle connotations or qualitative criteria.
The word "mineworkers" should not be used 
interchangeably with "miners", as is common 
practice.Professional miners constituted a discrete 
category of workers comprising approximately one-third 
of the total white workforce of the gold mines. Miners 
consisted of two groups. The first and much larger 
group comprised developers and stopers who were usually 
supervisors of Africans. The second smaller group 
consisted of timbermen, plate layers, pipe fitters and 
pump minders, who comprised approximately 10 per cent 
of the white underground workf o r c e . A l t h o u g h  most 
specialist pitmen, a,s the smaller group of miners was 
collectively called, possessed blasting certificates
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and had the necessa'"y skills to do developing and 
stoping, management tended not to regard them as 
"miners". Instead, it usually, but not always, 
reserved the term "miners" -for supers'! sors, who 
comprised appro;;imately 50 per cent of the underground
workmen 41 Therefore when the term "miners" was
sometimes e;:tended to include the specialist pitmen, 
they constituted appro;:imately 60 per cent of the 
underground workmen. Because the terms of service of 
most miners differed markedly from the rest of the 
white workforce, miners had few common interests with 
other underground workmen and even less with 
surf acemen.
Social scientists who confuse miners with other 
workmen, particularly underground operatives and 
artisans, or who use the term miners as a synonym for 
mineworkers or workmen, are nol, entirely to blame for 
this vagueness: contemporary commentators did not 
always avoid this pitfall either. Often they casually 
referred to workmen of ail descriptions on the mines 
by using miners as a generic term. It is therefore 
not surprising that a recent biography of an engine 
driver on the mines, is confusingly and incorrectly
entitled Letters of a South African Hiner 44
Apart from the necessity for appraising the 
qualitative differences between miners and other 
semi"Skilied and skilled artisans employed on the 
mines, there is another important reason, as we have 
noted, for observing a strict definition of miners as
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a distinctive group. Other workmen - even those who 
worked on a semi-permanent or permanent basis 
underground - were not as vulnerable to silicosis as 
were miners; and when the disease occurred in such 
workers, it usually developed slowly rather than in an 
accelerated way. It we are therefore to understand 
why the disease, particularly in its rapidly 
progressive form, was so prevalent amongst miners, 
they have to be carefully distinguished from the 
remainder of the underground workforce.
As we have noted, X have created my own approach 
to exploring the many themes asociated with the 
history of silicosis on the Witwatersrand. Neither 
general histories of occupational diseases nor 
specific studies on silicosis have provided me with a 
suitable model for my study. Even so, a number of 
these studies raise important issues, which have 
helped me in directing my focus and in solving 
problems.
As regards occupational medicine in the Western 
world, two general histories, those of Donald Hunter 
and George Rosen, provide valuable background
information, as does the history of the
pneumonconioses, edited by the Air Hygiene Foundation 
of America. But all these studies have the same 
limitations! their focus is almost entirely medical; 
their historical sweep is too broad to be definitive; 
and the methodology is purely descriptive.
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The 1985 essays, edited by Paul Weindling, which 
deal with the history o-f selected topics in
occupational health care, are multi-disciplinary and 
provide valuable insights. But as most of the essays 
explore only one or two aspects of occupational 
health, they are unsuitable models for this study.
All the essays of Vicente Navarro are written 
from a materialist standpoint. So, too, are the 
contributions of other social scientists which Navarro 
has edited, either alone or together with Daniel 
Berman. Such studies challenge the practice of 
medicine in the Western world today and explore the 
relationship between the medical profession and
society. Although none of the monographs deals with 
silicosis specifically, the questions which they raise 
are pertinent to this study.
Silicosis on tlie Witwatersrand gold mines was a 
serious problem for both the industry and the South 
A+rican state for the first half of the 20th century. 
Par instance, during the period 1902 to 1925 alone 
silicosis was the subject of nine legislative acts,^ '- 
six commissions of enquiry and ten pariiamentary 
select committees.Also, during the period 1912 to 
1919 the Miners' Phthisis Prevention Committee, which 
was jointly funded by the South African government and 
the Chamber of M i n e s , p r e s e n t e d  four major 
reports.'^® It is therefore surprising that only a 
handful of academic historians have found the 
implications of the disease to be sufficiently
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important to warrant specific study.
The paucity of research on a significant 
historical subject is not the sole problem. Another 
cause for concern is the inadequacy of the few studies 
which focus on the problem of silicosis. Their 
brevity is not the reason for my dissatisfaction with 
them. Rather, 1 find them to have methodological 
weaknesses. Also, all the studies ar>s flawed by the 
writers' superficial understanding of the complexities 
of dust-induced diseases in general, and of silicosis 
in particular. We first survey the single-theme 
studies of Pieter 8rey and Brian Kennedy and then 
examine the multiple-theme journal articles by G'illian 
Burke and Peter Richardson and by H. J. van Aswegen.
In 1969 Grey wrote a doctoral thesis on the 
development of the mining industry from 1902 to 1910. 
He relegates his treatment of silicosis to part of a 
chronological chapter devoted to health conditions on 
the mines. In this small section on silicosis Grey 
focuses on the responses of the state and the mining 
industry to the problem.Consequently his discussion 
of the disease does not explore its complex 
socio-economic and political ramifications. Also, 
although his research is thorough, it is based mainly 
on official sources, which obviously have an inherent 
bias. In brief, Grey uncritically assembles a quarry 
of unevaluated empirical data.
IS -
Kennedy's essay, published in 1984 in A Tale of 
Two Hiriirig Cities, is entitled “The Conquest o-f 
Phthisis", His theme is therefore self-explanatory. 
His discussion provides several useful insights, 
particularly those concerning the prevention of the 
disease in Broken Hill, the Australian mining centre 
to which he compares the Witwatersrand. Because of 
Kennedy's unfounded assumption that the disease was 
“conquered" during the period which he explores, he 
exaggerates the efforts made by the Transvaal 
governments, the medical profession and the gold 
mining industry to control the disease in South 
Africa. Kennedy also concludes that the mortality from 
silicosis amongst Africans increased during the period 
1902 to 1910. As we will later show, however, the 
source for his epidemiological data, the records of 
the Medical Officer of Health for Johannesburg, is 
unreliable.
The 1978 article by Burke and Richardson on the 
"migration" of the disease between Cornwall and the 
Wi twatersrand between the lEi90s and 1918 is analytical 
and explores a number of significant themes. It 
nevertheless lacks depth of research. Many of its 
premises, including those which concern the pathology 
of the disease, mining techniques and preventive 
measures, are unfounded,, Consequently incorrect 
conclusions abound.
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Van Aswegen's recent article, published in 1939, 
has dit-ferent defects. First, because it is based on 
too few sources, which are of limited value, his 
treatment of significant themes is superficial. Foi^  
instance, van Aswegen unquestioningly accepts the 
historical summaries, given in government publications 
and those written by health officers, concerr<..i.n the 
introduction of dust preventives. Consequently i.e 
both ewaggerates the initial concern shown by the 
state and the industry towards the occurrence of the 
disease and overestimates the benefits and quality of 
the remedial measures taken. 'Second, in a single 
paper he produces several chronological surveys of 
different aspects of the problem, without providing 
any implicit or explicit connections between them. We 
are therefore left in doubt as to the purpose of his 
exer~ise.
A number of.studies specifically concerned with
African mi newor kers, amongst whom mortality rates
were excessively high, investigate the medical care of 
nrothese workers.'-'^  But most general academic studies of 
the mining industry seldom tackle health issues. It 
is astonishing that three fairly recent major works, 
those of Frederick Johnstone,'-’-' in 1976, of Robert 
Davies,-"^ in 1979, and of David Yud el man, in 1983, 
pay no attention whatsoever to the problem of 
silicosis. Yet these histories intensively explore 
the links between white labour and the gold mining 
industry from its pioneering days until modern times.
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Most o-f the recent popular histories of the 
mining industry do not mention the spectre of 
silicosis, which for so many years provoked distress 
amongst miners."-'® This is not surprising as most of 
these histories are simply public relations 
exercises.John Lang's recent institutional history 
of the Chamber of Mines vdoes not, however, shirk the 
issue. Even so, his treatment of the disease is 
scanty: he does not give it the prominence which it 
warrants and to which the Chamber's archival records 
after 1911 attest.-'®
Silicosis is ai theme in most academic studies
which have investigated the origins and growth of
labour organisations. Even so, most historians,
including myself, have underestimated the importance
of the disease. For instance, Francois Srobler, David
Ticktin and Karen Thorpe fail to connect the growing
militancy of miners with their dread of the disease.
Also, the realisation in 1912 that all underground
workers shared a common danger underpinned the growing
alliance between the different sections of white
labour. Silicosis was as important, if not more so,
than abstriict socialist concepts, in helping to
promote the* unification of organised labour on the
mines. The alliance found concrete expression in the
general strike of 1913. Of course the general strike
was prompted by a wide variety of worker grievances.
/
Even so, as Lord Gladstone, the Governor General of 
Soutli Africa, perceptively understood, the catalyst in
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the general strike was the "growing realization...in 
the last two years" by all underground workers that 
they shared the "frightful risks from the ravages of
Miners' Phthisis to which their work exposes them„ 60
Histories of organised labour, including those by 
Ernest Gitsham and James Trembath in 1926 and by Ivan 
Walker and Ben Weinbren in 1961, as well as the 
biography of Bill Andrews written by R. K. Cope, have 
a credibility v»jhich is out of proportion to their 
contribution. Their ethos derives from a belief that 
active trade unionists know more about the inner 
workings of organised labour .than do "outsiders". 
While this may be true of current events, the 
assumption has less validity with respect to 
historical events, when such writers have to draw on 
memories. Oral history can, of course, provide 
valuable insights, particularly when there is no 
documented record of events. Oral history can also 
often reflect perceptions in a more significant way 
than do many written accounts. But reminiscences have 
obvious limitations which relate to clarity of 
memory. Although Trembath, Walker and Andrews 
participated actively in organised labour during the 
first decade of the 2 0 th century, they recounted the 
events during this period many years later.
With respect to the topic of miners in general, 
and to silicosis in particular, the limitations of 
these retrospective accounts by trade unionists are 
even more marked. The writers were all artisans and
— *7^0
not miners: both Sitsham and Walker wero typographers, 
who did not therefore work on the mines and had no 
personal acquaintance with mining conditions. 
Trembath accumulated an enormous collection of press 
cuttings on labour activities throughout South Africa, 
which cover the period with which this stud' deals. 
But Trembath was based in Kimberley and did not have 
first-hand knowledge of conditions on the 
Witwatersrand at this time.
Andrews's account - through his biographer Cope - 
of events on the mines has more authenticity. From 
1907 to 1912, as organiser of the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers, Andrews had the opportunity to meet and 
talk with many miners, as distinct from the 
mineworkers whom he recruited as members of his own 
organisation.'^^ Also, before his election as organiser 
of his union, Andrews spent many years as a fitter in 
the mines' workshops. Even so, when Cope compiled the 
biography, Andrews was already an old man. Some of 
his recollections, including those concerning the 
Crown Reef strike in 1902, are anachronistic. 
Similarly, his reminiscences of the threat of 
silicosis are hasy.^ '"'
More important, the v*jriters of these books lacked 
access to the records of the Transvaal Miners' 
Association and could not verify their accounts. Nor 
could any pioneer miners reminisce: miners' oral 
accounts of their own experiences would have assisted 
the trade union writers to compile their studies. By
19265 when C-itsh&m and Trembath published the -first 
trade union history, all the pioneer miners, who had 
stuck to their calling, were dead: most had perished 
•from an occupational disease, silicosis.
The present-day South A-frican Mine Workers' 
Union, the successor to the Transvaal Miners' 
Association, founded in 1902, claims that it does not 
possess any records of the pioneer union. As access 
to this valuable source is clearly impossible, we have 
to look in many other repositories for information 
concerning the early-day overseas miners.
A valuable source for the experiences and 
perceptic* s of miners of their profession in genera', , 
and of silicosis in particular, is the evidence of 
miners given before many government commissions and 
pariiamentary select committees during the period 1897 
to 1916. The evidence of numerous miners to the Mining 
Industry Commission during 1907 to 1908 is especially 
valuable, as it provides important insights into 
miners' terms of service and underground working 
conditions both before and after the Anglo-Boer War. 
Similarly, the testimony in 1907 of Thomas Mathews and 
Mathew Trewick, officials of the Transvaal Miners' 
Association, to the Mining Regulations Commission 
reflect accurately the shocking conditions and the 
excessive dust levels which existed on the 
Witwatersrand gold mines.
Bath Mathews and Trewick were industrious and 
responsible miners. More important, they were 
"er.ceptional ly well-informed",*^^ After leaving his 
birtii—place, Cornwall, during the ISSOs and the 1890s 
Mathews worked in a variety of metal mines in the 
western states of America. In Montana he was appointed 
Commissioner of Mines and Mining and was elected from 
1892 to 1894 as Speaker of the House of
Representatives.. On returning to Cornwall Mathews 
studied at the Camborne School of Mines and came to 
the Witwatersrand in 1897 as a graduate. Similarly, 
before emigrating to the Transvaal, Trewick had had 
seventeen years of experience in coal mining in
Northumder1 and, where he had been appointed as a local 
colliery inspector. Both these officials of the 
Transvaal Miners' Association had the experience and 
expertise to compare objectively conditions on the 
Witwatersrand with those in many other mining 
centres.
Unlike most other chairmen of commissions,*^® 
Andries Stockenstrom, who chaired the Mining Industry 
Commission, allowed the evidence of an unlimited 
number of witnesses. The eagerness with which many 
miners, who were not union officials, volunteered to 
testify, showed their desire for improved mining 
conditions: most miners confessed that they were 
frightened of contracting silicosis. They were 
prepared to risk victimisation by management, to 
give up valuable working time, to forgo a day's pay
and to face the "ordeal" ot "cross-examination in much
the same way as a guilty prisoner I 70 For purposes of
this study, the approximate 1 600 pages, which 
comprise the minutes o-f evidence of the lljning 
Industry Commission, are worthy of painstaking 
scrutiny.
Like Mathews and Trewick, most professional 
miners came from Great Britain.^^ Approximately 50 per 
cent of the miners had originally learned their 
vocation in Cornwiall and had a thorough training in
hard rock mining. Many miners had additional
expertise, which they had acquired abroad. 
Consequently most miners hac a sound yardstick, based 
on experience, against which to measure both health 
and work conditions on the f>'and. This was the basis of 
their testimony before all v;he commissions and select 
committees, which we have noted. We must acknowledge 
the validity of miners' perceptions in the same way as 
did M. H. Coombe, • the manager of the State Min , in 
1906:
It is the common belief amongst miners, and 
I am with them there, that this is the most 
unhiealthy camp, from a miner's point of 
view, that can be found, not even excepting 
the Australian Broken Hill silver mines.
As we have seen, Cornwall provided approximately 
51> per cent of miners on the Wi twatersrand. From no 
other county in Britain did miners emigrate to the; 
Transvaal on such a large scale. Cornwall has another 
dimension of importance, particularly for social 
scientists specialisirg in the history of the
Witwatersrand gold mines. No British community was as 
intimately involved with the activities o-f its mining 
kin abroad as the dii strict of Redruth. Local 
newspapers, published in west Cornwall, maintained and 
reinforced the links between the west county and 
far-flung mining communities. The press carried 
■'■egular columns and articles, which covered both 
trivial and significant events, concerning the 
personal and communal involvements of Cornishmen 
abroad. Of course the newspapers devoted a great deal 
of attention to the state of trade abroad and the 
availability of Jobs. Even so, many items concerned 
the intimate details of Cornishmen abroad: the birth 
of children, marriages, funerals and felonies. News 
coverage also ocused on happenings at overseas 
mines. Such commentaries ranged from accidents, 
promotions and presentations to social and 
recreational activities, including sporting events
such as soccer and wrestling. 75
This type of journalism was unique to Cornwall 
and occurred in no other mining centre in Great 
Britain.Consequently Cornwall possesses a valuable 
repository of source material which Illuminates the 
historian's perceptions of the aspirations and daily 
activities of migrant miners abroad: of Cornish miners 
in particular, and of British miners in general.
But Cornish newspapers constitute only one of 
many important documentary sources concerning the 
history of the Witwatersrand miners. Of equal
i mportance -for the purposes of this study are
contemporary Cornish medical records and reports,
which are also unique. The number o-f returned
Witwatersrand miners who died in the "rapidly -filling
graveyards" of Cornwall is well documented. This was
not so in the other mining centres in Britain, as the
Home Office, in 1912, confirmed:
The Secretary of State understands that 
members of the Royal Commission which is now 
making an enquiry with regard to
metal 1 iferous mines and quarries in this 
country have heard of deaths from Miners' 
Phthisis in districts in the North of
England among men who have returned from the 
Transvaal, but that it would be also
impossible to obtain statistics, as the 
cases are scattered among a large
population.^®
Eitatistical information was also defective for the
iron and colliery districts of South Wales 79
During the period 1896 to 1907 appro:;imately 95 
per cent of professional miners on the Witwatersrand 
were of overseas extraction; and most of them had been 
born in B r i t a i n . M a n y  miners who contracted 
s:.licosis in its rapidly progressive form on the 
W;.twatersrand returned home to die. On the basis of 
statistics compiled in 1906 by Louis Godfrey Irvine 
and Donald Macaulay, two Transvaal mine medical 
officers who showed a marked interest in the 
occupavti onal disease, the Mining Regulations 
Commission estimated that "at least one-third (and 
probably more) of the disabled miners", did not die on 
the Reef. It is for this reason that the Cornish death 
rate figures for silicosis are invaluable.
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From 1907 medical officers of health in both the 
rural and urban districts of Redruth, the major 
Cornish tin mining centre, kept separate records of 
the mortality from silicosis amongst rock drillers who 
had worked only on the Witwatersrand.®^ Miners from 
Redruth comprised approximately one-third of the 
overseas contingent of miners on the Witwatersrand. 
Therefore in order to obtain more comprehensive data 
on the death rate from silicosis, which so severely 
affected migrant miners who worked on the
Witwatersrand, the Redruth mortality statistics can be 
applied, even if cautiously and tentatively, to other 
United Kingdom and overseas mining districts.
For the period 1902 to 1910 there are no official
data for the mortality from silicosis of miners on the
Witwatersrand, In fact, there are "no accurate
occupational death-rates" at all. ■ Charles Lane
Sansom, the Witwatersrand Medical Officer of Health
from 1902 to 1907,. compiled figures for the mortality
amongst mineworkers from lung diseases, which Irvine
and Macaulay used for their 1906 and 1907
investigations. Even so, the research doctors found
the statistics to be unsatisfactory:
The data obtained from the Registrar [of the 
Witwatersrand Medical Officer of Health I do 
not permit a separation to be made between 
the underground and surface employees on 
mines, or amongst the former to distinguish 
rock drill men from general miners. __This is 
unfortunate and should be remedied.®'^'
Charles Porter, the Johannesburg Medical Officer of 
Health, was a member of the Mining Regulations
Commission to which Irvine and Macaulay presented this 
testimony. Had the mortality data from the 
Johannesburg municipality been o-f any value to the 
commissioners, they would have included them in their
statistical conclusions. 84 For these reasons this
study does not use the Reports o-f the Johannesburg 
Medical Officer of Health. They are of no value for
the period under review. 85
For the period 1902 to 1910 the Transvaal
Archives Depot possesses no epidemiological or
demographic data on silicosis whatsoever. 86 Even
Sansom's statistics are missing. The documents with 
the information were either lost, "mutilated" or
a“7destroyed- The Hi sappearance o-f these data was 
discovered in 1912, when the Minister of Mines, F. S. 
Mai an, sent an urgent telegram to Pretoria requesting
them for presentation to parliament 88 Neither the
Department of Mines nor the Department of Interior 
could "trace any papers on this subject" for the
period 1903 to 1909 89
Likewise, the archives of the Chamber of Mines 
have no statistics for incidence, prevalence and
mortality data from silicosis. 90 In compiling
epidemiological data I therefore rely on accurate 
statistics compiled after 1914. Also, I base my 
estimates on fragments of contemporary evidence: they
includ-^ both the Cornwall figures and the statistics 
compiled by the private consulting mining engineer, E. 
J. Moynihan, which he published sporadically in
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Transvaal newspapers between 1910 and 1913.
There is very little general information on 
silicosis in both the Transvaal Archives Depot and in 
the Transvaal Colonial Office files in the Public 
Record Office; -only a handful of despatches pertain to 
the problem. For the period 1902 to 1903 the 
duplicates in the Public Record Office provide a more 
comprehensive source of information than their 
counterparts in the Transvaal Archives Depot. This is 
because they include the enclosures which the Colonial 
Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, sent to Alfred Milner, 
the Bovernor of the Transvaal. The enclosures 
consisred of letters and published articles written by 
E<ritish doctors and mining personnel. They were 
concerned about the mortality from silicosis amongst 
miners who had returned to Britain during the 
Anglo“Boer War and suggested to Chamberlain that dust 
precaution measures be adopted on the Witwatersrand 
gold mines.
On the arrival of the documents in South Africa, 
the Transvaal administrati on separated the enclosures 
from the covering letters placing them in separate 
files. The files containing the covering letters are 
available in the Transvaal Archives Depot. But the 
enclosures, like all the documents on silicosis for 
the period 1903 to 1909, have been "lost".*^^ The 
missing file, SF 34, contained the Colonial Office 
enclosures as well as most other information pertinent 
to the appointment, in 1902, of the Weldon Commission
■■J
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on silicosis in the Transvaal
Apart from the despatches, there are fragments of 
useful material in the Transvaal Archives Depot. I 
found a few on the computer under "miners' phthisis". 
Most are not accessed so simply, but are scattered 
throughout the hundreds of files which comprise the 
archives of the Secretary of Mines in both the 
Transvaal Archives Depot and the Central Archives 
Depot.
To find material relevant to the health of black 
and white mineworkers in general, and to silicosis in 
particular, the researcher in the Public Record Office 
must scrutinise almost every file in the Transvaal 
Colonial Office section. Similarly, in the Transvaal 
Archives Depot the historian can find isolated but 
significant pieces of evidence only by laboriously 
searching through virtually all the official files>
Milner, Chamberlain and Patrick Duncan, the 
Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal and the colony's 
acting Lieutenant-Governor in 1906, spoke publicly 
about the problem of silicosis. But they did not 
mention it in their private correspondence. 
Likewise, neither the published letters of Jan Smuts, 
who became the first Union Minister of Miner in 1910, 
nor those of J. Percy FitsPatrick, a director of the 
Corner House, mention the disease.
I found only a few relevant documents in the 
archives of H. Eckstein and Company (housed in the
Barlow Rand Archives), so confirming what the 
librarian had initially told me, that "there was 
practically nothing" on silicosis. The same was true 
of the archives of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. 
Apart from the files concerning the establishment and 
building of Springkell -- the sanatorium for miners 
disabled by silicosis - the problem of the 
occupational disease did not warrant correspondence by 
the Chamber.
For the period 1902 to 1910 the dearth of primary 
source information concerning silicosis in these 
important repositories does not in any way diminish 
the importance of the subject. Rather, the absence of 
commentary is significant. In "Silver Blaze" Sherlock 
Holmes wanted to know wh 7 the dog did not bark, when 
it could well have been expected to do so. In a 
similar way the silence of these important people and 
institutions both whetted my curiosity and provided 
clues. Silicosis was not a high-profile disease. Nor 
was it a contagious one which placed the entire 
community at risk. The silence of all these parties 
confirmed that they were totally unconcerned with and 
indifferent to a serious health problem, which 
conce"ned only members of the working class.
The private papers of John X. Merriman, Prime 
Minister of the Cape Colony before Union, are a 
valuable source of information concerning silicosis. 
In 1912 Merriman was a member of the first
Pariiamentary Select Committee on silicosis 94 As
important, his nephew, Richard Barry, manager of the 
Nourse -from 1911 to 1916, was one o-f the -few mine 
managers who initiated e-f-fective dust precaution 
measures on his mine. In 1911, -for inrtance, C. J, N. 
Jourdan, an inspector o-f mines, in a paper presented 
to the South A-frican Institution o-f Engineers, 
recommended the universal adoption on the mines of 
Barry's system for wetting the siliceous dust. “ 
Barry's regular and intimate correspondence with his 
uncle provides an important source for the inner 
workings of the gold mining industry, particularly 
with respect to the problem of silicosis.
The South African medical journals, the South 
African Medical Record, published from 1902, and the 
Trans{-'’aal Medical Journal, started in 1905, provide 
important insights into the practice of medicine in 
-the Transvaal. They contain little information on 
occupational medicine in general, and on silicosis in 
particular. With respect to silicosis the two medical 
journals published in Britain, namely the British 
Medical Journal and the Lancet, are more useful. They 
contain articles written by Sir Thomas Oliver and John 
Scott Haldane, two doctors concerned with the 
prevention of occupational diseases. The prevalence 
of and mortality from silicosis amongst the 
Witwatersrand miners distressed them; they publicised 
the disease and alerted the public to the need for 
precautions.
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Eiei'tween 1902 and 1910 singularly few Transvaal 
doctors wrote articles on silicosis. On the whole the 
pubiished periodical contributions of doctors between 
1902 and 1916 are disappointing. The articles, with 
few exceptions, are compressed summaries of official 
commission reports.
In deploring the gravity of the disease and in 
advocating the need for preventive measures against 
dust, the medical literature, like the government 
reports, briefly and uncritically reviewed the 
circumstances of the past which had created the 
present serious situation. The motto of the writers 
seemed to be based literally on the popular quotation 
of the 19th century British poet and diplomat, Robert 
Bulwer Lyttons
Not to the past, but to the future looks 
true nobility; and he who seeks for true 
repentance for the past must woo the angel 
Virtue in the future.
With iFew exceptions. South African doctors, 
commissioners and investigative pariiamentarians 
refused to acknowledge the past liability of the 
various Transvaal governments and the mining 
industrialists for condoning the existence of dust 
conditions I'Jhich by 1910 had created a problem of 
great magnitude - one equivalent to a "national 
calamity".^' When these parties made value-judgements 
as to who was liable for the disease, they blamed only 
the miners for their lack of responsibi1 ity in
observing preccxutions.They continued to do so even
after 1912, when the Medical Commission showed clearly 
that all underground mineworkers, irrespective of 
whether or not the^r jobs created dust, were prone to 
si 1 i cosi s.
Two original contributions by doctors on 
silicosis amongst African mineworkers are valuable. 
In 1906 the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
s t its medical officer, Seorge Albert Turner junior, 
to Portuguese East Africa, south of Latitude 22° 
South, to investigate and report on the prevalence of 
pulmonary tuberculosis and other lung diseases amongst
the Africans in their "kraals". 100 Turner concluded
that silicosis was a minor health risk for African 
contract workers. This finding, based only on
cursory observations and perfunctory physical
examinations, both confirmed current medical 
assumptions and established a theory which, until the 
present, has held unchallenged sway. Scepticism 
concerning the theory prompted medical research with 
animals during the 1930s. But the results of the
investigations were inconclusive, 102
The? second important contribution in this field 
is the doctoral theesis of the Medical Inspector of 
Mines, Sebastian Valentyn van Niekerk, submitted to 
the University of Aberdeen. Much of the study is base?d 
on the report and findings of the 1912 Medical 
Commission on silicosis, of which he was chairman. 
Its value lies in the occupational, .pidemiological 
and demographic features of his clinical investigation
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o-f twenty—four cases of silicosis amongst African 
mineworkers. Also, the reasons for van Niekerk's 
personal objections to investigating the prevalence of 
silicosis amongst Africans throw light on the 
importance contemporaries attached to Turner's 
theory.
Mention must be made of the paper, "Safety 
Measures in Mining", read in 1906 by D. Macaulay and 
L. G. Irvine to the Chemical, Metal 1urgical and Mining 
Society of South Africa. The second part of their 
paper is an original investigative study of silicosis, 
which emphasises its epidemiolgical severity on the 
Witwatersrand. The two doctors up-dated the 1906 
death-rate figures and in 1907 Irvine presented the 
paper as testimony to the Mining Regulations 
Commission, an important health commission, which its 
title does not indicate. The implications of the 
findings of tne two doctors were serious. The 
commission immediately sent a directive to the 
Minister of Mines, Jacob de Villiers, urging him to 
amend the dust precaution regulations so that they
would be more effective 103
The Journal of the Chemicalf Metallargical and 
Mining Society of South Africa is a major source for 
this study. Founded in 1894 the society, as its name 
suggests, attracted as members assayers, chemists., 
metallurgists and mine managers most of whom were? 
directly or indirectly connected with the mining 
industry. The monthly seminars were topical and
'■-J
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5 igni-ficrnt- During the period two papers -fully and 
directly addressad silicosis. Other topics concerned 
preventive measures, including ventilation.
For purposes o-f this Jy both the papers and
their discussion, which the journal published 
verbatim, are invaluable. Discussion o-f each topic 
often occupied several meetings. Sometimes the 
members gave impromptu comments. But often they 
carefully prepared their arguments in writing as 
formal presentations. Through the cut arid thrust of 
c r" i. ti 1 debate, and in an atmosphere where members 
were encouraged to give expression to personal 
opinions, without the constraints of professional, 
managerial and industrial affiliations, we find a wide 
variety of public socio-economic responses to the 
problems associated with silicosis.
The Journal of the South African Institution of 
Engineers has a format similar to that of the Journal 
of the Chemicalf Metallurgical and Mining Society of 
South Africa. The papers in the engineering journal 
are more technical, as are the debates. Even so, the 
personal opinions of the society's members, comprising 
mine managers and engineers, provide valuable insights 
into m.anagement's attitude to the disease and to its 
preventi on.
The minutes of the Association of Mine Managers 
are also a valuable source of evidence. As a body, 
the mine managers expressed concern for the health and
i
r '
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welfare of miners. In 1901 the organisation was 
responsible fur revealing the mortality from silicosis 
and for instituting preventive measures
voluntarily.^'-’^  Also, the Association initiated the 
establishment of Springkell, a sanatorium for 
silicotic miners.
Committee decisions could not, and did not, bind 
individual mine managers to implement them. The mine 
managers' cr lective resolutions, which committed them 
to eradicate silicosis, more often than not conflicted 
with issues involving individual self-interest and the 
economic constraints of running the mines at a 
profit. An examination of the minutes of the 
Association of Mine Managers in combination with the 
discussions of the Chemical, Metallurgical and Mining 
Society and those of the Institution of Engineers 
reveal clearly the many contradictory attitudes of 
management to the problem of silicosis.
William Cullen, the Seneral Works Manager of the 
British South Africa Explosives Company, was an 
energetic member of the Chemical, Metallurgical and 
Mining Society and was several times elected as its 
president. In addressing a problem associated with 
silicosis, in 1905 Cullen's presidential speech urged
the members to eidhere to the ms of the
organisation. "The truth must out," he said, "Ceven 
if3 the p' olication cf unpalatable facts may or may 
not suit ,.ne policy of the government and the mining
houses. 1106 E/ piecing together the fragments of
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evidence garnered -from so many sources, this study, 
too, hopes to tell the "truth" about silicosis during 
the period 1SB6 to i910.
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development of the gold mining industry from 1902 to 
1910, Grey devoted twenty-five pages - part of a 
chapter on health conditions on the mines - to 
silicosis. Ten years later, in 1978, Burke and 
Richardson, from a materialist standpoint, examined 
the "migration" of the disease between Cornwall and 
the Witwatersrand. Their article is twenty-four pages 
in length and their time span is from the 1890s until 
1918. More recently, in 1989, van Aswegen contributed 
cx descriptive survey paper of twenty-six pages. Based 
largely on official published sources, vaxn Aswegen's 
paper spans the period 1886-1920.
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The controversy, initiated by contemporaries, 
concerning the relationship between Milner and his 
successors and the mineowners, is still endlessly 
debated, Denoon argues that the Randlords in pu>^ suit 
of profits dominated Milner. See, for instance,
Denoon, "The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-6", pp. 
481-494 passim, "'Capitalist Influence' and the 
Transvaal Government during the Crown Colony Period, 
1900-1906", pp. 301-331 passim, "Capital and 
Ccxpitalists in the Transvaal in the 1890s and 1900s", 
pp. 111-132 passim. The radical historians, Wolpe, 
pp. 429-430, and Legassick, pp. 260-261, support 
Denoon' 5 argument, but from a different perspective. 
Against this, other historians contend that the 
Governor of the Transvaal manipulated the mineowne>^s 
for his own political ends. See, for instance, Mawby, 
pp. 387-415 passim, who argues that Milner used the 
mining ir.dustry to achieve his political goals.
This study takes up the debate in several 
chapters where reference is also made to other 
relevant literature, including the revisionist article 
by Marks and Trapido.
In his review article o-f Yudelman's study, 
Davenport, o. 96, indicates clearly that Yudelman's 
theory is not entirely original.
C-f. van Aswegenij p- 55, who claims that 
silicosis is an industrial disease "peculiar to the 
gold mines o-f the Witwatersrand". As we shall show 
later, in chapters 2 and 3, such an assertion is 
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The role of Indians and coloured persons on 
the diamond and gold mines is a potentially fruitful 
area for future historical research.
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38 A tiny group of unskilled white labourers was 
also employed on the gold mines. Most of these 
labourers performed surface tasks. Management 
undertook experiments with white unskilled labourers 
in underground occupations both before and after the 
Anglo-Boer War. With the notable exception of F. H. P.
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three-year stay on the Witwatersrand working for an 
independent contractor doing diamond-drill boring.
See John Cockerill, letters, passim. Likewise, 
Thorpe's analysis of the early strikes on the mines of 
the Witwatersrand, particularly of the 1907 miners' 
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distinguish miners from artisans. For ins'tance, sne 
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mi ner.
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concerns the problem of silicosis. Duncan received it 
in 1936, when he was Minister of Mines, See Duncan 
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CHAPITER 2
MEDICAL ASPECTS OF SILICOSISs AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
"The dust and stones fall upon the lungs, so 
that men have lung disease, breathe with 
difficulty and . at last take 
consumption."---Dr G. E. Loehniss, 1690.^
"But behind this great industrial 
development Cthe gold mining industry] there 
has lain another and sinister reality, that 
of miners' phthisis. It is the shadow that 
has accompanied that spectacular advance - 
the 'black care' which has sat always behind 
the horseman...'Miners' phthisis' and
‘silicosis' are used as equivalent
terms. "---Dr L. G. Irvine and Dr A.
Mavrogordato, 1929.'^
In 1863 Edward Williams, a physician from Wales, 
in evidence to the Kinnaird Commission on metal mining 
in Britair. ^ said;
I do nov: recollect that I ever attended them 
Cniinersl for the miners' asthma. .. and I 
think that they do not seek any advice from, 
perhaps, the misfortune that we Cdoctorsl 
cannot give them much assistance. It is a 
thing which goes on...I never recollect 
being called in particularly to a case of 
miners' asthma...The men think that there is 
no remedy; it is a thing which they think 
that they have to submit to, and they submit 
to it with the best grace they can, and they
- 48 -
dragoon their existence as well as they
can.^
The testimony o-f Dr Williams reveals hii 
perception o-f miners as fatalists. He believed they 
faced the prospect of contracting occupational lung 
disease with its accompanying i ider o-'’ premature death 
with stoicism. This was not an idiosyncratic view but 
one that was typical of his profession. The opinion 
was so pervasive that it took root in the mystique and 
mythology attaching, in particular, to the 
metalliferous miners of Cornwall.^ This chapter does 
not test the validity of the assu'^pt ions, of Dr 
Williams, for the theme is explo~ed ater. It rather 
attempts to provide an historical context for the 
changed medical attitudes towards patients suffering 
from pneumoconiosis. Present-day doctors do not 
regard miners as bei ig fatalistic towards the
disease. Instead, they acknowledge that their
patien^-s express feelings which range from resentment 
to pessimism.
Also, this section provides an historical 
overview of the origins, causes, development and 
progression of silicosis; and it further attempts to 
explain its association with the infectious disease,- 
tuberculosis of the lungs, which it analyses in 
detail. A great deal of research undertaken after 
World War 11 has considerably enhanced medical 
knowledge of silicosis; and the need for a current 
understanding of this complex and slow-developing lung 
illness is well illustrated by two recent articles 
dealing with its manifestation during the late 19th
49
and early Luth centuries in the Transvaal — and in 
Cornwall. In both these articles the writers obscure 
the reader's comprehension o-f the disease by locating 
their discussions in out-of-date definitions and 
outmoded research findings,.*^ The result is that many 
of their conclusions and judgements, particularly 
those which pertain to incidence, prevalence and 
mortality data of the disease in the past, are highly 
questionable- Also, their misunderstanding of the 
pathology of the disease has iresulted in their 
over-emphasising relatively unimportant issues and 
their dismissing other significant features of the 
disease, particularly the morbid potential of 
silicosis in its simple form.
Because the meanings of medical terms have 
changed, it is often difficult to quantify data 
regarding diseases of the past. T^'- is particularly 
true of silicosis because of its still controversial 
associatign with tuberculosis of the lungs. It is 
therefore hoped that the portion of this chapter 
devoted to terminology will better equip the reader to 
understand and interpret contemporary medica.. reports 
and statistics which are quoted in subsequent 
chapters.
The chapter also focuses on the occurrence of 
pneumoconiosis in industry and mining in Britain, the 
original home of most of the coal and hard rock miners 
who migrated to the Witwatersrand gold fields. 
Although poor health conditions existed in the
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majority of the metal 1 i-ferous mines in Missouri, 
Colorado, Utah, California and Nevada before World War 
1, few American doctors were familiar with or 
interested ’n work done on the subject of 
pneumoconiosis in Europe, in Britain and in its 
overseas possessions.^ Also, the subsequent research 
fir.dings of the American doctors had minimal impact in 
their own country; it was not until 1929 to 1930 that 
the federal government and American industry turned 
their'attention to the problem. For these reasons the 
history of silicosis in the USA has been omitted.
This chapter deliberately draws a mono-causal 
link between the industrial revolution and the 
proliferation of occupational diseases. But the link 
is established merely for a survey and to locate the 
pneumoconioses in a chronological context. The 
complex relations between the social, ecponomic and 
political aspects >3f loccupatiional disease and of 
industrial medicine are discussed later. The chapter 
does, however, fiocus on the important contributions of 
South African doct>ors in advancing medical knowledge 
of the disease, with particular reference to its 
pathology.
Silicosis is classified as >one of the forms oi 
pneumoconiosis, which is the generic term fiar a grioup 
of lung diseases assiociated with dusty occupations. 
j! These diseases arise almost exclusively from 
industrial pursuits and are therefore preventable. 
Also, in their simple form the diseases are not
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infectious so that they cannot be communicated from
Done person — or animal — to another.
Pneumoconiosis, meaning "dust-containing-lung", 
is an 1874 abbreviation of the word pneumonokoniosis, 
a term coined in 1866 by a German pathologist, 
Friedrich von Zenker.^*"’ Today che word does not merely 
describe dusted lungs, as its author, Zenker, 
intended, when he found these organs impregnated with 
coal dust. Instead, it specifically denotes all forms 
of dust-inhaled diseases. Although the term 
pneumoconiosis has morbid connotions, there is a 
minority of diseases under its umbrella which are, 
however, benign. This applies to stannosis and 
baritosis which are produced by tin dust and barium 
dust. In these forms of pneumoconiosis the inhaled 
dust causes minimal damage to the lungs; the slight 
tisrue changes which result are visible only on 
X-rnys.^^ It therefore follows that only somie dusts - 
and silica is one of them - are harmful.
Except in the case of persons who suffer from 
asthma, most inhaled dusts are innocuous: they produce 
only pigmentation or slight chronic inflammatory 
reactions in the lungs of human beings - and of 
animals. Certain forms of mineral dust which are 
non-toxic in the ordinary sense of the word are, 
however, fibrogenic. This means that if they are 
inhaled continuously 'nd over long periods they are 
able to breach the "magnificent" defence mechanisms of 
the lungs and to penetrate the deeper layers of lung
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tissue where they remain and cause damage. All 
■foreign substances entering the body act as irritants; 
and in most cases irritation is followed by the 
formation of fibrous tissue. Nature aims at limiting 
the hurtfulness of foreign bodies that cannot be 
absorbed or removed by physiological processes; it 
does so by surrounding them with a capsule of fibrous 
or scar tissue. This happens to an intense degree in 
the lungs. Here the dust particles provoke the growth 
of fibrous connective tissue, called fibrosis, in 
exce*s of that which is normally present. These 
fibroqenic responses are not, however, identical and 
vary according to the kind of dust irritant.^*^
Similarly, each of the pneumoconioses is 
terminologically linked to the particular dust or 
industry or process which causes the fibrosis. Thus 
silicosis, coalworkers' pneumoconiosis, berylliosis 
and asbestosis and silicatosis are caused by silica, 
coal dust, beryllium, asbestos and other silicates. 
These are all potentially morbid diseases, as is 
mi>ced-dust pneumoconiosis, which results from the 
inhalation of normally inert dust mixed with small 
amounts of silica. Because exposure to fibrogenic 
dusts is almost exclusively occupational, it should be 
stressed that the pneumoconioses are man-made 
diseases.
Men have contracted pneumoconiosis ever since 
they first began to manipulate the products of their 
environment; and it has been suggested that
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palaeolithic miners died o+ the oldest occupational 
disease - si 1 icosis. Physicians in Greek and Roman 
times did not distinguish between various forms of 
respiratory diseases. Nevertheless, they drew a 
general connection between lung disorders and dust 
inhalation. Workers also did so; and there is 
evidence from Roman times right through till the 
middle ages that miners wore veils as a precaution 
against inhaling dust and noxious fumes. Although 
occupational dust had not yet been identified' as the 
prime cause of incapacity, workmen were aware that it 
damaged their lungs and that they ran the risk of 
premature death as a consequence.'-^
After the advent of the industrial revolution the 
pneumoconioses pro!iferated. With the industrial 
revolution's technolog iCc-1. advancements,
mass-production techniques and sophisticated
machinery, driven by powerful sources of energy, 
massive amounts of dust were generated in the 
workplace. As a result the prevalence of the 
pneumoconioses, the overall number of old and new 
cases in a single period, grew rapidly. The incidence 
of the disease, namely the occurrence of new cases in 
a single perrod, also accelerated. Equally important, 
in many workers liable to dust the onset, development 
and progress of the disease took place at much earlier 
stages in their working lives than had been the case 
before. Indeed, by the beginning of the 19th century 
large numbers of workers were handicapped or died from
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dust diseases at a relatively young age. British 
workmen gave thesa' industrial diseases graphic names 
which they perceptively associated with their trades 
and occupations; and "potters' rot", "grinders' rot" 
and "miners' decline" are but a few examples of the 
morbid terms they coined. Invariably these names 
illustrated pulmonary disorders which resulted from 
the impairment of lung function.
The main function of the lungs is the exchange of 
gases which a -■> essential for the life processes. 
Also, in the process of gas exchange the body forms 
and uses many substances which maintain and stabilise 
its metabolism. Hence any damage to a person's lungs 
vitiates their performance and undermines the healthy 
existence of the individual More specifically, in 
some forms of pneumoconiosis, and particularly in the 
case of silicosis, the fibrotic nodules obliterate
many of the air sacs and blood capillaries. so
effectively diminishing both the amount of aerating 
surface in the lung and the amount of blood brought
into contact with the air. 14 With s.licosis this
damage, for reasons not yet fully explained,
produces characteristic symptoms: shortness of breath, 
exacerbated by exercise or exertion, and an irritative 
cough. If the fibrosis becomes extensive, gas 
exchange becomes increasingly difficult; and when 
there is no longer sufficient ventilation, the right 
side of the heart may dilate from the strain. This 
condition, known as cor pulmonale^ is always disabling
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and poses a serious threat to li-fe.27
It has earlier been suggested that silicosis has 
a long and traceable history dating back to 
palaeolithic miners. The disease, however, is not 
related solely to mining; man has been exposed to 
silica dust in many other occupations. The 
development of technology, particularly during the 
18th and 19th centuries, with an accompanying
expansion of dust levels in the workplace, increased 
the prevalence and incidence of silicosis throughout 
the Western world. This prompted research, which was 
aided by the development of the microscope. During 
the lS60s, when Zenker was publishing hi pathological 
findings on pneumoconiosis, a few investigators, 
notably Edward Headlam Greenhow in Britain and Adolf 
Kuessmaul in Germany, identified both chemically and 
microscopically the dusts found post mortem in the 
lungs of workers.-*"”
Once scientists had correlated specific dusts 
with the occupations of deceased workers, it then 
became customary for them to name each form of dusty
OQlung after the responsible dust or occupation.Four 
years after Kuessmaul had affirmed the presence of 
silica in the lungs, Visconti, in an article published 
in a French medical journal in 1870, devised the term 
silicosis, so distinguishing this dust disease from 
the other pneumoconioses. Silicosis has for its root 
the Latin word, silex, meaning a flint. The 
derivation aptly describes the mineral character of
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the silica <or quarts) dust*'^ *-’ Silicosis becomes 
established in men and in animals when more cr less 
pure silica dust, or mixed dust in which silica is 
found in varying proportions, is inhaled over
continuous periods.
The cause (or aetiology) of silicosis - the 
inhalation of silica dust - appears to be simple, but 
there are many complex variables. The onset of the 
disease depends on the duration of dust exposure, the 
percentage of silica in the dust and the intensity of 
the dose. These factors are also contingent on the 
nature, shape and size of the dust particles. 
Together the variable dust elements constitute the 
respirable fraction, which is discussed later.*^ ’^  Also, 
the minimum amount of dust exposure necessary to cause 
the disease remains unspecified.'^'^ Similarly, the 
development of the disease is complex and is even 
today the subject of controversy- A discussion 
follows of the two forms of the diseasse: first, simple 
silicosis; and second, progressive massive fibrosis. 
It should here be noted that the term progressive 
massive fibrosis has replaced the earlier and less 
scientific names for this form of the disease: in the
1920s it was called "infective si 1 icosis" , while its 
later loose variant was "complicated si 1 icosis" .
In simple silicosis scar tissue or fibrosis 
usually develops slowly. In the early stages of the 
disease only isolated nodules form and, if the 
individual is removed from dust exposure, the disease
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is unlikely to progress further. But once nodules 
r-eplace lung tissue - and this always occurs in 
silicosis - there is permanent lung damage however
siight 36
There are* three different kinds of simple 
silicosis. Each has a distinctive tissue reaction, 
which is the product of a specific kind of dust
dose. 37 First, chronic silicosis, with discrete
nodules of approximately five millimetres in diameter, 
usually results from fm_"'erate dust exposure over a 
period of twenty to forty years. Second, as studies 
of sandblasters have shown, an increased particle dose 
can produce the less common form of accelerated 
silicosis within five to fifteen years-'^® Finally, 
heavy concentrations of dust during a period of two to 
five years may cause diffuse silicosis. Therefore the 
number of silicotic nodules is related to the duration 
and intensity of the dust dose.'^ '^  Eventually the whole 
of the lungs may become packed with nodules and in
places they may even be confluent 40
Although the relationship between dust dosage and 
individual response is clearly important, current 
medical science has not, as yet, been able to define 
it precisely. Even today it is not clear, for 
instance, whether short intermittent periods of 
exposure to intense dust concentrations are as 
dangerous as, or more dangerous than, exposure to 
lesser dust concentrations over a prolonged and
continuous p e r i o d . T h e r e  is, in addition, an
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anomalous aspect relating to the onset of the 
diseafse. After inhaling significant amo‘ -» of dust 
during a relatively short time, a worker may have a 
latent period of several years before signs and
AOsymptoms of the disease develop.
These features of the disease are relevant in 
assessing the views of South African and British 
doctors on the incidence of silicosis amongst black 
migrant mineworkers during the first three decades of 
the 20th century. Doctors concedeu that Africans were 
exposed to intense dust concentrations of short 
duration. Yet medical opinion almost unanimously held 
that, in contrast tc white miners, there was a 
markedly low incidence of a disabling form of 
silicosis amorgst black underground mineworkers. 
Doctors attributed this to the short contracts of 
African mineworkers, which were also intermittent. 
They believ'ed that after each contract an African 
mineworker had a chance to recover his health: he had 
a "holiday" at his "kraal" before resuming work on the
ATmines. This ntudy cannot make judgements on the 
validity of the medical knowledge of that time. Using 
other criteria, however, including the medical 
,rofession's own dependence on the continued 
prosperity of the gold mining industry, this study 
questions the accuracy of the contemporary physicians' 
estimates for the low incidence of a handicapping form 
of silicosis amongst African minev-or kers.
59 -
The onset of the disease is usually slow and 
insidious and its advance is progressive. While the 
individual may not necessarily suffer premature death, 
the replacement of "soft and spongy" lung tissue by 
"hard unyielding" nodules is often crippling.^'" One 
would expect the degree of disability to be linked 
with the amount of fibrosis, which is currently 
radiologically graded in South Africa as slight, 
moderate or marked. But this is not the invariable 
patterr.s often the severity of the symptofus has no 
direct relation to the number of nodules.Generally
speaking, chronic fibrosis may cause in some workers\
little or no incapacity- But chronic silicosis may be 
so pronounced in other workers that they are unable to
AOperform jobs that require any effort or exertion. 
Also, the disease is progressive. Removal from dust 
exposure may significantly retard the progression O'f 
the disease. Even so, this medical control does not
necessarily halt it 49
Unlike their British counterparts who were 
investigating the disease in Cornwall at the same 
time, Transvaal doctors in 1902 to 1903 seldom found 
that the silicosis thuy observed was accompanied by 
tuberculosis. But by 1906 physicians on the 
Witwatersrand ware acknowledging that the
manifestation of silicosis appeared to have altered. 
By this date, in contrast to the "dry" form of 
silicosis which had predominated earlier, they found
c r r -jmany cases that were "complicated" by tuberculosis.
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This did not necessarily mean that their earlier 
finding of a fatal but '"uncomplicated", or 
"uninfective", silicosis had been incorrect. Simple 
but accelerated silicosis may be as potentially lethal 
as progressive massive fibrosis.'-’'^
Significantly, from this time the majority of 
British and Transvaal health officers incorrectly 
viewed simple silicosis as a relatively minor 
illness.Doctors did not consider most cases of 
simple silicosis, particularly those in the early 
stages, to be severely incapacitating or fatal. 
Doctors held that the significance and potential 
danger of simple silicosis lay in its capacity to pave 
the way for the onset of pulmonary tuberculosis. They 
were correct in their view that "infective" (or
'complicated" silicosis) progressive massive
fibrosis - was a major threat to a worker's health and
l i f e .
In 1927 Dr Wilfred Watkins-Pi tchford the
retired Director of the South African Institute for 
Medical Research and the former Chairman of the
Miners' Phthisis Medical Bureau, 57 summed up the
prevailing medical views as follows:
In at least the very great majority of 
cases, the final and determining cause of 
the appearance of the disease in the Rand 
gold miner, even in its "simple" form, has 
been a tuberculous infection, rather than a 
surpassing of the capacity of the lung 
harmlessly to incarcerate quartz 
particles. . .
The agency which converts the liability into 
a manifestation of the disease, in any
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particular^case, is usually a tuberculous 
infection,
Progressive massive fibrosis seems to be an
adc'ition to, rather than a development of, simple
silicosis, and a dust-laden lung is a necessary 
precursor for its onsets ' At what stage of simple
silicosis this may occur is uncertain, but some 
doctors believe that it is more likely if fibrosis is 
accelerated or diffuse rather than chronic.^*-’ Against 
this, other physicians believe that tuberculosis can 
be superadded to simple silicosis at any stags in a 
worker's career: from even before dust lesions appear 
on X-rays to a late juncture of chron ici ty.
The latter rationale would explain the relatively 
lengthy working lives of numerous gold miners in
Australia, for instance. During the early part of the 
20th cer^tury Australian miners worked under less 
severe conditions of dust exposure than those which 
generally prevailed on the Witwatersrand mines. They 
plied their trade for approximately thirty to 
tf rty-five years, that is until they reached an 
coverage age of just under or just above fifty years.
t
Therefore many of them developed progressive massive 
fibrosis, in which tuberculosis was the predominant
element, at a relatively late stage in their 
62careers. *■
When simple silicosis changes to progressive 
massive fibrosis, the nodules proliferate rapidly and 
enlarge; they are usually more than two and a half 
centimetres in diameter, but sometimes reach the size
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of golf or cricket balls.^'^ As the condition 
progresses, the nodules lose their regular pattern, 
structure and concentric shape. They form dense 
"stoney" mattings containing obliterated blood vessels 
and air-vesicles; normal remnants of lung structures 
are barely found within them.. In advanced cases these 
fibrous masses may even distort the shape of the 
l u n g s . C l e a r l y  progressive massive fibrosis is 
always disabling and is often rapidly fatal. Also, 
lik."' simple silicosis, it is progressive; withdrawal 
from dust exposure does not necessarily halt its
advance. 66
Apart from silicosis, progressive massive 
fibrosis also occurs in other forms of pneumoconiosis; 
it is, for example, found in the lungs of haematite 
workers and colliers. Consequently progressive 
massive fibrosis has been the subject of much 
research, but its aetiology has not yet been precisely
jL C ielucidated. Some doctors attribute its manifestation 
solely to infection, specifically by tuberculosis.^^ 
But others suggest that it may be caused by any of the 
following three factors either singly or in 
combination; tuberculosis; massive retention of silica 
dust; and bronchial obstruction with partial lung 
col lapse.
Ihe evidence indicates a strong but not exclusive 
association between the tubercle bacillus and 
progressive massive f i b r o s i s . A s  a result, from 
early times medical controls in dusty occupations
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throughout the Western world have insisted on the
removal o-f a worker with tuberculosis from the source
of dust. This is to prevent the person from infecting
his fellow workers. The medical precaution obviates
the possibility of other workers already prone to, or
affected by, simple silicosis from developing
■70progressive massive fibrosis.''^ Apart from the risk of 
tuberculous exposure on the industrial floor, workers 
with simple silicosis also face considerable danger if 
they are exposed to tuberculous infection in their 
living quarters. In conditions of dust density at the 
workplace they were particularly liable to contracting 
tuberculosis and to developing, as a consequence,
progressive massive fibrosis 73
Clearly the onset of tuberculosis in a case of 
simple silicosis is highly dangerous. It is 
important, however, to dispel the popular but outmoded 
misconception that tuberculosis is the inevitable and 
immediate cause of death in progressive massive 
fibrosis. This was a mistaken view held by doctors 
during the first two decades of the 20th century; and 
is one to which certain historiar*.; currently 
subscribe. Of course tuberculosis may in some cases 
be the prins^ry cause of death: mors particularly this 
depends on the virulence of the bacillus in relation 
to the immunity and resistance of the patients. But 
in most instances, particularly those which involve 
urbanised workers, who have an acquired childhood 
immunity to tuberculosis, the disease has a fatal
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outcome for another reason: it leads to the onset o-F 
progressive massive fibrosis. It is this condition 
which destroys the arterial pulmonar/ system. 
Consequently heart failure, or more specifically, cor
pulmonale f causes death 75
As silicosis is generally a chronic disease, the 
principal symptoms manifest themselves relatively late 
in the life of a worker; X-rays of the chest are not 
usually positive until an individual has been exposed 
to twenty years of respirable silica. This would of 
court 3 be in conditions of moderate dust density. In 
such cases life expectancy is estimated at forty years 
after first exposure. Heavier exposure in confined 
spaces accompanied by the absence of dust preventive 
measures - conditions under which Witwatersrand miners 
worked both before and after the Anglo-Boer War - 
leads to a more rapid and earlier onset of the 
disease. In cases of simple silicosis the earliest 
symptoms are cough and expectoration. As the .disease 
establishes itself more firmly, these symptoms are 
accompanied by shortness of breath on e f f o r t . I f  
tuberculosis supervenes, cough and expectoration 
increase. The infection ma’/ also lead to
characteristic chest pain, the coughing of blood and 
weight loss. Tuberculosis, as has been noted, seems 
to be a common occurrence when fibrosis is accelerated 
or dif 3e.
In accelerated silicosis the major features are 
identical to those which are present in chronic
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silicosis. But the chest X-rays become positive far 
earlier - within -four to eight years o-f -first silica 
exposure. In such c.ases deterioration is rapid and 
may be fatal vjithin ten years of first eKposure.^^ 
These characteristics of accelerated silicosis, as 
sometimes happens with modern-day sandblasters and 
foundry workers, are strikingly similar to the 
descriptions of silicosis in rock drillers on the 
Transvaal gold fields eighty years ago.
During the period 1892 to 1912 most rock drillers 
on the WitwaterBrand, as well as general miners who 
were also exposed to intense dust doses, undoubtedly 
contracted accelerated silicosis. Preaent-day 
descriptions of the pathology and presentation of this 
form of silicosis are consonant with early Transvaal 
medical investigations. These contemporary studies 
confirm that large numbers of miners were severely 
disabled or died within five to fifteen years of first 
dust exposure. From 1902 until 1912 doctors estimated 
that the average life expectancy of Rand rock drillers 
was 35,5 years; their average working lives were a 
mere o,49 years.
The symptoms described by pioneering doctors in 
the field of occupational medicine correspond with 
those seen today. In 1905 Sir Thomas Oliver, a 
physician from Newcastle-upon-Tyne and a w'orld 
authority on industrial medicine, maintained that 
shortness of breath was the only sign of "noteworthy 
fact" in diagnosing silicosis in i'ts early stages.
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For him the symptom indicated that a Witwatersrand
*7Qminer was becoming "lunged". Also, in 1912 two
-full-time Wi twatersrand mine doctors, Louis God-frey
Irvine and Andrew Hutton Watt, graphically described
the progression o-f the disease:
As the disease progresses to the stage o-f 
advanced fibrosis the cardinal symptom o-f 
shortness of breath becomes more urgent and 
distressing; the irritative cough more
frequent; escpectorat ion may become more 
copious, but is still in most cases slight,.
The patient becomes unable to work, he loses 
flesh, his narrow shrunken rigid chest may 
scarcely expand at all even on forced 
inspiration, the shoulders are hunched, the 
chest appears to be practically fixed in the 
position of extreme ewpiration. The lips 
are bluish, the exprassion anxious, the 
pulse rate is accelerated, and the right 
side of the heart dilates under the 
strain.
At the turn of the 20th century physicians 
diagnosed the disease almost exclusively by clinical 
methods.®^ Doctors relied heavily on symptoms, 
physical and stethoscopic examinations,, and chest 
measurements for inhalation -and exhalation - crude and
inaccurate criteria by today's standards 82 Sometimes.
if tuberculosis was suspected, sputum was tested for
evidence of the tubercle bacillus. 83 Radiography was
seldom used as a diagnostic tool. 84 This was so
despite the production of high quality plates 
exhibiting shadow and fine detail shortly after 
William Conrad Rontgen's discovery of X—rays in
oer1895.° Apart from the high costs of the equipment and 
plates, conservative members of the medical profession 
were sceptical about the use of X-rays, which they 
viewed as merely an expensive adjunct for confirming
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what they considered to be accurate clinical
diagnoses B6 In 1912, when sliding scales -for
compensation based on the degree of disability were 
introduced -for Qold miners in South A-frica, 
radiography was used only in doubtful clinical
cases 87
As increasing numbers of doctors equipped 
themselves to handle the apparatus and developed 
specialist skills in interpreting the images, the 
medical profession confirmed the importance of 
radiography.The efficacy of X-rays in diagnosing 
tuberculosis and silicosis before these diseases could 
be clinically determined made it especially valuable; 
and in 1914 the Johannesburg medical fraternity agreed 
that opl iions based on simple clinical examinations 
were "an example of the dogmatism born of a complete
ignorance of the subject" of radiography 89
In 1916 at the newly founded Miners' Phthisis 
Medical Bureaj the use of X-rays in all first-time and 
periodic; medical examinations of white miners became 
standard practice.^'*’ Health officers today are 
convinced that a definitive diagnosis of silicosis 
requires X-ray appearance together with an 
occupational history evincing prior dust exposure. 
Also, present-day health officers, when they stress 
the necessity for radiography, often quote the views 
of pioneering South African d o c t o r s . I n  1916 the 
medical report of the Miners' Phthisis Prevention 
Committee firmly laid the foundation for modern
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standard practices
We are fully of opinion • that the 
radiographic appear/inces in cases of 
silicosis afford the most reliable single 
piece of evidencej in establishing the 
existence and the actual stage of the 
disease in any particular case, in 
determining the presence' or absence of 
tuberculosis, and in differentiating cases 
of early silicosis from cases of commencing 
tuberculosis.
Radiographic examination is of particular 
value in the case of natives, in whom 
ordinary clinical examination _^ is often
difficult and may be misleading. 93
Despite this statement, white miners were the 
sole recipients of routine radiography. Only a small 
number of black mineworkers was examined by X-rays. In 
isolated instances and foi- irposes of compensation, 
the Miners' Phthisis Medical Bureau X-rayed Africans, 
in whom cases of simple silicosis and progressive 
massive fibrosis were suspected. This occurred after 
Africans had been clinically checked at preliminary 
and periodic examinations.*^^ Later, in 1926, the 
Chamber of Mines instituted annual radiographic 
examinations, but only for the "long-service
Otrnatives".^'-' Thus unlike the case of white miners, 
thirty years elapsed before routine radiography was 
introduced for African min e w o r k e r s . T h i s racially 
discriminatory practice blemishes an otherwise 
important and frequently quoted precedent.
Silicosis, as earlier noted, is an irreversible 
condition for which there is no cure. As was 
recognised in the early part of the 19th century, the 
only way of halting the advance of the disease was for
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workers to "renounce their work".^^ Even after such 
drastic medical intervention physicians conceded that 
they had little else to offer. At best they could try 
to alleviate the patient's condition with medication
QOfor the symptoms and hygienic care.^^ Modern medicine 
can do little more. It stresses early diagnosis of 
the disease, followed by the removal of the worker 
from the dusty atmosphere and resettlement elsewhere,
before disablement occurs 99
In 1912, when compensation was first introduced 
in South Africa, it was compulsory for miners, who 
were positively diagnosed as having silicosis, to stop 
working underground after they had been compensated. 
But this is no longer the law today. Apart from the 
instant and permanent withdrawal of mineworkers in 
whom tuberculosis is diagnosed, since 1917 miners with 
simple silicosis have been allowed to resume 
underground work if, after re-examination, they are 
found to be fit to do so. They are allowed to work 
underground until the disease has advanced to a 
legally prescribed stage. They are then withdrawn- 
from service and are given additional compensation, 
lest the progression of the disease causes 
d i sab i 1 i ty. ^ ^
There are two reasons for the changes. First, 
because the disease is progressive, removal from dust 
exposure does not guarantee to stop its advance. 
Thus it seems pointless to deprive a worker of his job 
when the pathological changes to the lung, which are
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constantly monitored; will inevitably progress to 
another stag'', but one which as yet causes no 
disability. The second reason has significant 
implications and relates to the vicious circle in 
which silicotic victims are trapped. On the one hand, 
in continuing to work under controlled dust conditions 
silicotics run the risk of their disease advancing. 
On the other, their removal from du'sty work may expose 
them to an equal, if not more dangerous, health risk. 
This is because silicotic patients, who seldom find 
alternative work at equivalent wages, invariably 
experience reduced earnings, with an accompanying fall 
in nutritional and housing standards: under these
reduced living conditions they face the possibility of 
tuberculous infection and the onset of progressive 
massive fibrosis. Therefore, as research has shown, 
compulsory withdrawal of workers from their jobs in 
the early stages of silicosis may ironically be more
1 O”harmful to their health than continuing to work.-^ -'-
During the' first two decades of the 20th century 
early-stage silicotic miners oin the Wi twatersrand 
would have preferred the option of continuing to work 
rather than face the bleak prospect of "starvation" 
for themselves and their families: they could not 
subsist on their compensation awards of £3 per month, 
which were given for one or two years depending on 
their stage of disabi 1 ity. Also, as there was 
virtually no secondary industry in South Africa, most 
silicotic miners could not find alternative
- 71
employment. Former miners, devoid o-f other skills and 
lacking the capital necessary tor farming or business 
enterprises, became all too often dependent on the 
charity of their friends. ■ Immigrant miners, who 
lacked the means to return home, often remained on the 
Reef. There, together with South African born 
silicotics, they swelled the ranks of the landless 
unemployed Afrikaners. Others resorted to petty
crime. Such activities and the wretched destitution 
of these workers made headline news in the press - 
even in those newspapers which the mineowners 
controlled.
As has been noted, the reduced living standards 
of silicotics makes them vulnerable to pulmonary 
tuberculosis. During the early decades of the 20th 
century, however, the disease was an even more ominous 
threat than it is today: at that time tuberculosis was 
highly prevalent in the white urban centres of South 
Africa. The infection so dangerously affected 
miners that in 1912 the Miners' Phthisis Board 
estimated the life expectancy of a silicotic miner who 
also had tuberculosis - he had progressive massive
fibrosis - at no more than six months on average. 109
Complicated employment issues still confront 
silicotic workers today. But the choice of 
continuing to work under "controlled conditions" is, 
at best, a limited answer to a complex mesh of 
socio-economic problems. In such a solution, based 
partly on both compassionate and pragmatic
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rationales,^there is a touch, too, of expediency.
Current drug treatment is directed entirely at 
infectious complications. Certain modern compounds 
may alleviate symptoms and retard infection so 
prolonging life. But medicinal therapy remains 
largely futile. When tuberculosis supervenes on 
silicosis, anti-tuberculosis drugs are used. Apart 
from sterilizing the sputums of infected patients, 
little else can be done. In contrast to the success 
of drugs in controlling the simple form of pulmonary 
tuberculosis, they exert minimal curbs on the
1 1 Oinfection in pro-gressive massive fibrosis. •
The association of tuberculosis with silicosis is 
a complex problem which has puzzled the medical 
profession for many years. Repeated studies in
epidemiology, pathology and experimental medicine have 
demonstrated their frequent co—existence but the 
reason is not yet understood. ^ Long before Zenker 
coined the term pneumonokoniosis for the lung 
condition observed in miners and stoneworkers, both 
workmen and physicians had been well aware that a 
number of occupations gave rise to lung disorders 
which led to premature death. Seorg Bauer, more well 
known under his noitt de plume, Georgius Agricola, in 
his famous treatise on mining - De Re Metal 1ica - 
vividly described the terminal features of the miners'
condition which so closely resembled tuberculosis. ^
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He recorded!
The constant dust enters the blood and lungs 
producing that difficulty of breathing which 
the Greeks call asthma. When the dust, is 
corrosive it ulcerates the lungs and
produces consumption 115
Tuberculosis has been recognised since ancient 
times. It has always been identified with the market 
place and "civilised" urban ways of life in which 
overcrowded living conditions and low nutritional 
standards provide ideal conditions for its 
proliferation. So, too, it flourished in the new 
industrial complexes of 18th and 19th century
E u r o p e . P h y s i c i a n s  have named tuberculosis the 
"poor man's d i s e a s e " . T h e  medical interpretation is 
simply that tuberculosis makes greatest headway 
amongst those people vjhose standard of living is low 
and whose resistance to the germ is correspondingly 
feeble. The disease is infective and is caused 
entirely by the activity of the bacillus of 
tuberculosis, or the tubercle bacillus, today known as 
Mycobacter ium tuberculosis. Unless the specific germ 
is present, the disease cannot occur. While it may 
affect any part of the body - the lungs, lymph glands, 
spleen and bones - in this summary only the lungs are 
discussed, as other forms of tuberculosis are not
associated with dust diseases 118
The germs are spread largely by spitting or 
sneezing. Qnce released into the atmosphere they are 
usually inhaled and are sometimes ingested. Although 
they thrive only in animal or in human tissues, they
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are resistant and may remain viable for many months in 
dust or on articles in daily use. The contagiousness 
of tuberculosis, well known since its earliest 
manifestation, has always resulted in health officers 
insisting on the observance of hygienic habits to curb 
its spread. During the late 19th century and the 
early decades of the 20th century the study of 
bacteriology predominated. The focus on this new 
medical science coincided with an era in which 
tuberculosis was alarmingly prevalent, with 
corresponding high death rates, particularly amongst 
the industrial claries.
During the 19th century the emphasis on 
bacteriology and the prevalence of tuoerculosis help 
explain the medical profession's commitment to improve 
sanitation in the workplace before embarking on other 
occupational health precautions.^ The anxiety of 
health officers with regard to spitting is 
understandable.! and today one of the aims of drug 
therapy is the care and ccntrol of sputums of infected 
persons. A concern with spitting - indeed it verged 
on the obsessional — underpinned the contemporary 
medical profession's determination to curb tuberculous 
contagion.
On the Reef, before 1912, it was commonly, if not 
optimistically, believed that the tubercle bacillus 
could not survive the acidity in the Witwatersrand
1 'T 'Ogold m i n e s . I n  its interim report of 1913 the 
Miners' Phthisis Prevention Committee, however.
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dispelled the saisconception; the committee reported 
that 15 per cent o-f sputum samples taken underground 
contained living bacilli. This finding evoked 
anKiety not only amongst doctors but also amongst the 
informed public, including miners, It proved that 
miners were exposed to a double risk of infection: 
from the workplace itself; and from their fellow 
workers, one-sixth of whom were estimated to have
active tuberculosis. 125
African and Afrikaner adolescents and young males 
were particularly susceptible to tuberculous
infection. Their rural backgrounds did not equip them 
with an acquired childhood immunity. Also, in the 
towns they had insufficient resistance to withstand 
the environmental stresses of poor living conditions 
and physically debilitating mine work. Hence they
experienced a high morbidity and mortality from simple
tuberculosis when they came to work on the gold 
mines. In these "unseasoned’' populatior , simple 
tuberculosis often occurred in a rapidly progressive 
form, which frequently had a fatal outcome.
Therefore rural Afrikaner and African mlneworkers 
often died from simple tuberculosis; they died before 
simple silicosis had sufficient time to become
established.
Apart from its contagiousness, laboratory 
experiments have shown that there are different 
strains of tubercule bacilli with va^-ying degrees of 
virulence, which produce the disease. Whatever the
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virulence of the strain the early changes are the same 
and the initial lung lesions produced are similar. 
These comprise clumps of tuberculous cells called the 
tubercle. But the course of the disease alters or is 
modified by a number of circumstances. For example, 
when a moderate number of mildly virulent strains of 
bacilli become implanted in the lungs of an individual 
of average resistance, the disease will usually follow 
an orderly progression which ends in complete 
healing. This is because the body is sufficiently 
healthy to combat the germs. Such a person does not 
normally develop active tuberculosis and consequently 
does not pass on the infection. In contrast, numerous 
bacilli of high virulence in a person whose resistance 
is low may cause changes which fail to produce a 
healing reaction and which result in permanent lung 
damage. Such lowered resistance may be caused by a 
number of factors, including poor living-, conditions, 
stressful work and, importantly, the presence of 
si 1icosis.
When healing occurs, the tubercles may be 
absorbed and disappear, or they may become 
encapsulated by tissue and appear as scars. The scars 
frequently enclose a latent form of tuberculosis, 
so-called because living bacilli are walled up in the 
scar tissue. Although the presence of these bacilli 
will cause a tuberculin test to be positive, they will 
usually remain quiescent if the individual leads a 
healthy life. But should his health and life-style
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alter detrimentally, the bacilli may be reactivated 
and the tuberculosis will -flare up and spread. 
Changed circumstances may include; lowered 
socio-econcmic standards; a heightened stress level 
which may be induced by environmental strains or 
accelerated physical labour demands; a serious 
infection, such as pneumonia; and finally, and 
importantly, lung damage, especially pneumoconiosis.
Significantly, when reactivated tuberculosis 
occurs in a silicotic lung, its progression usually 
differs from a primary tuberculous infection; it 
invariably runs a serious course. Also, the dormant 
bacilli tend to die in the course of time. The 
chances of their reactivation are therefore 
considerably higher in younger rather than older
men, 128 This fact partly explains the markedly high
number of Witwatersrand miners in the prime of life 
who were afflicted by progressive massive fibrosis in 
which tuberculosis was an important element. In such 
cases open or communicable tuberculous • infection may 
have co-existed with the si 1 icosis,Alternatively, 
extensive fibrosis could have caused the reactivation 
of latent tubercles.
Before Robert Koch in 1B82 identified the 
bacillus responsible for tuberculosis, the disease had 
a variety of names. As the striking symptom in 
tuberculosis is the wasting away of the body, the 
Greeks called it phthisis^ and consumption and decline 
were subsequent synonyms. Phthisis was also a major
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symptom of industrial dusc diseases. It was, 
therefore, logical to link the term to the occupation, 
hence miners' phthisis, stonemasons' phthisis or
potters' phthisis. 130
During the latter part of the 19th century the 
science of pathology grew through the use of the 
microscope, which aided Koch's identification of the 
tubercle - the clumps of tuberculous cells - and his 
subsequent- discovery of the tubercle bacillus.^^^ But 
the concentric fibrotic nodules of simple silicosis, 
found in post-mortem examinations of the lungs of 
workers who had plied dusty trades, closely resembled 
the tubercle- The similarity was so marked that Koch 
designated it the pseudo-tubercle, a term also 
deployed in the 1920s by Anthony Mavrogordato of the
1 ■ rrjSouth African Institute for Medical Research. 
Although pathologists gradually drew distinctions 
between "dust phthisis" and "tubercular phthisis" on 
the basis of whether or not there was a history of 
occupational dust exposure, most doctors viewed 
tuberculosis as an integral part of silicosis and
continued to call it miners' phthisis 134
This was the term which Transvaal doctors adopted 
at the beginning of the 20th century. Few disputed 
that the debilitating condition which developed was 
established by an initial si 1 icosis; but silicosis 
was reserved for delineating only the original damage 
and the progressive tissue responses. In other words 
the term silicosis was restricted to defining the
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pathology of the disease.; miners' phthisis was the
name given to its complex clinical manifestation.
At the beginning of the 20th century the South 
African medical profession agreed that the name
miners' phthisis lacked precision. But they also 
believed that it aptly summed up the complicated
character of the d i s e a s e . A l t h o u g h  they later
conceded that it was an unscientific title, they
retained it in the belief that tuberculous infection, 
or phthisis, as the infection was often colloquially 
called, was the predominant factor in most cases of 
pronounced disablement and premature death in
miners, 139 By adhering to their choice they laid the
basis for its legal recognition in 1911. In 1914 
Sebastian Valentyn van Niekerk, the Medical Inspector 
of Mines, gave the reasons for the South African 
doctors' preferences
We know now that these bacteria are 
abundantLy met with underground, and the 
disease they produce and Miners' Phthisis is 
so interdependent, in my opinion, that I 
have been wont to say that, by eliminating 
the causes of Pulmonary Tuberculosis,...we 
may consider the Miners' Phthisis battle
half won, and vies i/arsa 141
Eventually the South African doctors were swayed
by their British colleagues, who preferred the name
1silicosis of the lungs. During the 1920s silicosis
became the preferred term in South Africa. But until 
1950, both in South Africa and internationally, 
miners' phthisis was retained and used interchangeably 
with silicosis because of legal precedents. In 1927
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Wilfred Watkins-Pitchford explained this anomaly;
The term .miners' phthisis, if it has any 
precise meaning, refers only to silicosis 
when associated with an active tuberculosis; 
its retention in the title of the South 
African Act Cof 1925D, and in the title of 
the CMiners' Phthisis Medical] Bureau which 
administers its medical provisions, is 
indeed merely a historical relic.
Finally, at the Third International Conference of 
Experts on Pneumoconiosis held in Sydney in 1950, the 
delegates agreed that in future the terminology of 
pneumoconiosis would take the form of naming the dust 
or occupation to which the worker was exposed. At 
this late date in the 20th century the international 
medical profession formally abandoned the use of the 
term miners' phthisis.
The changes in international nomenclature for 
silicosis indicate that an understanding of
contemporary disease terminology is vital if one is to 
interpret the medical reports and the health
statistics of the r.'st. This is particularly
necessary in the case of South Africa where until 1920 
medical termir.ology was often peculiar. In 1912 the 
medical commissioners on miners' phthisis reported 
that "the classification of the causes of death is not 
uniform with that employed in other countr ies".
As has been noted, during the first two decades 
of the 20th centurv silicosis and miners' phthisis 
had, in the Transvaal, specific clinical and 
pathological meanings. Likewise, the word phthisis, 
too, presents difficulties. Only a few medical
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practitioners used pulmonary tuPerculosis to denote 
this specific illness in. the scientific way which Koch 
had made possible by his identification of the 
tubercle bacil lus. Instead, the majority of doctors 
preferred the old-fashioned and colloquial term for 
this infection, namely phthisis. In contrast to
Britain, where phthisis unambiguously came to mean 
simple pulmonary tuberculosis, its use in South Africa 
was rather more vague, for hers it carried both 
specific and general connotations. Of course
phthisis was frequently used to denote simple 
pulmonary tuberculosis. But in other circumstances it 
was the rubric for many lung diseases which were 
thought to possess a tuberculous element. 
Consequently in South Africa mortality statistics for 
phthisis often indicated non-tuberculous diseases, 
including bronchitis and emphysema, and simultaneously 
embraced both simple pulmonary tuberculosis and 
"infective" silicosis - or miners' phthisis - as 
progressive massive fibrosis was- then clinically
termed. Clearly the generic use of the word
phthisis poses problems for the investigator of the 
Witwatersrand's incidence, prevalence and mortality 
data for both simple pulmonary tuberculosis and 
progressive massive fibrosis. Also, even if 
occupational indicators showing dust exposure 
accompany mortality statistics under the umbrella of 
phthisis, the researcher cannot definitively conclude 
that this rubric denoted progressive massive
fibrosis. Possibilities may be inferred; but at best
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these can be only tentative.
Apart -from its lack of precision, the meaning o-f
the term phthisis gradually changed with time. In
Britain, as has been noted, and "elsewhere" it was
merely modified and refined to denote unambiguous
simple pulmc>nary tuberculosis. But in South Africa
its meaning changed rather more dramatical ly. As
silicosis became publicised in the Transvaal, laymen
abbreviated miners' phthisis to phthisis and doctors
followed suit. This practice caused confusion "in the
public mind" as there was an interim period during
which phthisis was a synonym for both silicosis and
pulmonary t u b e r c u l o s i s . I n  1910 an inspector of
mines clearly demonstrated the anomaly;
The disease to which miners are particularly 
subject on these fields is that of 
consumption, phthisis or tuberculosis, - 
call it by any of these names- This disease 
is aggravated and, perhaps in the first 
instance, brought about by silicosis, to 
which the erroneous name of phthisis is
generally applied by the uninitiated 153
The imprecision persisted, however, for nearly a 
decade- Finally, legislation in the early 1920s 
compelled doctors to register diseases in a more 
uniform way and in internationally accepted medical 
l a n g u a g e . C l e a r l y  an accurate historical 
interpretation of contemporary medical data in South 
Africa and in other parts of the world requires a 
close scrutiny of the data's terminological conteKts.
Several historians of southern Africa have 
reached the mistaken conclusion that phthisis always
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meant so-called miners' p h t h i s i s . O n  the basis of
contemporary statistics for phthisis, derived from
reports of medical officers of health and the census,
some research workers have further concluded that
official figures understated the prevalence of
1 'SAsilicosis on the gold mines. Although the
hypothesis is plausible, particularly in the case of 
African mineworkers, other kinds of substantive 
evidence rather than such imprecise data are needed to 
warrant this finding.
It should also be- stressed that official death 
rates and the census are far from being good indices 
of the actual prevalence of occupational disease. The 
diagnosis of death frequently referred to the 
immediate cause or terminal condition, including heart 
disease and pneumonia; more often than not phthisis 
was blamed. The cause of death seldom cited the 
primary disease, the more especially if this was a 
chronic condition of lonc) standing, as in the case of
1 "nV *silicosis. Unless an autopsy had been performed, a 
procedure against which white workmen had "a natural 
prejudice", even hospitals seldom recorded miners' 
phthisis as a cause of death.
As we have seen, the general consensus amongst 
South African and British doctors was that an initial 
silicosis exposed the lungs of workers to tuberculous 
infection, the agent which was held to be the cause of 
death. At the turn of the 20th century South African 
physicians called this "mixed" or "complicated"
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clinical manifestation of progressive massive fibrosis 
"infective" si 1 icosis. Twenty years later, after 
eKtensive investigations, they coined a more 
scientific clinical term — si 1ico-tuberculosis.
In clinical terms only, this form of progressive 
massive fibrosis was predominantly found amongst white 
miners. Doctors identified the tuberculous 
infection, in its open form, through the disease's 
typical symptoms of weight loss, night sweats and 
sputum streaked with blood; positive sputum tests. 
X-rays and post-mortem findings could invariably 
verify dubious diagnoses.
By the early 1920s, however, an opposed school of 
thought emerged in South Africa. It challenged the 
si 1 ico-tuberculosis theory by arguing that silicosis 
was tuberculous in origin. It held that the presence 
of the tubercle, whether active or quiescent, was the 
necessary precursor for the establishment of 
si 1 icosis. Tuberculo-si 1 icosis was the name given 
to this clinical condition, which pathologists found 
to be more prevalent amongst African mineworkers than
whites. 164
To settle the controversy over which disease came 
first - silicosis or tuberculosis - in 1926 Frank 
William Simson of the South African Institute for 
Medical Research undertook research with animal 
experiments. Together with his colleague, Archibald 
Sutherland Strachan, he showed that that there was a
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type of silicosis which from the beginning could be
produced with an accompanying element of tuberculosis,
but which created no detectable signs of the
infectious disease in the guinea pigs while they were
alive. Equally significantly, the two pathologists
also demonstrated that a form of silicosis could be
produced which from first to last had no element
whatsoever of tuberculosis: dust alone could cause
both simple silicosis and progressive massive
f i b r o s i s . A l t h o u g h  there are counter— arguments
which dispute the validity of the conclusions of the
latter experiment, many authorities currently accept
this oft-quoted finding; they support the view that a
tuberculous element need not be present in either
simple silicosis or progressive massive fibrosis, both
of which may be potentially fatal. Although
tuberculosis is frequently associated with progressive
massive fibrosis, in view of the current debate it
seems difficult to state incontrovertibly that
silicosis predisposes to tuberculosis, and that
progressive massive fibrosis with tuberculosis is
* 1 A 7necessarily si 1 ico-tuberculosis.
The controversy about the association of 
tuberculosis with silicosis is not merely of historic 
or academic medical interest. Whether silicosis is 
conducive to tuberculosis, and which comes first, 
silicosis or turaercu’osis, are questions which have 
everywhere influenced administrative procedures for 
awarding compensation in cases of silicosis.
86 -
Governments and insurance companies have based their 
decisions on principles similar to those set out in 
Britain in 1906. In that year a British departmental 
committee was appointed to recommend additional 
industrial diseases tor inclusion under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. In reaching its decisions the 
overriding proposition ot the committee was that ths. 
disease should be “so specific to the particular 
employment that its causation by the employment can be 
established in individual cases". An industrial 
disease was then seen "as a disabling disease which 
arises out of, and in the course of, employment in an 
industry". Simple silicosis meets these 
requiremenfcs! associated tuberculosis, however, caused 
problems as it is not a disease specific to any 
industry.
Guided by the medical belief that an element of 
tuberculosis was always present in "complicated" 
silicosis, the South African state solved the problem 
in 1912 by awarding compensation for progressive 
massive fibrosis, which was then legally termed 
"miners' phthisis in a marked degree". The
difficulty of diagnosing typical silicosis, either 
clinically or by X-rays, when it was concealed or 
masked by tuberculosis, prompted the award later, in 
1916, of compensation for simple tuberculosis. But an 
important condition of the award in the case of gold 
miners was that evidence should be lodged of a 
two-year period of exposure to silica.^^^’ Compensation
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for simple tuberculosis, applicable solely in South 
Africa to the gold mining industry, was virtually 
unique to South A f r i c a . T h e  clause still applies in 
Sou.. Africa today, although it no longer seems to 
have a sound medical or scientific basis: it is 
retained only because of legal precedent. Some 
present-day health officers argue that it should be 
retained, however, as numerous African mineworkers 
contract tuberculosis every year, a phenomenon which 
many epidemiologists regard as being occupationally
related. 17:
There is no uniform international approach to 
compensation for tuberculosis in conjunction with 
silicosis. Also, the controversial association of the 
two diseases with each other has led to the enactment 
of anomalous and sometimes illogical measures. Before 
World War 11, for instance, in Ontario legislation 
went through two phases. At first compensation was 
awarded to "tuberculous-complicated" silicosis, but 
only if open or communicable infection could be 
demonstrated. Later, under recession, the laws were 
amended in rather a fickle way. Those in whom 
disabling but simple silicosis was diagnosed, were 
better compensated than those who had silicosis 
"complicated" by tuberculosis. This was the case 
despite progressive massive fibrosis being as 
potentially serious, if not more so, than simple 
silicoii s. In contrast, since IVIS British 
legislation has been consistent and less capricious.
38
Whenever silicosis is "complicated" by tuberculosis,
the condition is always compensated. British health
officers view the disease as being totally disabling,
regardless of the stage of fibrosis and of the disease
1 74.h comes first.
A close association also exists between the 
progressive massive fibrosis of coalworkers and 
tuberculosis. This finding stems from
epidemiological studies and research, conducted after 
World War 11, particularly in Britain and West
Germany, on t 'e health of colliers. 176 Unlike the
?arly 1930s and earlier, when coalworkers were thought
to suffer minimally -from dust disorders 177 after 1945
reassessmerrcs showed clearly that coal dust posed a 
marked health threat to workers in the industry. In 
addressing problems stemming from coalworkers' 
pneumoconiosis, health officers involved in recent 
projects often find solutions which derive from 
earlier experiences with silicosis. Apart from the 
medical data they supply, silicosis studies also 
provide a wide variety of valuable socio-economic 
insights, which apply to coalworkers' pneumoconiosis.
This was not the case at the turn of the 20th 
century. Remedial measures applied to hard rock mines 
often stemmed from their earlier adoption in the coal 
mining industry. It is against this background that 
we must examine 19th century attitudes to dust 
diseases in mining. We must turn to Britain if we are 
to understand the health conditions on the
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/Jitwatersrand gold mines, after the metal had been 
discovered in 1886. Britain was the birthplace of most 
of the Witwatersrand gold miners; and the metal mines 
of Cornwall provided much of the expertise for the 
industry's initial t e c h n o l o g y . A l s o ,  both before 
and after the Anglo-Boer War, most of the physicians 
on the Witwatersrand were of British stock. They 
brought .viith them their training and knowledge, as 
well as British attitudes to medicine in general, and 
to occupational health in particular. As important, 
most of these doctors belonged to the British Medical 
Association. Their receipt of the society's journal 
enabled them to keep abreast with current medical
trends in Britain, Europe and elsewhere. 179
In Britain, by the mid~19th century, appalling 
working conditions on the mines, with an accompanying 
high mortality from lung diseases and accidents, 
evoked strong social pressures for reform. The coal 
mines, in particular, were the subject of beneficial 
’•hygienic" regulation; and by the beginning of the 
20th century the occupation of coal mining was 
declared "now a healthy and comparatively safe
_„„ii 180
By the end of the 19th century, toe, the medical 
profession's curiosity concerning dust diseases had 
for several reasons dwindled almost to vanishing 
point. According to Sir Thomas Oliver, the renowned 
occupational disease specialist, one of the reasons 
was the growth and prestige of bacteriology with its
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focus on the germ causes of disease. in 1903 he 
declared:
Speaking generally, I may safely say that 
there has been comparatively little written 
upon pneumoconiosis since the discovery of 
the tubercle bacillus by Koch Cin 18823. The 
bulk of prevailing medical and pathological 
opinion upon miners' phthisis was formed
anterior to Koch IBl
Another significant reason for the loss of medical
interest in dust diseases was the "disappearance" and
"rarity" of colliers' phthisis. Dr John Tatham, the
statistical expert in the Registrar's Office, attested
to this phenomenon in 1902 when he blithely wrote: "As
a class colliers compare favourably with men in most
1 R*?other occupations on the score of health."
Tatham's trstin-*.ny also strongly suggests that 
one of the reasons for the. medical profession's 
earlier focus on dust diseases, particularly 
coalworkers' pneumoconiosis, or "black lung" and 
anthracosis, as it was then termed, stemmed from the 
significant contribution of the coal mining industry 
to the economic strength of Britain. In 1851 the 
number of coal miners was 216 000; and within forty 
years it had more than doubled to 517 000.^®*^ Py 1905, 
in the Newcastle district alone, 25 000 miners were 
responsible for the production of nine million tons of 
coal. This constituted 22 per cent out of the 
national annual output of approximately 200 million 
t o n s . C o a l  mining was of national importance for 
another reason as well. By 1911 it employed, in one 
way or another, neatrly one-tenth of the adult male
U
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p o p u l a t i o n . T h e  industry's magnitude suggests that, 
had a high mortality, particularly from 
pneumoconiosis, persisted amongst its many employees, 
doctors would have continued with research on dust 
diseases; self-interest, curiosity and social 
pressures would undoubtedly have had this result.
During the same period, and in contrast to the
coal mines, the tin mining industry was relatively
1unimportant in the national economy of Britain. 
This could explain the indifference, and even negative 
attitudes, of the state and of the medical profession 
to the welfare of tin miners. In contrast to the coal 
mines, lung disease persisted on the tin- mines after 
1850. Also, after 1880 it caused a considerably higher 
mortality than before amongst relatively young mien. 
Apathy towards the fate of tin miners was, indeed, 
marked in Britain.
During the period when research on dust diseases 
was most intense, in 1861 and 1862 Edward Head lam 
Breenhow, the first English medical factory inspector, 
presented two reports, which demonstrated the high 
prevalence of respiratory illness amongst metal 
miners. Breenhow's disturbing findings probably 
influenced the appointment in 1862 of a commission 
under Lord Kinnaird to investigate the health 
conditions on metal mines. A researc-h officer of 
considerable standing, Breenhow was convinced - 
although he did not yet have conclusive proof - of the 
damaging properties of occupationally produced dust;
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and his reports reflected this belief.^®® His premise 
was reinforced by the statistics of the first 
superintendent of government statistics, Dr William 
Farr, whose figures for lead, tin and copper miners 
reflected an excessive mortality from lung
diseases. 187
But in 1864 the K.innaird Commission's report 
ignored both Sreenhow's evidence and the sinister 
statistics of Farr.^'^’"* Likewise, the commission 
dismissed the evidence of miners who asserted that 
dust was the cause of their illness.Instead, its 
conclusions were guided by the views of most medical 
experts who attributed a subsidiary role to dust in 
provoking lung disease. Noting that the disease rate 
amongst coal miners was then on a par with that of 
metal miners, the Kinnaird Commission, as with the 
coal mining investigations, recommended similar 
"hygienic" improvements.^''^
-j
Ironically, by the mid-1860s two doctors found 
proof of the causative role of silica dust in 
occupational lung disease. The one physician was 
Greenhcw. The other was Thomas B. Peacock, from St 
Thomas's Hospital and the principal meaical 
investigator for the Kinnaird Commission, who had 
been, during his earlier investigations, not at all 
sure about the relationship.* Neither doctor was 
given the opportunity to make the proof public; there 
were no more commissions on metal mining for the 
remainder of their lives. Forty years passed before
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the next official investigation; this was the 
important Haldane Commission of 1902.^ '^ '^
During the interim period the Metalliferous Mines 
Act of 1372 incorporated most of the recommendations 
of the Kinnaird Commission. These measures, inter 
alia, prohibited children under twelve from working 
underground; and they banned the use of vertical and 
overhanging ladders. These improvements and other 
“hygienic" provisions certainly helped eliminate some 
of the more glaring malpractices in the Cornish tin 
mines. But the remedial measures were offset by the 
continued "excessive mortality at all ages" from lung 
disease. ^
As has been noted, British and European research 
on dust disease virtually ceased during the last three 
decades of the 19th century. Such lack of interest, 
coupled with the coinciding decline of Cornish tin 
mining, had unfortunate repercussions for the tin 
miners. Owing to overseas competition, accompanied by 
a falling price in the metal, after the early 1860s 
Cornish tin mining declined from its former 
pre-eminence.-^^' jhere were minor upturns, but the 
number of mines steadily dwindled. The decline was 
reflected in the emigration of thousands of males; 
they were unable to find alternative employment in 
Cornwall and were therefore obliged to find mining 
jobs els'iv’tere in Britain or overseas. Also, there 
were fewer active miners in Cornwall itself. In 1873, 
when the mining population had already been halved.
-J
- 94
there were 26 500 surface and underground workers. By 
1878 the number had decreased to 17 380; and in 1898 a 
mere 2 749 men and boys were still registered as
mineworkers. 200
In 1871 when Charles Barnham, a physician from 
Truro and a former medical investigator for the 
Kinnaird Commission, presented a significant paper to 
the British Medical Association, it evoked no 
response. The apathy persisted despite his exposure 
of the high incidence of lung disease among Cornish 
miners and his suggestion of the causative role of
dust 201 Apart from a brief two-year boom, from 1870
to 1372, the tin mining industry was in decay and of
minimal account in the national economy. 202
Tin's relative economic unimportance seems to 
explain the lack of interest of both the government 
and the medical profession in the prevalence of lung 
disease in the tin mines. This was so in 1892 when 
neither party followed up the findings, which the 
superintendent of government statistics, Dr William 
Ogle, submitted to the Labour Commission. His 
comparative occupational tables for the years 1830, 
1881 and 1882 revealed that, unlike the case of 
colliers, there had been no decrease in the incidence 
of lung disease amongst tin miners since Farr had, 
thirty years earlier, quoted his statistics to the 
Kinnaird Commission.'^ In addition, tin miners - and, 
not surprisingly, potters, whose mortality was
marginally lower - "had the highest death-rate from
U
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disease of the lungs of any occupied class in the 
United Kingdom" For tin miners the average death
rate was three times higher than that of coal and 
ironstone miners; and in the age groups twenty-five to 
thirty-five, thirty-five to forty-five, and forty-five
to fifty-five, their mortality was three, four and a
205half, and two and a half times greater.
Unlike Farr's computations which remained 
unpublicised, the "oft-quoted statistics" of Ogle, 
presented under similar circumstance, seem to have 
been widely circulated. They were certainly common
OA Aknowledge amongst doctors and mining inspectors.''^ 
Although health officers understood the implications 
of the figures, they apparently lacked the resolve or 
inclination to heed Ogle's warning that "diseases of 
the respiratcry organs other than phthisis 
Ctuberculosis!" were responsible for the high death
rate amongst a particular occupational group 207
The public also disregarded this aspect of Ogle's 
report. Despite the "excessive mortality in all ages" 
which silicosis c a u s e d , t h e  chronic lung disease 
lacked the spectacular ingredients to provoke popular 
indignation and sympathy for what was essentially a 
working class problem. Its lack of dramatic impact 
contrasted strongly with the intense feelings aroused 
by "phossy's jaw", ar. occupational disease that caused 
agonising pain and disfigurement in young girls and 
women. Its hideous spectacle evoked public outrage 
which led in the early 20th century to the world-wide
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abolition of phosphorous in the match making 
industry
disease statistics for 1892 and 1893.
The indifference of health officers was reflected 
in other ways too. Mining inspectors overlooked 
deteriorating dust levels, the results of which were 
evident in the registrar's annual mortality and
But the
alarming rise in the death rate for tin miners in the 
forty to fifty-five year age g r o u p , a s  -these 
figures strikingly demonstrated, evoked no public or 
official response. Despite the considerable medical 
knowledge about the causative link between dust and 
lung disease, health officers were diffident about 
drawing obvious conclusions concerning the prevalence 
of disease and mortality on the tin mines. The state 
did . nothing; and safety measures remained 
conspicuously a b s e n t . I t  is scarcely surprising 
that Cornish tin miners seemed oblivious of the 
increased dangers of their calling.
These heightened dust levels were in part a 
reflection of the depressed condition of the Cornish 
tin mining industry. Its deteriorating economic
position, accelerated by Australian competition during 
the 1870s, necessitated the introduction by the 
mineowners of labour-saving devices and the 
application of new technox-gies. Such measures were 
designed to prevent the closure of additional mines
and to revitalise the industry. !i: Ironically, both
the introduction of mechanised rock drill.; during the
■^J
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1870s and the substitution o-f dynamite for gunpowder 
seriously endangered the lives of miners at an earlier 
age • than that to which they were already 
accustomed.
Minor strikes erupted amongst tin miners in
o 1 gCornwall during the 1890s.-" This was a new form of 
resistance amongst the Cornish miners who until this 
time, in contrast to the colliers, had a history of
t Afeeble union organisation: Cornish miners had
217tended to avoid potential conflict by emigrating, 
Although the disturbances coincided with the 
publication in the 1890s of the registrar's mortality 
statistics, the strikes were linked to discontent with
^ 1 Qhours and wages, grievances which reflected the
changed status Cornish miners from that of 
"handicraft" workers to wage labourers.-'^ -^  ^ The 
evidence does not show that the dissatisfaction of 
miners was eMplicitly related to health and safety 
condi tions. Inured to shortened lives and long 
accustomed to the presence of dust, Cornish miners 
were not aware of - nor were they alerted to - the 
morbid threat posed by increased levels of dust.
Simultageously, beginning in 1892, the concerted 
industrialisation of the Witwatersrand gold mines 
began. Cornwall braced itself for "another rush of 
emigration", this time to Johannesburg, which became 
styled "the Cornishman's El D o r a d o " . T h e  news of 
the "LAND OF TRANVAALIAN BOLD" also spread to other
mining centres; and colliers from all parts of the
98
British Isles departed for "remuneration never dreamt 
of by them at home". They were accompanied by lead 
miners from Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland, 
Westmoreland, Yorkshire and Lancashire and as far
O'? Aafield as the Isle of W i g h t . A l s o ,  Cornish miners 
did not go unprepared. Before leaving, many of them 
equipped themselves to handle the mechanised rock 
d r i l l s . T h e s e  drills had first been introduced on 
the Witwatersrand in 1889, within three years of the 
discovery of gold;'^ '^ ° and by 1896 appro>:imately
1 115 were in use. 227
Coal and ironstone miners who had for thirty 
years enjoyed "considerable immunity from pulmonary 
consumption" and "respiratory disease" seemed blithely 
unaware of the inherent dangers to their health and
OOOlives in gold mining. Cornish miners, inured to
such occupational perils, were fatalistic about their
future. In 1863 a surgeon giving evidence before the
Kinnaird Commission affirmed his knowledge of the
prevalence of "miners' disease" and explained why
miners did not consult him;
Because 1 think that they look upon it as 
part and parcel of their business. A man 
embarks as a miner, and he looks forward to 
the day when he will have the disease; he 
expects it, — he reconciles himself to it, - 
and puts up with it.'^ '^^
Dr E. Williams's perceptions of miners' attitudes were 
confirmed by the views of D. Busza, =>n elderly Cornish 
miner. Having outlived most of his contemporaries, 
Buzza expressed a hint of satisfaction, if not pride,
- 99
at beatinq the odds:
Can you go up the ladders now? - Very 
badly; nothing like what I used to do; but 
then there is one thing besides this, my age
is great; am an old man for a miner, 60
years of age; I uas 60 last F^bruary.-^s' 3230
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CHAPTER 3
PREVENTIVE ASPECTS OF SILICOSIS! AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
"We venture to express our convi-tiori that 
there is no reason why work underground in 
whatever kind of mine, should not be a 
perfectly healthy employment; the work 
itself is thoroughly wholesome both to body 
and mind, and the special dangers, whether 
to health or to life and limb, associated 
with different kinds of mining, are su< h as, 
if recognised and faced, can be avoids’ 
provided that both employers and employed 
will co-operate in bringing this end 
about."-- Haldane Commission, 1904^
"If this is so Cthat mining can be perfectly 
healthy employment!, then I think -^ he title 
which Drs. Irvine and Macaulay might have 
chosen for this paper would be 'The
Prevention of 
D i sease'."--Dr J,
Preventible 
McNeillie, 1906.
L sic 3
At the turn of the 20th century pre-, antive 
medicine was in its infancy - an evaluation which many 
current doctors still apply to this branch of medicine 
today. Preventive medicine was at that time narrowly 
focused on sanitation and "hygiene", which constituted 
a branch of public health; and its major object was to 
combat germs. An extract from an article in the
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LsTic&t of 1705 orovides an apt illustration:
I'hen in the future the historian sits down 
to record the progress of preventive 
medicine throughout the world, the recorf 
will consist very largely of an account O'.^ 
the diffusion of English sar.'tatiort and 
ideas through the instrumentality of her 
Crown and self-governing colonies. Other 
national, however, will also justly claim 
their share. For instavice, the story of the 
battle fought by the Americans in Havana 
against, not the Spaniards, but, the 
stegomyia fasciata, the bearer of yellow 
fever, is an excellent example of hygienic 
progress made immediately after the war.*^
Such views gained strength from the sanitary and 
hygienic provisions applied to the coal mining 
industry of 17th century Britain. Such remedial 
measures successfully reduced the high mortality 
rates, particularly from lung disease, which were 
prevalent amongst coalworkers during the first half of 
that century. It was comparatively easy for the state 
to prescribe prophylactic provisions in a single 
industry. But the protection of workers from silica 
dust was a more complex problem, which sanitary, and 
hygienic measures alone could not curb; and the task 
of introducing remedial legislation to reduce 
silicosis was exacerbated by the vast array of 
silica-producing industries, including certain kinds 
of hard rock mining.
This chapter shows that silica is ubiquitous and 
therefore an important explanation for the widespread 
occurrence of silicosis. It also demonstrates how the 
different forms of silica vary in their potential for 
causing disability and death.
1 Ih
The chapter -further discusses a number of
theories accounting -for the toxicity o-f silica and 
explains some of the complexities o-f dust. In so 
doing it -focuses on the origins and development of 
non~,nedical technologies used for suppressing and 
diluting dust, and it examines medical controls to 
reduce both the incidence and prevalence of 
silicosis. These preventive measures illustrate the 
successes of doctors. But they also show the 
limitations of conventional medicine in the field of 
preventive medicine in general, and of occupational 
health in particular.
Vicente Navarro perceptively warns that 
industrial illnesses cannot be viewed solely as the 
logical and inevitable outcome of industrialisation. 
Such a mechanistic interpretation ignores the process 
of industrialisation and its relationships wi'Ch those 
forces which have helped to mobilise capitalist 
societies.'^ Therefore although some of the complex 
social, economic and political responses to industrial 
disease are noted in this section, they will be 
examined in detail only in later chapters.
This section also shows how the Miners' Phthisis 
Prevention Committee, the South African Miners' 
Phthisis Medical Bureau and the South African 
Institute for Medical Research helped create a 
world-wide awareness and understanding of the problems 
of silicosis. The e are achievements which many
e=]overseas authorities have acknowledged. The decision
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by the International Labour Organisation to hold the 
■first international con-ference on silicosis in 
Johannesburg in J.930 was a logical consequence of such 
pioneering work. At this conference, attended by 
represej itatives of many countries, South African 
fi'iedical and mining experts presented nineteen of the
i-twenty-six papers.'^
The element silicon is widely distributed in 
nature- It comprises approximately 23 per cent of the 
earth's crust and is second in abundance only to 
o/vgen.^ Although silicon is found in practically all 
rocks and in many sands, clays and soils, it does not 
occur in a pure form. When combined with oxygen it 
forms a chemical chain called silicon dioxide, 
colloquially known as silica, which, as we have seen, 
causes silicosis. It may also combine with oxygen 
plus other elements to form more complex chains called
CJsilicates, of which asbestos is one example.“ The 
ubiquity of silica is therefore one reason that it is 
a major health hazard.
It is believed that the crystalline structure, 
peculiar to silica, accounts for its potential to
Ocause lung damage. Silica occurs in three kinds of 
crystal forms. The largest group constitutes the 
macro-crystal 1ine forms. These include quarts, by far 
the most common, as well as sand, sandstone, quartzite 
and certain granite formations. Cristobalite and 
tridymite, which are uncommon but extremely dangerous 
varieties found in meteorites and certain volcanic
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rocks, are part o-f this group. So, too, are coesite 
and stishovite, which are even rarer -forms occurring 
in meteorite craters.^'"^ Although these rare 
macro—crystal 1 ine -forms have, as yet, no industrial 
application, they are included here because o-f their 
experimental value to research workers in exploring 
the fibrogenic properties of silica. In contrast, 
crypto- or micro-crystal 1ine forms, such as 
chalcedony, of which true flint is a form, are used 
occupationally. So, too, are the non-crystalline, or 
amorphous, kinds. Consequently silica is also found 
in the non-crystal 1ine gemstone, the opal, and in 
diatomaceous earth, which is cr josed of minute 
skeletons of fresh-watef or marine plants. Although 
scientists do not believe that non-crystalline forms 
of silica have fibrogenic properties, these silica 
forms may acquire them if heated and melted! such 
processes convert the non—crystal1ine forms into the 
macro-crystal 1ine ones of cristobalite and tridymite, 
which are even more dangerous than quarts.
Metal miners all over the world face the hasard 
of silica in two mining processes. They first 
encounter it when digging through the country rock to 
reach the deposits in the development stage of the 
mines. Also, as there are usually large quantities of 
silica in the lodes, seams and reefs in which the 
actual ores are embedded, exposure to silica occurs 
during the excavation of the ore, that is during the 
production stage of mining. The Witwatersrand gold
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■fields illustrate this point well.
When go?d was discovered on the Rand, it was 
found in sevet^al series of beds or strata, known as 
reefs, of which the Main Reef was then the most 
i m p o r t a n t , T h e  reefs are studded with pebbles 
ranging in size from peas to hens' eggs; and this 
formation distinguishes them from other non-auriferous 
strata. As these conglomerate beds resembled a type 
cif confectionery decorated with almonds, the Dutch 
likened them to banket, which became their name.-^^ 
SiKty to 8«-< per cent of the banket comprises quartz.^^^
The scattered pebbles, which contain grains and
pellets of pyrites and the finely divided gold, also
consist largely of quartz. These components are
bonded together by’ silica; and it is in this siliceous
cement, and in the pyrites, that the pin-pricks of 
1 Agold are found. To reach the gold-bearing banket, 
shafts are sunk and tunnels are driven through the 
prevailing rock. The rock consists principally of 
quartzite, a sandstone rock which has been hardened 
and solidified by metamorphosis; and sand-stone shale 
also abounds.
This geological description makes it clear that 
even during the haphazard first stage of mining on the 
Witwatersrand, from 1886 to 1892, miners were exposed 
to the danger of silica dust. After management in 
1892 systematised the development and production 
processes, the risk to miners of contracting silicosis
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intensified. The danger persisted until the outbreak 
of the Anglo-Boer War, in 1899, and was all the more 
serious because of the complete absence of dust 
preventive measures. During the post-war period, 
between 1901 and 1912 - and even later - the exposure 
of miners to excessive dust levels continued; although 
remedial measures were eventually introduced, they
were poorly implemented 17
The huge number of miners afflicted by silicosis 
on the Witwatersrand was linked partly to the nature 
of the gold deposits. These were unique in the world 
in two major respects, namely their extensiveness and 
regularity,Therefore the concentration of a large 
number of miners in a single but contained gold 
producing region led to a prevalence of silicosis 
which, in absolute terms, exceeded that of any other 
hard rock mining centre in the world.
But there was also another reason for the 
excessive prevalence of dust and hence the disease. 
It concerns the nature of the ores, which on the 
Witwatersrand are generally of low grade quality. 
This meant that when average grade ore of 
approximately 6,5 penny weights Cdwts) per ton was 
being mined, two to three tons of rock had to be 
excavated and processed to extract a single ounce of 
gold.^ Accordingly, the industry could be viable only 
if huge tonnages were milled. Also, the mineowners 
were determined to extract from the reefs every 
possible ounce of gold.'^ *"’ This led them to expand the
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scale and to intensity the rate o-f development and 
production to levels which other mining centres did 
not a t t a i n ; i n  relative terms the monthly tonnage 
e>;cavated and processed on ths Witwatersrand exceeded 
monthly tonnages elsewhere."^-^ The resort by management 
to such techniques released vastly increased dust 
densities to which miners were exposed. Despite the 
disclaimers of Transvaal doctors that the occurence o-f 
the disease was global, the incidence o-f silicosis, 
both in absolute and relative terms, was higner and o-f 
a more accelerated kind on the Witwatersrand gold 
fields than at other similar mining centres.-^^
Not only metal miners are exposed to silica.-"^ -'
Coal miners also face the danger. In bituminous (or
"soft") coal mining small amounts of particulate
silica exist in the airborne coal dust. In the mining
of anthracite, a less common form of coal, silica dust
is generated in far larger quantities. In Wales and
Somerset, in south-west England, and in European
countries, including Germany and Russia, miners have
to tunnel through siliceous sandstone rock to reach
the "hard-headings" from which the anthracite deposits
are hewn.-^“ While the presence of silica in coal dust
was widely recognised in the late- 19th century and the
early decades of the 20th century, only a handful of
perceptive research workers linked the presence of
silica particles with the lung diseases of coal
miners. Like the descriptions of Bernardino Ramassini
(
at the beginning of the 18th centur y, do ct or s'
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accounts of the injured lungs, were only much later to 
be classified as typical examples of
OQsi 1 ico—anthracosis. Therefore at the turn of the 
20th century, although the majority of medical experts 
clearly recognised the potential of silica dust for 
lung injury, they generally dismissed the danger of
coal dust."^ Also they believed that coal dust had a
propfnylactic effect on respirable stone dust; doctors
held that coal dust protected workers against lurg
K)damage, particularly by pulmonary tuberculosis.^- This 
explains why, until tru. middle of the 20th century, 
pneumoconiosis was ignored on the South African coal
mines.
It was only after 1930, following intensive 
research in Germany and Britain, that the dangers of
coal dust became clear;.31 and in 1943 British
legislation introduced compensation for coalworkers'
- y  t~ypneumoconiosi5 . There is still controversy about 
coal dust's potential for damage. One school contends 
that, irrespective of whether or not silica is mixed 
in the du=»t, coal dui. t on its own is damaging, and 
that an overload in the lungs produces fibrosis and 
emphysema.The other school argues that coal dust is 
benign and that it disables colliers only when it is 
mixed with significant quantities of silica.'"'^  Both 
schools agree, however, that progressive massive 
fibrosis, with an associated tuberculosis, can develop 
in coal-dusted lungs. Both groups also believe that 
the presence of silica dust plays a greater or lesser
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role in the genesis of coalworkers' pneumoconiosis.
It was not in miners' lungs th'-*- silica was 
originally found.Initially doctors i tified it in 
the lungs of tradesmen, including potters, 
metal-grinders and millstone makers; and it is to 
non-mining dusty industries to which we now must
turn.57
Quartz, the most abundant form of silica, is 
widely used in industry because it is cheap and has 
other valuable p r o p e r t i e s . I t s  peculiar crystalline
structure enables it to resist fracture or cleavage.
59so endowing it with a required industrial hardness. 
Also, it is of great importance in the refractory 
industries because of its high melting temperature, 
its low co-e .-f icient of expansion and its inertness at
high temperatures.Workers are therefore exposed to
silica in a wide variety of industrial occupations.
As quartz is a major component of sand, 
sandstone, flint and quartzite, numerous jobs 
involving their use pose a health hazard. Workers 
come into d ' ect contact with quartz in sand-blasting, 
in any tasks involving the use of concrete and mortar, 
and in the manufacture of certain types of abrasives 
and scouring powders. Apart from their use in roads, 
railways and building construction, sandstone and 
quartzite are used to manufacture stonework. In the 
masonry industry, and particularly in the production 
of monumental masonry, the cutting, cleaning and
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polishing processas release dangerous amounts o-f dust 
in c’ ;e proximity to the craftsmen. Flint dust is 
equally hazardous. "Glass sand", or "potter's flint", 
derived from grinding or crushing calcined flint 
pebbles, is highly prized in the manufacture of 
optical glass and pottery products, including china, 
earthenware, tiles and ceramics.; Vitreous silica, or 
"quartz glass", which is obtained in a similar way and 
is used for making precision instruments, also falls 
into this category. These powders are highly sought 
aftiir because of their purity which does not stain the 
finished products. The production of these powders, 
however, poses serious health risks.
Under certain circumstances tiny quantities of 
silica dust may also cause silicosis. This occurs, 
for instance, when silica is superheated. As has been 
noted, the grinding of flint pebbles for pottery 
glazes is a dangerous occupation. So, too, is the 
cleaning of pottery after it has been kiln-fired at 
high temperatures. Under the very high temperature 
conditions, the silica in the clay is converted into 
Cristobalite and tridymite. Although the level of 
respirable silica is relatively low, the loose dust on 
the utensils is highly fibrogenic.
This also happens with industrial ganister. 
Ganister, a variety of sandstone—shale, can withstand 
high temperatures. As a result in the past it was 
often mixed with clay to make bricks for furnaces in 
iron and steel foundries. Undef- normal conditions
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ganister dust is potentially hazardous. But its 
silica content, as with flint, becomes specially 
harmful when subjected to high temperature 
conditions. Early medical works frequently refer to 
the dusted lungs of ganister workers and potters; and 
their indisposition - silicosis - was termed "ganister
A -ilung" or "potter's rot".
The possibility of dust exposure is not limited 
to those who work in confined spaces. Risky outdoor 
operations include sand-blasting and the quarrying of 
granite, quartz, sandstone and slate. Quarrying also 
involves related tasks such as hewing, cutting and 
shaping blocks of stone. As a result there was a high 
incidence of silicosis amongst the masons responsible 
for Cragleith sandstone buildings in the city of 
Edinburgh.
The dust generated by stone crushing is also 
dangerous. On the Witwatersrand gold mines the 
prevalence of silicosis was markedly higher amongst 
underground workers than amongst surface hands. 
Health officers, accordingly, directed preventive 
measures almost entirely at underground conditions. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1710, doctors began to 
advocate safeguards for surface workers at crusher 
stations.They, too, were falling prey to the "white 
death", but in fewer numbers than m i n e rs .L at er 
investigations proved the validity of the physicians' 
assertion; and in 1914 compensation for silicosis was 
extended to include crusher— station workers on the
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gold fiiines.^ ^
In some industrial processes the silica in the 
airborne dust may exceed concentrations of 60 per 
cent. Even so, it is interesting to observe that 
workers subject to these conditions do not develop 
silicosis. Nor do desert dwellers who are frequently 
exposed to dust storms. There are two reasons for 
this phenomenon. First, the dust particles may be too 
large and coarse to be inhaled. Second, if they are 
inhaled, the respiratory system has no diff icul "■'/ in 
exrilling them because of their physical composition. 
It follows that only a certain portion of '>e total 
airborne dust generated in mining or In industry
constitutes a health hazard.46
Two major variables, suspension characteristics 
and size, create the toxic fraction of airborre dust: 
first, the dust must be able to remain suspended in 
the air for a reasonable length of time;^^ and second, 
the particles must be sufficiently tiny to fall within 
the respirabli? fraction. Only those particles which 
are less than seven microns in diameter - a micron is 
0,001 of a millimetre — constitute the respirable 
fraction; and they have the potential to be both 
inhaled and retained in the lungs. The coarse 
particles within this fraction may be significant in 
causing airways diseases, including chronic bronchitis 
and emphysema. But they are too large to penetrate 
the alveoli, or tiny air sacs, situated in the deep
lung tissue.*^- The particles with this potential are
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even more minute. They range -from one to three 
microns in diameter; and particles of only this size 
cause si 1 icosis.
While most physicians by the beginning of the 
20th century agreed that silica dust caused silicosis, 
several years elapsed before they began to suspect 
that particle size was also significant.'^"^ Also, they 
had formulated simplistic and mistaken theories to 
explain the toxicity of silica.
Such impressionistic theories were in conflict 
vjith the new imperative — the 20th century demand for 
scientifically proven medical answers- The 
eclecticism of the 19th century medical doctors 
spilled over to the first two decades of the 20th 
century.* But research-oriented doctors were gradually 
obliged to specialise. Even so, it was bevond the 
scope of the medical profession alone to solve all the 
numerous complex problems which occupational medicine 
entailed. Medical specialists had to rel^ on the 
expertise of professionals in the non-medical
sciences, including engineering, chemistry and
physics. Specialisation and collaboration were both 
compatible and desirable in the field of occupational 
health, particularly with regard to dust diseases.
Specialist medical doctors applied the findings 
of other disciplines to their own field; and their own 
discoveries assisted other experts to devise 
precautionary and preventive measures. In these
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years, as in the 19th century, -forensics was the 
starting point -for many investigations. Through 
post-mortem examinations o-f the lungs, research 
workers -from a growing number of diverse scientific 
fields measured and quantified silica particles and 
analysed their composition to explain the damaging 
potential of the particles.
Although silica has a low chemical activity, it 
stimulates severe biological activity in the lungs.
As importanc, the reaction of the lungs to silica is 
out of all proportion to the amount of foreign 
materials small quantities of silica produce large 
amounts of fibrous tissue. This has puzzled
scientists ever since silica was identified in the 
lungs; and at least sixty theories ~ physical, 
chemical, immunological and "macrophage” - have been
E TC?advanced to explain its damaging mechanisms.
At first it seemed logical to attribute the 
fibrogenic potential of silica to its physical 
properties. This was the only recognised view at the 
turn of the 20th century when atf---*tion in the 
Transvaal and Britain focused on silicosis. Doctors 
at this juncture believed that the hardness and 
sharpness of the silica particles abraded and 
lacerated the lung lining causing fibrosis. "The dust 
quarried on the Rand is about as sharp and as hard as 
possible," said Dr Walter Pakes, the Transvaal 
government bacteriologist in 1903. He added: "The 
sharper the particles the shorter the life of the
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miner. ,,56 This theory seemed so plausible that
scientists f,^ und it to be congruent I'jith the
pioneering -findings, in 1913, o-f the chemist, John 
McCrae, that only the minute silica particles were 
responsible -for silicosis. In 1923, however, an 
American doctor, Leroy II. Gardner, convincingly 
re+uted the the,r.>ry by showing that the harder and 
equally sharp dusts of carborundum and diam,:>nd lacked 
the toxicity of silica.^^ Gardner further proved that 
soft, amorphous ‘ silica was f ibr,agen ic, while
stishovite, with its angular crystalline structure.
was not 58
Research into the pihysicfitl pr,r>perties of silica 
continued. In 1935 P. Heffernan, a British medical 
officer, tried to prove that freshly fractured quarts 
had greater fibr,:>genic p,3tency than quarts which had 
aged. This was an attempt t,rj counter the propositi>Dns 
of the then pred<riminant chemical school. Alth>ough 
Heffe,'nan's theory had a number of adherents for sc<me
C.-0time, it, t>:io, has been discarded. A more
sophisticated physical hypinthesis is the
pieso-electric one, which suggests that the
compression >:if silica particles releases a toxic 
electric charge. The the,:iry has, however, been 
discarded in the West; and Russian scientists
currently pursuing such research have had no
conclusive results. 60
During the 1920s and 1930s chemical theories held 
sway. A major hypothesis, developed by British
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scientists, was the "solubility" or "chemical toxicity 
theory o-f silicosis". It stemmed -from the -findings 
that, although ordinary quartz has a low solubility 
level, powdered quartz, namely silica dust, has a high 
level of solubility. Prominent proponents of the 
chemical school included W. E. Bye and W. J. Purdy 
and, later, E. H. Kettle and E. J. King. From 1922 
these scientists argued that the silicic acid
liberated by silica dissolved in the tissue fluids of 
the body and caused fibrosis.^ This explanation was 
invalidated, however, when research workers found that 
the amounts of released silicic acid bore no 
correlation with the degree of f i b r o s i s . A
reinterpretation of this theory in the 1950s by a 
British chemist P. F. Holt, emphasised the surface 
size of silica particles.But this hypothesis cannot 
explain why tridymite, with its low level of silica 
solubility, produces more scar tissue than other forms 
of quartz with higher solubility rates.*^ "^
Immunological theories were at various stages 
also introduced to explain why persons working under 
virtually identical dusty conditions were differently 
af-fected by silica. Such theories gained strength 
from the fact that every person is unique; he is 
"characterised by his own individual umbrel la". 
Doctors assumed that the varied fibrotic responses 
were due to individual allergic reactions to silica in 
tk lung tissues. This narrow focus on hereditary 
factors is presently not entirely discounted. But
- 131 -
immunological theories today place more emphasis on 
acquired -features. These encompass a host o-f
environmental agencies of which irritant gases, 
including nitrous fumes, atmospher'ic pollution and 
tobacco smoking, are a fevj. Such agents do not 
directly cause fibrosis: they may affect the
dust-clearing mechanisms of the lungs, alter an 
individual's vulnerability and predispose him to 
developing other lung conditions, which in turn may
reduce his immunity to silicosis hh
It is in this dust-clearing function of the lungs 
that the "macrophage" theory is located. This 
hypothesis, which most scientists currently support, 
was originally propounded by A. C. Allison and his 
co-workers. Aided by improved techniques in tissue 
culture and the development of the electron 
microscope, much research work is still devoted to
this proposition hi
Macrophages are free-lying tissue cells - in the 
lungs they are found in the alveolar spaces - and they 
constitute one of the body's defence lines against 
invading organisms.'^® Through the process of 
phagacytosis the cell membrane is able first to 
depress and engulf a foreign particle, and later tc 
destroy it by means of released enzymes. Sometimes, 
however, as with the tubercule bacillus, the foreign 
body is resistant to the enzymes; and when the 
macrophage dies, the foreign body is released back 
into the lung tissue.
In the case of silica a different reaction is 
believed to occur. According to doctors, after the 
macrophage has absorbed the silica particle, this 
particular foreign body alters - or destroys - the 
enzymes. Consequently when the macrophage dies, both 
the original silica particle together with the altered 
macrophage content are released. Fresh macrophages 
then congregate to attack the foreign substances; and 
they, too, are in turn altered and destroyed. Chronic 
inflammation results; and the healing process is 
ironically fibrosis.
Despite advafjces in the understanding of the 
toxic mechanism of silica, the findings of scientists 
have had only limited application in the field of 
prevent on. A striking example,, however, was the 
application of the chemical "solubility" theory in 
Canadian gold mines. Aluminium oxide powder was 
released into the mines as a coating for silica dust 
to reduce its solubility, so stifling its fibrogenic 
potential. Although other dust suppressant measures 
accompanied the use of this compound, it was thought 
to have prophylactic v a l u e . B u t  experiments have 
since revealed the compound's weaknesses. Its use 
delays, but does not prevent, the onset of fibrosis in 
animals. Also, in numerous cases silicosis manifested 
itself in the animals long after they had been removed
fronj dust exposure. 72
Prophylactic methods have been more successful in 
other industrial processes, particularly those where
1 oo
sandstone grinding wheels were formerly used. In such 
cases emery, corundum and carborundum have proved to 
be relatively safe substitutes.^'^ Also, relatively 
harmless compounds have replaced flint in the 
manufacture of scouring powders and abrasive paper and 
cloth. All the same, substitutions of this kind owe 
more to general knowledge of the dangers of silica 
than to any specific theory related to its disabling 
properties. Likewise, new i/nmunological precautions 
are the result of environmental studies. While 
generations of scientists have gradually expanded our 
knowledge of the fibrogenic mechanisms of silica, 
their theories and findings have had only limited 
application in the fiel f prevention. Also, there 
is still no certainty that the current and popular 
macrophage theory provides conclusive answers.
Other avenues of dust research have been more 
successfully applied in practice. By the beginning O'^  ^
the 20tn century health officers, who believed that 
dust particles caused silicosis, did not then realise 
the importance of particle size. The visibility of 
dust clouds, accordingly, was used as a criterion for 
judging whether or not a working place was a dangerous 
zone. Such judgements were wrong because visible dust 
clouds are caused by particles larger than those which 
constitute the respirable fraction. The most 
dangerous dust particles - thode less than 10 microns 
in diameter - leave no trace of haziness and are, in 
fact, invisible to the human eye. The potency of
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these particles in causing lung damage was established 
in 1913, as we have noted, by the research work o-F Dr 
John McCrae, a chemist at the newly founded South
y~7African Institute for Medical Research. ' His findings
reinforced the need for col1aboration between medical 
doctors, scientists and mining engineers on the 
Wi twatersrand.
Until then the medical profession had been 
responsible for most of the research on silicosis. 
Therefore this harnessing in ths' Transvaal of the 
expertise of members from many other professions 
marked a new departure. Co-operative investigations 
aimed at the prevention of silicosis in mining were 
initiated in South Africa; and the Miners' Phthisis 
Prevention Committee was institited in 1911. The 
personnel of this body, which was jointly funded by 
the government and the Chamber of Mines, was drawn 
from both the state and the private sector.''^
Another change occurred almost simultaneously. 
As we have seen, prior investigations on silicosis in 
Europe had centred largely on its occurrence in 
industry. But since then until now, throughout the 
British Empire and the Western world, research on 
silicosis has focused largely on its occurrence in
yomining.'^ This new emphasis was triggered largely by 
the disclosures of the alarming prevalence - and even 
notoriety - of the disease on the Witwatersrand gold 
mines.
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With McCrae's pioneering findings research on 
particle size continued.®*-’ Simultaneously mining 
engineers created rudimentary 'dust-measuring 
instruments.®^ These, notably the Kotze konimeter, 
devised by the government mining engineer, Robert 
Nelson Kotze, were used to calculate the number of 
invisible but loKic particles of dust circulating in 
working places in the mines.®'^ Also, the konimeter was 
useful for making snap dust measurements in dangerous 
localised zones. The use of the konimeter involves 
laborious and tedious particle counts. But it 
represented a major innovation as, until then, dust 
density had been measured by weight, an inaccurate and 
crude dust-calculation method.®'-^
Dust measurement is an extremely complicated 
procedure; and it was only in the 1930s that some of 
its complexities began to be unravelled. An 
understanding of the complexities of dust resulted 
partly from the introduction of the sophisticated 
thermal precipitator which, like the konimeter, is
OAalso used for taking "on the spot" dust samples. 
Research in this field continues today. The 
measurement of dust assists health officers to assess 
the degree of risk in the industrial environment; dust 
measurement helps to control the pneumoconioses as
well as other dust-induced diseases 85
Although the measurement of dust is a significant 
indicator of risk in a given situation, its 
suppression is crucial. This is accomplished by two
-
inte?r-related methods. The “wet" methods involve the 
use of water at the very source of dust production. 
The "dry" methods are important in eliminating the 
remaining dust. Measures for achieving the latter 
objective involve the use of powerful ventilation 
fanr^ , which dilute the air, and filtration units, 
which catch and extract most of the dangerous residual 
particles- Other precautions, primarily connected 
with blasting operations, are the removal of- all 
personnel from highly dangerous dust zones and the 
imposition of restricted re-entry periods.®*^ Devising 
and implementing these efficient techniques for dust 
suppression, dilution and extraction took several 
decades. But since 1916 the efforts and 
accomplishments of the South African gold mining 
industry were, and are, pre-eminent in the field of 
mining throughout the world. This is reflected by the
apparent minimal incidence of silicosis on South
87African gold mines today.
This success story was neither swift nor smooth. 
Current technologies for delivering water are
obviously highlv' advanced compared with methods in use 
at the turn of the century. All the same, 
contemporary principles of suppressing dust through 
water, which were very early advocated by the few 
concerned medical doctors and other professionals 
associated with the gold mining industry, are
identical to those applied today.®® Similarly, this
small group of reformers also counselled the
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prohibition of in-shift blasting, and the introduction 
of prescriptive periods for the exit and re-entry of 
workers to blasting areas. Such measures, they 
correctly believed, would diminish the risk for
workers of excessive dust exposure, and would 
simultaneously provide sufficient time for the
0<Dsaturation and settling of the dust- Even so, from 
1902 to 1914 - and later — management was generally 
dilatory in systematically and efficiently 
implementing these sound principles. Clearly during 
this period management's professed goal to eliminate 
silicosis from the mines was subordinate to its
commitment to reduce working costs 90
Between 1916 and 1920 the mineowners finally 
accepted their share of responsibility for eradicating 
silica dust though systematic watering and the 
prohibition of in-shift blasting. But shortly 
afterwards mining and medical professionals, who were 
studying dust composition and movement, realised that 
the use of water had limitations. Although dust may 
adhere to drops of water, it does not necessarily 
cause them to precipitate and settle. The minute
particles in water suspension constitute a hazard as 
grave as dry dust. The same danger also exists if 
dirty or contaminated water is provided, as on 
evaporation the water releases dangerous quantities of 
dust into the air. Such problems created technical 
difficulties and raised working costs, dilemmas which 
management both had to confront and to reconcile with
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other priorities.
At the turn o-f the 20th century the small group 
of healt' officers in the Transvaal also advocated 
improved ventilation as a preventive measure for 
silicosis, a suggestion in line with contemporary 
international views. Such views held that the main 
function of ventilation was to keep the different 
parts of a mine in a "healthy" condition and 
"therefore free from all accumulations or mixtures of 
dangerous gases". Also, contemporary mining 
engineers perceived ventilation as a source of cool 
air so providing workers with comfortable temperature 
and humidity conditions, an environment in which they
O Acould achieve maximum productivity. From such 
considerations it is clear that health officers 
interpreted ventil-^tion as a general air dilutant for 
the promotion of hygiene and as a source of cooling, 
but not as a specific dust dilutant. • In coal mines 
numerous inflammable and noxious gases abound, unless 
precautions are taken to diminish their risks. 
Therefore in view of the primacy and economic 
importance of the coal mining industry in 19th century 
Europe, and particularly in Britain, it was logical 
for health officers to emphasise the gas-dilutant 
qualities of ventilation.
During the first half of the 19th century the 
mortality amongst coalworkers in Western Europe was 
excessively high. Lung diseases produced a large 
number of deaths, particularly amongst colliers in the
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forty- to fify—year age group; and in poorly 
ventilated mine workings volatile gases caused 
high-profile accidents. In Britain these appalling 
circumstances, as we have n o t e d , p r o m p t e d  state 
intervention. In the enactment of new safety and 
health regulations for coal mines, in 1842, 1850 and 
1855, a high priority was given to improved 
ventilation. But the shaping of these measures owed 
xittle to advainces in medical knowledge, particularly 
the importance of dust, and to the influence of the 
medical profession. Rather, public pressure was the
dominant force? 96
To meet the new legislative standards for air 
purity the owners of the coal mines ware obliged to 
supplement natural ventilation; and they frequently 
did so by installing mechanical f a n s . I m p r o v e d  
standards in hygiene and ventilation, sustained by 
public vigilance, trade-union vigour and a reasonably 
strong state inspectorate, significantly reduced
coalworker mor tal i ty; and by the end of the 19th 
century doctors regarded coal mining as a relatively 
safe and healthy occupation. An additional reason 
for satisfaction was the apparent decline in the 
prevalence of coalworkers' pneumoconiosis, then known 
as colliers' phthisis or anthracosis. Doctors 
attributed this phenomenon solely to improved 
ventilation, a term which, as we have seen, also 
connoted hygiene. Health officers did not conclude 
that better ventilation had diluted the dust
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._vels. 100
Also, throughout the remainder o-f the 19th 
century and during the first two decades of the 20th 
century dust levels on the British coal mines remained 
relatively low and were virtually stationary, an 
aspect which has been overlooked by medical 
h i s t o r i a n s . T h e  two major technologies responsible 
for increasing the dust density in hard rock mines 
were not transferred to the ,.oal fields. First, 
because of its risk in conjunction with c^.al-induced 
gases, dynamite was not used as a substitute for 
gunpowder ^ and gunpowder blasting continued to 
release a coarse rather than a fine dust. Second, the 
industry remained largely labour intensive. 
Power— driven machines, namely mechanised coal cutters, 
did not replace hand tools on a large scale until the 
192C's. Consequently until then, coal deposits 
continued to be hewn by hand; and it was at a 
relatively late stage in the history of meci' ">nisation 
that dust levels on the coal fields increased 
significantly. The improved health of coalworkers can 
therefore be attributed to a decline in 
ventilation-related accidents and to improved 
standards in air pur if ication, dus*" dilution and 
hygiene.
Unlike colliers, metal miners do not generally 
face the danger of rock-producing gases, such as 
methane. Nor is carbon monoxide poisoning a high risk
in most hard rock mines. 104 Because of these
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relatively low-risk gas-related features, minimal 
attention was paid to the ventilation and the hygiene 
of metal mines during the second half of the 19th 
century, the period during which exacting regulations 
were being applied to the coal mines. In fact, in 
Cornwall and on the Witwatersrand, for instance, 
mechanical ventilators such as fans were rarely, if 
ever, installed. This lack of attention to 
ventilation was a serious omission on the part of 
management and mining inspectors, as during this 
period the introduction or mechanical rock drills and 
the use of dynamite generated ever—increasing dust 
densities,,
At the beginning of the 20th century the dawning 
awareness of the silicosis hazard focused attention on 
the need for supplementary ventilation in 
metalliferous mines. Air analyses revealed that gold 
miners on the Witwatersrand were invariably subjected 
to nitrous fumes, which were the product of defective 
detonators and "bad quality explosives", ° 
Witwatersrand chemists and medical doctors disagreed 
with each other over the role of nitrous fumes in 
causing silicosis; chemists argued that it was the 
primary cause, while doctors contended that nitrous 
fumes were secondary to dust. But it should be 
stressed that both these professional bodies agreed 
that nitrous fumes as well as dust predisposed to 
si 1 icosisc
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Because o-f the relative absence o-f nitrous fumes 
in Cornish mines, British doctors, particular1y John 
Scott Haldane, vociferously opposed the view, peculiar 
to South African health officers, that exposure to
110nitrous fumes was a subsidiary cause of silicosis.
By the 1920s the British doctors had shown the 
soundness of their t h e o r y , w h i c h  current research 
c o n f i r m s , t h a t  dust was the sole cause of 
silicosis. While the inhalation of nitrous fumes may 
inhibit the efficacy of the lungs in dealing with
particulate matter, the fumes are neither a primary
113nor a subsidiary cause of silicosis.
Clearly the initial thrust for improved 
ventilation on the Witwatersrand stemmed largely from 
accidents caused by gassing, and the incorrect belief 
in the causative role of nitrous fumes in silicosis. 
Even so, the provision of mechanical, ventilation 
lagged behind ’’wet methods" for preventing 
si 1 icosis. ^ While lack of knowledge and inadequate 
technology were undoubtedly contributory factors after 
1920, between 1902 and 1914 the primary reason for 
the delayed introduction of mechanised ventilators was 
undoubtedly its expense.
From the outset management was reluctant - in 
fact, refused - to embark on costly projects. The 
views in 1906 of D. Wager Bradford, the mine manager 
of the Langlaagte Deep, are all the more telling 
because they continued to hold good for at least a
vJ
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decade longer:
In regard to the matter o-f mine ventilation, 
this is a very big question. Forced 
ventilation along the reef on a large scale 
may mean an enormous expenditure of money. 
It is easy to talk glibly of its advantages, 
nor do I deny them, but it is an expenditure 
which a great many mines could CsicI verv' 
ill afford, and while I recognise the fact 
that this argument should not weigh too 
heavily in connection with health, it seems 
to me that it is one that should be 
effective. ^
Mechanical ventilation was, and still is, enormously
expensive, and the cost calculations of the mining
engineers at the turn of the century were not
exaggerated, as an article published in a scientific:
journal explained! in 1906:
When mechanical ventilation is employed, the 
supplying of an unnecessary amount of air 
becomes a serious matter from an economic 
point of view, as the horse power required 
to increase the ventilation is not in proper 
' proportion to the increased quantity, but to 
its cube, that is, to double a given 
quantity, eight times as much horse-power is 
needed; to treble it, 27 times; and so on.
The cost, therefore, rises very rapidly, and 
the supply of more air than is necessary is 
a direct waste of money.
Tn 1974 it was estimated that out of a total annual 
ventilation bill of R90 000 000 the electricity costs 
in forty-three mines for driving fans and providing
cooling power alone was RIO 000 000. 118
The gold mining industry has from many quarters 
received praise for its ventilation programmes which
1 1 Qhave so successfully dealt with dust- But these
commendations ignore the mineowners' history of
cost-cutting. As businessmen, who participated in the
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gold mining industry for profit, the mineowners came
to the most expensive way of handling dust, namely
ventilation, only after cheaper methods had been
tried. Even so, for many years it was the
mineowners's specialty to adopt policies based on
expediency with scant regard for the "ultimate
1consequences".
When management eventually improved and
mechanised ventilation, its initiatives v>)ere not
directed solely towards the dilution of dust. The
exigencies of deep level mining required the solution
of other ventilation problems. As gold was mined at
deeper and yet far deeper levels, there vias an
accompanying rise in temperatures to degrees so high
that workers could not cope efficiently with their
tasks. The problem was compounded by excessively
1high humidity levels, the result of saturating the 
workings with water, in accordance with government
•I O Tlegislation. Although such unpleasant conditions
caused heat-related illnesse>s, more important, they
diminished worker productivity. The mineowners'
primary motive for introducing mechanical ventilation
1was therefore economic. A side benefit was the
elimination of dust.
Despite their reassuring rhetoric in 1912 that 
the "problem" of silicosis was "now being effectively 
grappled with",^^*^ the mineowners, a year later, 
privately conceded the "seriousness" of the 
Even so, they were sluggish in"facts".
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implementing dust precaution measures voluntarily and 
did so "most grudgingly and at the point O'f 
b a y o n e t " . I n  this respect they were little 
different from their counterparts in Austral ia.
After World War 1, slowly and often tortuously, 
the axiom gradually gained acceptance that employers 
have an obligation to provide their employees with 
safe working conditions. A less obvious proposition, 
but one equally stressed by present-day health 
officers and trade unions, is that workers, too, have 
a duty at work to conserve their heal th. 
Consequently there is often a tacit agreement between 
management and workmen in dusty industries that each 
party shall observe health precautions. While the 
efficient provision of water and ventilation by 
management can reduce dust' to definably controlled 
limits, there may in certain workings and operations 
still exist a residual percentage of dangerous 
dust. Under such circumstances workers are required 
to comply with additional preventive rules. These 
include their observance of prescriptive exit and 
re—entry periods to blasting cones, and the wearing of
protective clothing 1 “70i.
Currently there appears to be a high degree of 
worker compliance in the gold mining industry. But 
worker laxity and resistance to prophylactic aids may 
often occur, as it does in other industries, unless 
the efficacy of remedial measures can be shown beyond 
doubt. Dissenting responses by workmen are
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particularly apparent with respect to the wearing o-f 
respirators, which they i^egard as an ine-F-ficient dust 
preventive. These subjective perceptions are not 
entirely lacking in validity, as scientific 
investigations have proved. Modern respirators are 
sophisticated in design and are available in a wide 
variety of materials. But most present-day health 
officers concede that they cause discomfort when worn
over long periods; and some experts continue to
134criticise their efficacy.
In 1901, when respirators were first introduced 
on the Witwatersrand gold fields, there was much 
worker opposition to wearing them. Miners were all 
too well aware of the obvious imperfections and even 
inutility of respirators - findings later upheld by 
the Miners' Phthisis Prevention Committee in 1913- 
Also, the the unwillingness of most health officers to 
recommend "without reservation'' even the best designs 
then available strengthened miners' resistance to 
respirators.Nevertheless mine managers continued 
to impose them on unconsenting vjorkmen; ^ t h e y  
dismissed the experiential evidence of miners as 
impressionistic and in "complete ignorance of
1 ’ ^ ' 7science". Doctors also subscribed to management's
138views of miners that they were ignorant; and the 
following quotation illustrates the paternalism of 
both health officers and managments
The miner here...has been and and is
\bi;careless of his life. It will proba ^^require legislation to force him to care.
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In many societies where wealth and power largely
coincide in the dominant social and political
structures, not surprisingly we also -find
paternalistic value systems which tend to ignore the
common humanity shared by both employers and workers.
Also, there is a tendency in such societies for
medical care to be skewed in favour of those who
1 Anbelong to the dominant classes. Perhaps even more 
deplorable is the view that w»orkers are responsible 
for their own illnessi the victims are blamed for
getting ill by chance and through their own fault 141
"Blaming the victim" strategies can be traced
back to Agricola in the 16th century, when he wrotes
The critics say further that mining is a 
perilous occupation to pursue, because the 
miners are sometimes killed by the
pestilential air which they breathe:
sometimes their lungs rot away; sometimes 
the men perish by being crushed in masses of 
rock; sometimes, falling from the ladder 
into the shafts, they break their arms, 
legs, or necks...But since things like this 
rarely happen, and only in so far as the 
Morkmen are cat&IesSf [italics added! they 
do not deter miners from carrying on their 
trade.
These rhetorical forms persisted for the next two 
centuries, and by the end of the Victorian era, when 
silicosis became an identifiable industrial menace in 
the Transvaal, a chorus of victim-blaming echoed along 
the Witwatersrand. Implicit in this rhetoric is a 
denial of responsibility. Individuals in positions of 
authority use it as a medium for transferring to 
others their own liability for the occurrence of 
disease and their failure to prevent it.
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"Blaming the victim" strategies are still invoked 
today. In South Africa, however, they are not 
directed solely at black workers, as is sometimes
suggested. 14: With respect to health most black
workers are in many respects far more disadvantaged 
than their "privileged" white counterparts. 
Nevertheless, white workmen are also the targets for 
"unjust" c e n s u r e . W h i l e  some present-day health 
officers, in much the same way as their predecessors, 
continue to blame workers for their ignorance and 
carelessness, others base their case on lack of
worker compliance in observing precautions. Instances 
of genuine worker negligence certainly occur. But the 
ostensibly plausible reason for censure has inherent 
flaws: the mere provision by management of preventives 
does not guarantee their routine use. Workers do not 
readily avail themselves of preventive measures, 
unless they are alerted to the specific dangers in the 
workplace and are schooled in the use of safeguards. 
But many medical officers seldom take these factors 
into account. Instead, in the event of accidents or 
the incidence of occupational disease, all too often 
they simply blame the victims for their lack of 
co-operation. This kind of rhetoric conceals a 
refusal by many medical authorities to take 
responsibility for the health education of workmen.
In societies where the working class is accorded 
inferior economic and social status its collective 
actions or the actions of its individual members
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invariably tend to be discredited. Nor are
"intellectuals", who claim to be objective,
necessarily immune or less prone to making cuch value
j u d g e m e n t s . I n  a recent article a dermatologist,
possibly unconsciously, typifies this tendency by both
his tone and emphasis. On the assumption that
preventive measures are routinely used, he first
blames the workers for neglecting to take
p r e c a u t i o n s . O n l y  several paragraphs later is the
need for health education advocated:
In the management of occupational skin 
disease, prevention is most important. It 
can be difficult to persuade the workforce 
to use precautionary measures routinely in 
the prevention of dermatitis; and it may not 
be until an outbreak of dermatitis has 
occurred that measures will be deployed...
Both the workforce and managerial staff
should be aware of potential sensitizing and
irritant properties of all materials used.
There is a need for continuous education
about the hazards of materials used and
1 ASpreventive measures.
Some individuals with an avocation will
voluntarily choose a potentially unhealthy industrial 
job. But in all societies most people for economic 
reasons must accept work wherever the labour market 
can absorb them. Accordingly, in South Africa many 
workforce novices, most of whom are black, join 
industrial enterprises with health risks attached. In 
so doing they usually have some general but hazy 
notion of the potential dangers. But many of these 
workers, particularly those employed in secondary 
industries, may spend their entire working lives 
without acquiring any further knowledge or specific
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understanding of the attendant risks. This applies, 
in pcvrticular, to occupations where the risk becomes 
cumulative, but only over time, and cannot be 
pin-pointed at any one moment.
The findings of the Erasmus Commission in 1976
confirm that South African workers are poorly catered
151for with respect to health and safety education. 
This general criticism, however, does not apply to 
affiliates of the Chamber of Mines, which usually 
provide training programmes. Even so, it can be 
argued that these particular training schemes are too 
compressed and intermittent to provide a thorough 
occupational education. Also, as the programmes are 
totally management devised and controlled, they do not 
therefore necessarily meet the perceived needs of 
trade unions and their members. Finally, they tend to 
ignore the practical experience and general 
occupational impressions of mineworkers, whose 
insights may not be as inadequate as practitioners of 
"blame the victim" tactics would have the public 
believe.
The same weaknesses are apparent in the teaching 
seminars given to seconda'^y-industry workers by the 
National Occupational Safety Association (NCSA), an 
organisation financed by the commissioner of the 
Workmen's Compensation Fund.-^  By focusing on profit 
incentives these training programmes tend to skew and 
diffuse their ostensible health objectives. As the 
Erasmus Commission concluded, all these limitations
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indicate the urgent need -for instituting a vital
nation-wide project aimed at the occupational health
155requirements of industrial workers.
In such a scheme, if the medical experience and 
knowledge of union-sponsored health officers could be 
harnessed to the expertise of professional 
educationists, it would in a small, but significant 
way, comply with Dr Henry Sigerist's call in 1943 for 
a community commitment to occupational health. 
Sigeri&i s request did not dismiss the need for 
medical and technical contributions. Indeed, he 
stressed the need for professionals to both assist
each other, and so the community, and to continue with
157specialised research in their various fields.
As the "wet" and "dry" preventive measures for 
silicosis have already been detailed, we must now 
examine the specific medical controls of the disease. 
In so doing we will again observe the pioneering role 
of the South African, doctors. In accordance with 
silicosis legislation passed in 1916 the South African 
government established a state institution, the 
Miners' Phthisis Medical Bureau. Its functions were to 
monitor the incidence of the disease and to control 
the award of compensation. Full-time doctors in the 
employ of this body initiated pre-employment and 
periodic examinations of first-time miners. These
medical controls for pneumoconiosis were the precedent 
for modern ones; and similar measures are currently in
general use throughout the Western world. 160
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The aim o-f the initial e>;amination is to prevent 
persons with defective lufigs or sufferers from lung 
disease, particularly tuberculosis, from entering 
dusty a:,dustries. Periodic examinations — these are 
conducted in South Africa at six-month intervals - 
also serve important functions. Their aim is to 
detect cases of simple silicosis, progressive massive 
fibrosis and simple tuberculosis. As we have
earlier noted, workers with any form of tuberculous 
infection are immediately - and permanently — removed 
from the source of dust exposure for their own sake 
and to stop them infecting others. In South Africa 
black mineworkers are, and have always been, at great 
risk of contracting tuberculosis in the course of 
their work; and health officers have always seen them 
as being far more liable to tuberculosis than 
silicosis. Consequently, insofar as Africans are 
concerned, the importance and purpose of.the periodic 
examinations have always been the detection of
tuberculosis. 163
Although sound in principle, until the i940s in 
practice these examinations in South Africa had grave 
sh»r<rtcomings. The reason was that the medical 
scrutiny of black mineworkers was inferior to that of 
white miner , White miners were the sole recipients 
of medical attention at the Miner' Phthisis Medical 
Bureau. Indeed, from 1916 the first—time nriners, known 
as the New i.and Miners, were throughly checked both 
clinically and radiographically. This was not so with
the vast majority o-f African mineworkers. After 1926 
the tiny group of long-service workers, that is those 
who had more than five years continuous experience, 
received thorough physical checks and were routinely
X—r; 64 But the examination of African contract
workers was far less exacting. Like the New Rand 
Miners, they were subject to the principle of initial 
and periodic examinations.-^'^ But in practice, until 
the middle of World War 11 the application of these 
medical controls to African mineworkers was 
superficial and far inferior to those applied to white
miners. Consequently many cases of tuberculosis and
166silicosis in black mineworkers were not discovered.
This was so during the 1920s — and even later. 
After 1920 the mining houses did, indeed, make a 
concerted effort to reorganise and reform their 
medical care of African mineworkers. Also, they 
appointed to the mines full-time medical officers who 
devoted their attention exclusively to black 
workers. Nevertheless, the routine examinations for 
detecting lung diseases were deficient in time and 
quality; they were purely clinical,, as we have noted 
earlier. Moreover, as Africans were obliged to strip 
naked for the investigations, they regarded them as 
being a degrading e x p e r i e n c e . A l t h o u g h  a number of 
health officers also recognised the deficiencies of 
the medical examinations, they did not explicitly 
challenge them. Their rationale was that the medical 
profession could not improve its techniques within the
154 -
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constraints imposed on it bV'' the size o-f the black 
labour force committed to its care. Undoubtedly the 
position of mine doctors as employees of tne mining 
industry curbed their independence as professionals 
and placed themi in a conflictual situation. But 
clearly, too, during this pericid their allegiance to 
their employers outweighed their professional
commitment to their patients.
Between 1914 and 1930 the medical examinations of
African mineworkers continued to be perfunctory in
many respects. In 1914 the Native Brievances
Commissioner, H. M- Buckle, compared them to military
"marches" in which the participants were inspected
like soldiers on parade. The analogy was still
appropriate in 1930, as Dr A. I. Girdwood, the Chief
Medical Officer of the WNLA, unwittingly demonstrated,
when he described, with a measure of pride, his
organisation's procedures in the initial examination:
There are usually about 170,000-1 SO ,| 000 
recruits examined annually at the W.N.L.A, 
central depot, and the numbers presented for 
examination daily vary from 300 to 1,200„
A staff of six whole-time medical officers 
perform these examinations..,
CAfter bathing and being taught how to 
breath! the boys are then lined up naked, in 
rows of about twenty-five, before each 
medical officer, who carefully auscultates 
the chest, front and back, and a mark is 
made on the boy's chest on the detection of 
any abnormality, however slight. He is 
thereupon removed to a special examing room 
for re-examination by one of the medical 
officers, whose whole time is thus 
occupied. If considered necessary the 
native is detained in hospital and X-rayed; 
his medical and labour history are enquired 
into, and a bacteriological examination is
155
made of his sputum.
On the completion of auscultation of each 
row, an inspection is made of limbs, eyes, 
glands and for the presence of any venereal 
disease, and those passed fit are sent to 
the depot Pass Office for registration.
A medical officer, when he has become
accustomed to doing this work and has
developed the power of concentration, is
able to examine about sixty natives per
hour, taut requires a break of about half an
hour after two hours' work. To many it may
appear impossible to examine such a number
with any degree of accuracy, but it must be
realised that all that is demanded of the
medical officer is the detection of an
abnormality and not a diagnosis of the
condition. After doing this work for
several years the W.N.L.A. medical officers
nave naturally become proficient in the use171of the stethoscope.-^'
In South Africa there are other factors which 
weaken the principle of using medical examinations for 
regulating the inc i -ice and prevalence of silicosis. 
Such factors do not possess overt racial 
implications. Rather, their shortcomings relate to 
the absence of legislation for the control of 
silicosis in general. In many other countries medical 
controls, similar to the ones discussed, are 
obligatory in all pneumoconiosis-producing
industries. But in South Africa their legislative 
force does not extend to secondary industries; and 
they apply only to present-day "control led" mines. 
This is also the case with the observance of
1 77"permissive" dust levels.
Thousands of South African workers in 
dust-producing industries are at risk, some gravely
so 17: Unlike workers on the "controlled" mines, these 
workmen do not have the benefit of state—prescribed
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medical controls and "permissive" dust levels: they 
rely solely on management for the voluntary 
introduction of such preventive measures. As the 
Erasmus Commission concluded and as recent medical 
studies have proved, the latitude given to management 
in implementing precautions may partly explain South 
Africa's poor record for safety and health in many 
secondary industries and in certain primary industry
sec tors.174
The conduct of medical examinations is one method
of monitoring disease incidence. Also, from its
inception the Miners' Phthisis Medical Bureau has
provided a second valuable service, that of recording
incidence, prevalence and mortality data for
silicosis. Apart from their statistical importance,
such records assisted technologists in monitoring the
adequacy of dust controls and guided state officials
in determining "permissive" dust levels. For health
officers records of this kind continue to be valuable
1indicators of disease and dust control.
The South African medical profession has always 
tended to underrate its contributions to solving the 
problem of silicosis on the gold mines. Doctors 
perceive the achievements of technologists as being of 
greater significance than their own, and one will 
frequently hear them express the view t!iat ventilation 
"cured" the disease. In 1933 Alexander J.
Orenstein, a leading mine health officer and an
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authority on silicosis, stated:
EKcept in the matter of the elimination of 
the unfit, the medical fraternity cannot 
claim very much credit for the reduction of 
the incidence of phthisis CsilicosisH. It is 
the mining engineer who, mainly through 
increased ventilation, has been responsible 
for the betterment of our conditions. '
Such views indicate both the medical profession's 
sense of frustration with preventive medicine and its 
diffidence in the area.
The primary objective of doctors is to promote 
health- In their view it amounts to prevention, cure 
and rehabi1itation. As rehabi1itation is seldom
optimal, doctors place far more stress on the first 
two constituents, and of these prevention is their 
first option, as the medical adage "prevention is 
better than cure" testifies.Ironically, this is 
only a rhetorical priority: medical practitioners tend 
to shy away from the processes of prevention,
especially when the causative agents of disease are 
not exclusively linked with germs.
The gap between words and deeds arises from a 
combination of ignorance and indifference. Ignorance 
can be ascribed partly to the learning process. In 
developed countries prevention of disease usually 
forms a tiny oomponent of meat undergraduate teaching 
programmes; here the hospital, with its focus on 
curative medicine, orovides the context for medical 
training. This curative approach is reinforced in 
graduate doctors by hospital-based fiscal and state
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pol icies. Consequently where health care is equated 
with cure, the distribution o-f health services becomes
•f Q Hskewed and -favours the affluent classes. As a
branch of preventive medicine, the teaching of 
occupational health is even more inadequately
taught. As a result clinicians, whose practices are 
unconnected wi’th the industrial floor, rarely 
recognise the preventive and work-centred paradigms of 
occupational medicine. Nor have working class
problems associated with occupational health evoked a 
growing and substantial response amongst the medical 
profession. Such low levels of interest are
replicated in the teaching of medical students who, in 
turn, tend to neglect the psychological, occupational 
and socio-economic integers of their patients'
environment. 184
The indifference of doctors to preventive or 
community-based medicine can be partly explained by 
deficient teaching programmes at undergraduate 
levels. But another significant feature of these 
programmes is the fact that they are devised by the 
medical profession itself. This creates a complex 
situation which gives rise to another explanation for 
the profession's general lack of interest in
preventive medicine. Radical political economists 
argue that in many developed countries the medical 
profession is linked to the dominant power bases of 
societies' in helping the state to shape the nature of 
health services doctors therefore have a vested
- 159 -
1interest in protecting the status quo.^°-’ But, perhaps 
more simply, because the financial incentives are few, 
doctors are not much interested in preventive medicine 
in general, and in occupational health in particular. 
As the financial attractions of preventive medicine 
are truly limited,, doctors prefer to cater for the 
more affluent sectors of society; it is those sectors 
that help them to sustain their standards of
l i v i n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y  the profession has neglected 
those health and care structures which cater for the 
working classes. This is obviously so in South Africa 
where black persons, who predominate among the poor, 
are the recipients of an inadequate health care 
sv'stem. Another less obvious case is that of
Britain, where occupational health has been excluded 
from the National Health Services, even relatively 
exempt as that structure has been from overt
materialistic considerations.
Preventive medicine in its wide context of 
community health care and development also carries 
political implications, V'/hich many doctors avoid in 
the belief that the practice of medicine ought to be 
value neutral. This may be one reason that 
occupational health is not a popular speciality.^‘^  As 
intermediaries between employers and workers it is 
difficult for industrial doctors to avoid conflict and 
political involvement by maintaining a neutral 
stance. They are willy-nilly obliged to confront the 
often painful dilemma of their dual allegiance; to
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vested interests who employ them; and to workers whose 
well-being is also their concern. The neutrality of 
the industrial doctor, however desirable, may 
therefore prove unsatisfactory, if such a posture 
results in one of the parties being favoured at the 
expense of the other.
The need for occupational h€?alth specialists to 
take decisions may be an every-day occurence; the 
reason is that issues may range from details of 
compensation to "safe" dust levels. Also, the
difficulties experienced by doctors in making
commitments are exacerbated when problems involve 
probable solutions rather than scientifically grounded 
ones. In this regard cautious specialists, who warn 
against active involvement, nevertheless criticise 
their colleagues for political "inertia" when they 
fail to ensure the implementation of proven preventive
measures, 191
Finally, preventive medicine demands teamwork. 
It is not only intef— professional but
multi-professional. The application of non-medical 
technologies has been markedly successful in curbing 
the incidence of dust diseases, so challenging the 
medical profession's self-image of omnipotence. Even 
so,, conventional medicine has also made important 
contributions in the field of pneumoconiosis. 
Although medical controls cannot cure silicosis, they
i
have succeeded in reducing disability, morbidity and
mortali ty 192 But non—medical successes have clearly
161
undermiried the medical pro-fession ' s belief in its 
curative competence and have led it to question its 
sense of worth. Such negative perceptions need not 
persist if the profession can accept as one of its 
primary functions the provision of medical care as 
distinct from medical cure. The acceptance of this
proposition can have positive consequences. The 
medical profession will not need to devalue its 
utility in occupational medicine. Rather, it will be 
better able to accept and integrate the implications 
and limitations of its co-operative role in preventive 
medicine.
A community-centred approach to occupational 
medicine is, to a large degree, and in economists' 
jargon, a public good. The market provides few 
incentives for its provisions there is no profit in 
it. If it is to be provided it must be done through 
non-market mechanisms. Clearly there • could be 
inefficiencies, including greater bureaucracy and 
dispensing with the informaticin provided by the price 
system. Depending on phenomena such as political 
structures and social values, there is a trade-off - 
the improved health and safety of an entire society.
The insights of Dr Henry Sigerist on occupational 
medicine are as valid today as they were nearly fifty 
years ago. During the 1940s, when he initially aired
162
them, he noted:
The prevention o-f occupational disease is 
the collective responsibility of society and 
all measures available - technical medical 
and social - must be applied to promote and 
protect the health of those who through 
their labor create the nation's goods.
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CHAPTER 4
THE HEEDLESS YEARS 1B86~1B99
"But no one who had carefully watched the 
rise of gold mining believed that the 
Transvaal was a failure. It v-tas known to be 
under a cloud which time would roll away, 
and leave not a silver, but a golden 
lining...Where the blustering speculator 
ruled and the worthless manager controlled, 
we now have men with scientific mining 
knowledge with very different assistants to 
carry out their ideas."--— IliTiing Journal, 
1893.^
"After boring—machine labour in South
Africa, Cminers returned to England! 'only 
to die of phthisis', of somewhat the same 
description as that of the phthisis of steel 
grinders and stonemasons, due to the 
inhalation of dust, a disease widely 
different from the old 'miners' complaint' 
of Cornwall or the tuberculous phthisis, as
it is generally known..."---Cornubian,
1902.^
Long before the initial introduction of
mechanical rock drills in Cornwall during the 1860s, 
generations of Cornish tin miners as well as hard rock 
miners in other parts of Britain and Europe had 
succumbed to silicosis. This disease, variously
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described by a number o-f indefinite names, including 
miners' phthisis, usually manifested itself in a 
chronic form. This meant that the victims on the 
mines risked disablement and death at an average age 
of fifty years. Indeed, Dr William Ogle's official 
statistics in 1392 showed that during the 1880s they 
had the shortest working lives of any other 
occupational group in England and Wales.^ A few health 
officers viewed this situation in a grave light. But 
most doctors seemed to regard an average of thirty 
years as an adequate span for the working life of a 
miner.
An extract from the report of the Transvaal 
Medical Society submitted in evidence to the Weldon 
Commission on miners' phthisis in 1902 supports this 
impression:
Miners’ phthisis is not peculiar to machine 
miners, for, although it is most typically 
and commonly seen in them, it frequently 
develops also in course of time amongst 
miners who have never used rock drills at 
all. Host cases of this sortf howei/er., have 
been mining for long periods, e.g., over 30 
years, and it may be taken that the ordinary 
miner has a considerable advantage^in length 
of life over the rock drill miner.
The extract appears to Offer a straightforward 
comparison of the working lives of rock drillers with' 
accelerated silicosis and "ordinary" miners with 
chronic silicosis. But it contains a subtle 
disclaimer, which has been italicised. Although the 
doctors noted that general miners were liable to 
chronic silicosis, they also made it plain that they
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had no serious misgivings about the shortened careers 
o-F the victims.
During the latter part of the 1'5'th century and 
the opening years of the 20th certury chronic 
silicosis was habitual amongst miners; miners all os'er 
the world recognised that incapacitation and premature 
death from lung disease almost inevitably accompanied 
work in metal or hard rock mines.^ They were 
conscious, too, that these occupational hazards were 
of minimal concern to the vast majority of medical 
professionals, members of management, and governmental 
authorities, who viewed these morbid factors as 
inescapable facts of the miners' vocation.
In short, members of the managerial and 
professional classes took the disease and death of 
miners for granted. This attitude was entirely in 
accord with the low regard they had for miners as a 
class of workers. The candid, even if brutal and 
insensitive, views . expressed by Beorge Albu, a 
prominent mining director, in cross-examining a 
witness before the. Transvaal Industrial Commission of 
1897, were typical of management. “It must be very 
hard on a woman," he said, "if the husband has got no 
further in life than a miner.
This dismissive view of workers was also bound up 
with the health officers' Isissez faire attitude to 
the working class. In assumicT that workers exercised 
freedom of occupational choice, the health officers
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concluded that miners in choosing their calling
Vs’eighed the attendant risks, which included their
liability to silicosis.® Thomas Mclsaac, who had had
prior mining experience in British Columbia and Canada
before coming to the Witwatersrand, interpreted these
views in 1903 to the SJeldon Commission:
I have never seen any special interest taken 
in the .matter Cof sickness amongst the 
miners!. It was recognised that the work of a 
miner was unhe/^ilthy, and I never saw any 
steps taken to make it more healthy...as a 
rule old men do not suffer. They .Cminers! do 
not get very old.*’
In examining this passage we should also note that 
Mclsaac's tone was clearly one of resentful
resignvation. As such it calls into question the 
mystique which surrounds the 19th century Cornish 
miners, and which historians tend to perpetuate. In 
doing so historians stress the innate fondness of the 
Cornish miners for their profession which bred in them 
an "unquestioning acceptance" of and an "immunity" to 
their harsh conditions.^** But the evidence of Mclsaac 
does not seem to agf^ ee with these romanticised 
assumptions. Further research on the perceptions of 
Cornish miners during this period is clearly needed.
During the 19th century miners in Cornwall - and 
elsewhere - usually began an informal apprenticeship as 
children, when they were approximately ten years of 
age; and they were fully fledged professionals before 
they were out of their t e e n s . T h e r e f o r e  a working 
career vnhich constituted a mere thirty years 
foreshadowed a relatively short lifespan; and like
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Mclsaac, miners were oblicjed to face the prospect that 
a majority of them would not reach "old-age". 
Consequently when overseas miners drifted to the gold 
•fields of the Wi twatersrand, after their forma.' 
launching on 8 September 1886 by Paul Kruger, President 
of the South African Republic,^® as a matter of course 
they acknowledged — as did health officers and 
management - that they would have relatively short 
working lives.
They could not know that within thirteen years
after gold mining began on the Witwat•^^srand hutvdreds
of them would be dead or dying suddenly 4- id p, nful.iy
from accelerated silicosis at a relatively young age.
This appeared to be a unique form of the disease and
differed in many marked respects from its chronic form.
In retrospect Sir Thomas Oliver, a physician from
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, reported:
'1y experience was gained in miners who had 
returned to Northumberland during and shortly 
after the close of the CAnglo-BoerJ War. A 
few years previously young miners in the 
bloom of health had left their Northern homes 
for the South African goldfields, and after 
working there four to six years returned to 
Northumberland and elsewhere broken in 
heal \.h.
The bad news soon spread through Cornwall and 
other British mining centres and burst upon mining 
circles along the Witwatersrand. These alarming
disclosures came between 1900 and 1902, that is during 
and shortly after the Anglo-Boer War, so that Transvaal 
health and mining officers turned to the medical 
history of the gold fields during the pre-war
;79
period,, It was important -for them to -find out whether 
silicosis -.'{as an entirely new phenomenon on the 
Witwatersrand, as the reports seemed to indicate. 
They concluded that a lack of- awareness of the dangers 
of heightend dust levels and even the existence of 
accelerated silicosis on the gold fields were typical 
of the period from 1386 to 1399.^^ This view gained 
additional support in 1930 from three prominent health 
officers, who presented a joint historical survey to 
the International Conference on Silicosis held in
Johannesburg.16
This long-held view is, in fact, an unchallenged 
myth. Official, popular and acaidemic historians have 
helped perpetuate it by either their unquestioning 
adoption of this conclusion, or by their uncritical 
acceptance and repetition of the evidence on which the 
health officers bas-d their original case in 1902. 
Dispelling this old canard theref' e requires a 
careful analysis of the health officers" evidence.
Official medical records to assist the doctors in 
their investigation of the prevalence of silicosis 
during the period before the Anglo—Boer War hardly 
existed. One reason was the absence of a public 
officer of health. Accoroingly, there were no mine 
statistics regarding prevalent diseases among the 
workforce,^® Also, the records of mine managers were 
of little value. In contrast to fatal mine .\ccidents 
which were noticed and recorded, deaths from disease 
invariably occurred beyond the boundaries of the
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mining properties. Finally, because o-f the frequency 
with which workmen changed jobs on the mines, 
management did not not'ce the absence ' of miners who
had died 19
There were also no reliable mortality statistics 
for those who died from disease in private dwellings 
or hospitals. The sole hospital was the Johannesburg 
Hospital, which was erected in 1388 as a "corrugated 
iron building with a canvas roof". Although by 1899 
it had managed to keep pace with the needs of the 
mining town, it remained a relatively small
O Ainstitution; and as late as 1906 it had only about 
300 beds for white patients.'^ In the years before the 
outbreak of tl'ie Anglo-Boer War, as in the post-war 
period, it lacked the facilities to nurse, for any 
length of time, either those with severe illnesses or 
those who were chronically ill, including miners who 
had si 1 icosis. Also, the hospital did rot keep a
DTcomprehensive register of • admissions and deaths. 
Even when the hospital, on compassionate grounds, 
occasionally admitted terminal cases of silicosis, it
O Arecorded the evidence only in isolated instances.
The investigators' recourse to the records of 
doctors in private practice proved equally 
unrewarding. Nor were the medical practitioners' oral 
recall of case histories any more illuminating. 
Although several doctors remembered that they had 
attended to patients terminally ill with silicosis, 
they had attributed death not "to that cause, but to
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ordinary chronic pneumonia" or tuberculosis."^
In the total absence o-f statistical evidence, the 
research team turned to the report and evidence of the 
Industrial Commission of 1897. As this became tr*;" 
1 inch-pin for their case,"^° a brief outline of the 
reasons for the commission's appointment and its terms 
of reference are therefore in order.
The immediate cause of the appointment of the 
Industrial Commission was the' depression in the gold 
mining industry which followed "the feverish stock 
market speculations which had reached their pinnacle 
in 1395 two years earlier. Kruger's government hoped 
that public confidence in the industry would be 
restored by the commission's recommendations. Also, 
the Republican administration anticipated that the 
evidence would show that the responsibility for the 
depression rested with the mineowners, rather than 
with its own allegedly incompetent policies and 
hostile treatment of the mining industry.
The commission's terms of reference were to 
"report regarding all matters that may have stood in 
the way, or have hindered, and still may hinder the 
development of the mining i n d u s t r y T h e  terms of 
reference had wide parameters and could have 
encompassed deficiencies in the mineworkers' ‘daily 
working conditions. A detailed analysis of the 
evi . ice shows, however, that neither the witnesses 
nor the government commissioners, aided by advisory
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representatives o-F the mining industry, viewed such 
issues as relevant to the commission's immediate 
task. The context o-f the all-pervasive depression on 
the Witwatersrand in the wake of the industry's slump 
dictated a concentration on those narrowly focused 
economic issues which were reliant only on the high 
working costs of the mines.
White mineworkers, many of whom had lost their
jobs and had been hard hit in other ways by the
29depression, were also concerned with such issues. 
Iiiey were anxious, too, about the possibility of 
additional mines closing and a further reduction in 
the number of available jobs. Alexander Buchan Fyffe, 
a member of the newly formed Rand Mine Workers' Union 
and the sole official spokesman for the mineworkers, 
in his evidence to the commission did, in fact, 
mention a few workmen's complaints. But his major 
concern< not unnaturally'at this time and in this 
context, was with mineworkers' earnings. Indeed, the 
major portion of his testimony aimed to show that 
wages, particularly those of married men, were low 
relative to the high cost of living.'^ "^’ In similar vein 
the only other worker who presented evidence, Robert 
Barrow, an experienced Lancashire foreman, confined 
his complaints solely to the high cost of living for
marr ied men.31
It is on this flimsy evidence - or lack of i^t - 
that the investigating team of health officers based 
their case in 1902. They contended that, as neither
- is;
Barrow nor Fyf-fe had aired "any grievance as to the 
condition o-f health or suggestion as to disability 
arising from the method o-F mining", this constituted
proof that no-one on the Transvaal gold fields was
avjare of the d i s e a s e . I f  they considered the 
evidence of F>'ffe and Barrow as being the decisive 
factor, their conclusion was based on even shakier 
grounds.
There are strong grounds for believing that 
Barrow's evidence had been instigated and prepared by 
H. Eckstein and Co, the holding company for the mine 
of which he was fore' ,n.'^ '^  Therefore we can almost 
entirely disregard his testimony. Likewise, although 
Fyffe's evidence was more critical of management's 
policy towards the white workforce, for several 
reasons it can also be discounted.
First, the organisation which Fyffe represented, 
and which survived for only a few months, had a 
membership which at its peak totalled a mere 800.'^^ It 
therefore barely repre?sented the views of white mine 
employees whose numbers in December 1397 totalled 
S 060. This figure includes the 293 clerical staff 
members and, more important, the 2 339 workers listed 
as miners.'-""-^  Second, his trade union did not consist 
solely of miners; it also comprised artisans and 
entrepreneurs - Fyffe was himself an independent 
mining contractor - many of whom therefore had little
regular or continuous underground working
experience.'^*’ Finailly, his opening statement made it
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clear that his primary, i-f not sole, objective was "to 
'jive evidence on the working man's wages on the
Rand . 37
Local medical practitioners in 1901 and 1902 must 
certainly have felt reassured when they received the 
message that their colleagues had been unaware and 
ignorant of the existence of silicosis in the early 
days of gold mining on the Witwatersrand. Their 
absolution from neglect was reinforced in 1907 by one 
of the original members of the Transvaal Medical 
Society's investigating committee, Louis Godfrey
Irvine, who was by then recognised as a leading expert
*70on the disease.'^ In evidence to the Mining
Regulations Commission, Irvine stated:
Neither the employers nor the workmen, nor 
for that mattsTf anyone eise., C italics 
added! realised at that time the great 
danger to health and life arising from rock 
drill work.'^ '^
The 1930 medico-historical survey, already referred 
to, bestowed additional blessings on the doctors who 
had practised medicine in tine Transvaal before the 
Anglo-Boer War. In a watered-down version of his 1907 
statement Irvine, as one of the co-authors of this 
conference paper, stated that the period from 1336 to 
1899 was " local ly. .. one of pi"actical ignorance of the 
menace of silicosis".'*^ '"’
Some Johannesburg doctors had in the course of 
private practice first attended to patients with 
symptoms of the accelerated type of silicosis in 1897,
185 -
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that is ten years atter the gold mining industry had 
begun o p e rating.As severe incapacitation and sudden 
and pain-ful death amongst the Witwatersrand miners 
occurred on average only seven years after the onset 
of accelerated silicosis, the year "^ 7 was a
significant signpost. It indicated a nng link
between the malignant form of the disease and the 
widespread introduction, in 1892, of mechanised rock 
drills which exposed miners to excessive amounts of 
respirable silica dust. But in the triennium 
1S97-1C/9 only a handful of Johannesburg residents 
associated with the mining industr*y drew this
connection; and the majority of th6?se did so with
hindsight.
In the lighit of this evidence, the health 
investigators' claim that there was "ignorance" of the 
"menace of silicosis" is ostensibly plausible. But 
their blanket assertion of total unawareness was, in 
fact,, a half truth. There was indeed "ignorance" - 
but in only one respect. The ignorance applied to the 
manifestation of silicosis solely in its accelerated 
form and not in its chronic form.^^ The widespread 
prevalence of chronic silicosis, although it was then 
vaguely termed "sick miners lung", was common 
knowledge.^'-'
It cannot be contended that there was a scarcity 
of medical doctors on the Witwatersrand to diagnose 
this condition. Within two years of the proclamation 
of the gold fields, Johannesburg, its chief urban
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centre, had by 1883 evolved "from the position of a 
diggers' camp to that of one of the largest towns in 
South A f r i c a ; a n d  by 1893 it could boast of 
"stately" suburbs containing houses which cost from 
"£1 000 to £4 000". Under such circumstances there 
were certainly sufficient doctors to cater for the 
town's inhabitants, as well aS for dwellers on the
East and West Rand. 43
The strong possibility exists that the 
investigating officers made these sweeping claims of 
"total ignorance" and "total unawareness" to protect 
themselves and their colleagues from justifiable 
accusations of neglect. It can be arguew further that 
state officials, doctors and management, by
disregarding the health and welfare of miners in 
respect of chronic silicosis, condoned the unhealthy 
mining conditions which ultimately spawned the
development of accelerated silicosis. Such 
heedlessness was all the more serious in the light of 
the relatively advanced state of contemporary medical 
knowledge about the disease. Moreover, the public 
accessibility of a number of official British 
statistical studies extended this understanding,, for 
the scientific surveys demonstrated the excessive 
mortality from lung disease in hard rock miners.
The occurrence of chronic silicosis with its 
resultant premature mortality was a universal 
phenomenon in hard rock mining; and in all metal 
mining centres scant attention was paid to this
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adversity -For miners. On the Wi tv-aatersrand the 
manifestation of chronic silicosis paralleled the 
experiences of other similar mining oistricts, 
including Cornwall, Victoria and Western Australia.^^ 
During the 19th century accelerated silicosis was also 
beginning to appear in these mining regions, 
particularly in Cornwall. But its incidence in these 
centres lagged behind that on the Wi twatersrand,■ 
while its prevalence was less noticeable as well. The 
impact of accelerated silicosis in the Transvaal had 
important repercussions. It alerted health officers 
in all the hard rock mining districts of Britain and 
her overseas possessions to the more malignant form of 
the disease. Its occurence caused them to focus also 
on chronic silicosis, a form of the disease which, as 
has been noted, had until this period been almost 
entirely nerlected.
There are several reasons for the prominence 
assumed by both forms of the disease in the Transvaal. 
The magnitude of the industry and the vast numbers of 
miners employed were causes of primary importance. 
Linked to these factors was the unique concentration 
of the Witwatersrand's gold deposits in "a
cr -icomparatively small territory" This resulted in the 
containment of workers in a single region. 
Consequently the fate of numerous afflicted workers on 
the Witwatersrand could be more easily accounted for 
than that of miners in Cornwall, Victoria and Western 
Australia, for example, where the tin and gold
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deposits were scattered os'er wide terrains. I-f we are 
to explain the proli-ferat of silicosis in both its 
chronic and accelerated forms on the Witwatersrand, we 
need to examine the nature and modification of local 
working conditions. Changes in development and 
production techniques accompanied the expansion of 
gold mining from its immature beginnings to its 
conversion to a rich and powerful industrial
enterprise. It is therefore to the early workings on 
the gold fields that we must novi turn.
Gold was first discovered in ISS.j on Transvaal 
farmlands in outcrops, a term which must be clarified 
because of the relevance of outcrop mining to the 
occurrence of silicosis. The gold reefs, like strata 
which form the crust of the earth, were probably 
oi iginally deposited in horizontal layers. But they 
are invariably no longer found in this position. 
Instead, on the Witwatersrand, these beds of rock in 
which the gold is impacted are inclined at an "angle 
of dip" to the horizon; and when they come to the 
surface at some point this is called the outcrop. 
Such outcrops of parallel banket beds were discovered 
on the Witwatersrand. They run from east to west in a 
general straight line, termed the strike. It was soon 
estimated that the Witwatersrand strike extended for 
approximately fifty m i l e s . B u t  during the period 
1886 to 1914 the major mining activities took place in 
the forty-mile stretch from the farm, Randfontein, in 
the west, through the newly established town of
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Johannesburg in approximately the centre, to the -farm,
Modder-fontein, in the east 54
Bold excavation initially took place on th(' 
outcrop claims. Each claim constituted a 
paral lelogram, the size ot which was 150 Cape -feet in 
the direction of the strike, that is from east to 
west, and 400 Cape feet in the direction of the dip,
ercrnamely from north to south. As each claim was 
relatively small - it was a mere 60 000 square Cape 
feet, or the equivalent of 64 025 square English feet 
~ the claims were invariably combined with contiguous 
claims to form larger and more viable mining plots: 
the Village Main Reef and the Henry Nourse, for 
instance, constituted eleven and thirty-four such 
claims.
Outcrop companies also often amalgamated with one 
another. By 1895 the Ferreira, which had previously 
absorbed thirty-one claims belonging to the Rand 
Mines, amalgamated with the Wemmer, which at that time 
consisted of twenty-one claims - its ten original 
claims plus an additional eleven subsequently taken 
over from the Village Reef.'-'^  These amalgamated 
outcrop properties were not necessarily long, narrow 
east—west strips. Indeed, while there was no standard 
plot size, amalgamated claims often extended from the 
northern outcrop itself as far south as the down—dip 
boundary. Consequently their north-south widths could 
range from 400 feet - this was the width of a single
claim - to several thousand feet. 58
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Ore was extracted -from the outcrop itself or 
below the ground in the direction of the dip, the dip 
being the inclination of the reef, at right angles to
C T .Othe strike, and running in a north-south direction.'-" 
The angle of the dip, namely the position at which the 
reef began its inclined descent, varied. Although the 
average dip at. the surface was approximately fifty 
degrees, in some regions it was a mere sixteen 
degrees. In other places, particularly in the 
neighbourhood of Johannesburg in the central section, 
it was often as steep as eighty-seven to ninety 
degrees. The lateral and vertical extent of the 
outcrops, and the angle of the dip, determined, 
therefore, the nature of the excavation methods 
adopted.
The geological composition of the surface and 
upper layers of the earth, namely the weathered zona, 
also shaped the initial digging operations. Tl' se 
surface layers were colloquially termed the free 
milling zone; and it was in this belt that the 
original underground excavations were located. In 
contrast to the "blue", hard, pyritic rock which lay 
approximately 100 to 200 feet below the surface, the 
weathered zone consisted of "red", soft, oxidised 
rock.^^ It was relatively easy to excavate the damp 
and friable surface banket. When it could not be dug 
up, hand-held hammer drills, known as hand drills, 
were used to penetrate the ore which was subsequently
released "in bucketfuls" by blasting with dynamite. 62
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Apart from thc2 ease with which it could be 
excavated, the banket in the free milling zone had a 
natural concentration of high grades of ore.^ '-' The 
grades averaged one Troy ounce, or twenty dwts, per 
ton; they far exceeded the average grades found in the 
pyritic zone below. Also, the "free" gold Cf-f the 
weathered zone was amenable to mercury- After the 
banket had been broken up into smaller pieces by the 
stamps and then crushed by the mills, the gold was 
easily extracted from the residual rock by a simple 
process of amalganation with the quicksilver. In 
contrast, pyritic ore excavate^ from the lower depths 
resisted the amalgamation process; "vast dumps of 
untreated tailings" running as high as fourteen dwts 
per ton had to be abandoned.Consequently early 
mining was largely confined to the free milling zone. 
The pyritic zone was deliberately avoided, unless the 
gold grades were running sufficiently i;igh to offset 
the loss in the tailings.
The term mining, with its scientific, 
technological and organisat.onal connotations, cannot 
be applied to the original operations on the gold 
f i e l d s . O r e  was literally dug out of the ground or 
gouged out of the outcrop rock. The simple workings 
consisted of the following: short adits, or horizontal 
tunnels, driven into hilly outcrops; open-cast 
quarries; and shallow vertical and horizontal shafts 
haphazardly sunk to one or two levels in the free 
milling zone.*^^ In 1908 M. H. Cocmbe, the manager of
192
the State Mine, vividly recalled his introduction to
the Witwatersrand in ISSSs
1 enquired the direction and set of-f to the 
Wemmer, that being the nearest mine on which 
work that could be called mining was in 
progress. Arriving there, I .-ound an open 
cutting probably 200 -ft., long on the
outcrop strike and 40 to 50 ft- deep, at 
the bottom of which a mixed assortment of 
natives, Cape boys, and Europeans were at 
work, drilling and filling ore into buckets, 
which in one instance were hoisted with a 
whip, oxen being the motive force, and in 
the others with windlasses, white men being 
on the handles.
About 100 ft. west of the western end of
the open cast, a little 6 ft, x 4 ft, shaf'" 
was sunk, from which a drive was proceeding 
towards the cutting, all tha work being done 
by white men. I do not remember seeing the 
slightest evidence of machinery on the 
Wemmer at this time, if I except the whip 
and the windlasses, and I think they were 
trying to keep a mill going out of the 
cutting. ^Such was the genesis of mining on 
the Rand. 68
Two years later, in 1S70, gold mining was still 
cha<^-acterised by a lack of sophistication in
techniques and organisation. The strike was 
honeycombed with shallow vertical and inclined shafts; 
and batteries of crushers and mills dotted the 
landscape like groves of trees. Apart from the
batteries, other power-driven equipment included only 
essential Cornish pumps and haulage gear for the 
deeper excavations. In short, there was little 
mechanisation. A low level of intensity characterised 
the scale of operatio.ss which were, in the main, 
located in the weathered zone.
A brief explanation of the initial mining
operations on the Witwatersrand will enable us to
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understand why conditions o-f work rsiidered miners 
liable to the risk of contracting silicosis. In so 
doing we must also appraise the Transvaal health 
officers' retrospective assessment, in 1930, that in 
the early workings mining conditions were healthy, a 
judgement which most historians have unquestioningly 
accepted. In a sweeping statement made before the 
International Conference on Silicosis the Transvaal 
health officers claimed; "It can...be safely said that 
the miners were eKposed to little if any injurious 
dust during those d a y s . T h e y  used two arguments to 
justify their claim; first, the prevalence of open-air 
quarry work; and second, the "comparative" softness 
and friability of the banket in the underground 
workings of the free milling sone.^^ Although these 
contentions have some plausibility, they are not 
sufficiently strong to support the generalisation, 
which must therefore be challenged.
Let us examine the first premise that open-cast 
quarry work does not ewpose workers to the risk of 
respirable silica. Undoubtedly th'~ outdoor method of 
excavating ore has advantages for miners working in 
proximity to dust. For instance, it is a rather 
obvious proposition that after blasting heavy 
concentrations of dust - and fumes - cannot accumulate 
in the open air. It should be noted, however, that 
during this period, one in which no dust preventive 
measures were adopted, workers were exposed to free 
silica in a variety of other tasks. These outdoor
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jobs ‘ some o-f which were similar to those performed 
in the shallow underground workings — included hand 
drilling, shovelling the broken ore into buckets and 
bins, and tipping their contents into containers in 
readiness for crushing and milling procedures- In 
1914 Wilfred Watkins~Pitchford, director of the newly 
founded South African Institute for Medical Research, 
exploded the myth that hand drilling "is not 
particularly conducive to miners' phthisis". Although 
at the time of writing he was referring to hand 
drilling in the pyritic sons, his remarks which 
followed are relevant to mining conditions in the free 
milling zone:
This opinion certainly receives no support 
from the fact that stonemasons, who follow 
their calling in the open air, and employ 
only hand tools for their work, are 
specially liable to develop the disease. 
"Stonemasons' phthisis" was, indeed, 
definitely recognised as a disease before 
miners' phthisis,^'^
While hand drilling and the other equally well 
defined mining processes generated varying quantities 
of respirable silica, there was another indirect 
source of dust, but one which is seldom noted; dust 
was also frequently released, even if inadvertently, 
by the impacting of one rock on another during and 
after specific procedures.Also, each battery of 
stamps and mills was a major source .of dust. Although 
-ne stamps and mills used water for breaking and 
crushing the ore, the huge unenclosed machines created 
enormous dust clouds which perforce enveloped those 
workers whose jobs were to feed the machines and free
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them of their residue.
There can be no doubt that such working 
conditions promoted the incidence of silicosis, but in 
a chronic rather than in an accelerated form. Yet the 
1930 health officers failed to draw this conclusion. 
Their omission to do so is striking, because surface 
dust conditions during the 1920s were remarkably 
similar to those during the late 1880s and early 
1890s, Their own experience had shown and empirical 
data had proved that crushing and milling operationsj 
could produce a chronic form of silicosis. This was 
certainly so with operators at crushing stations whose 
incapacitation and death had been documented since 
1910. These surface workers V'lere so vulnerable to 
silicosis that South African legislation in 1916 made
special provision to compensate’ them. For these
reasons we must reject the health officers' first 
proposition ttiat open-cast mining v*ias harmless,
Likewise, their second proposition, which stated 
that the dust from the weathered cone could not cause 
silicosis, can also be proved wrong. It is probable 
that the shallow underground workings in the free 
milling zone were reasonably well ventilated. This 
was because air currents which were created by the 
numerous vertical cuttings and shafts driven from the 
surface to these =>hallow depths could diffuse dust 
concentrations produced in underground excavation and 
ore-removal jobs. But this was not the corner-stone 
of the health officers' proposition. Instead, they
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■focused only on the geological composition o-P the 
weathered zone. Implicitly they argued that mining 
operations in the triable free milling cone provoked 
only a soft, coarse, harmless dust, as opposed to the 
hard, fine, dangerous dust which was later produced in 
the pyritic cone. As there are no records or any 
other evidence of dust samples having been .taken
ypbefore the Anglo-Boer War, this theory has little 
substantive value, and should be viewed rather as a 
subjective hypothesis.
Despite its attributes of softness and friability 
the composition of the weathered zone was hugely 
siliceous. Consequently the dust it produced 
possessed high concentrations of respirable silica and 
was, by definition, a hazard to health. As important, 
the numerous underground procedures continuously 
stirred up siliceous dust in clof-a proximity to the 
workers; and long term exposure to -this hazard would 
undoubtedly have induced a chronic ^orm of silicosis. 
There is little satisfactory empirical evidence or 
established scientific data to support the health 
officers' conterition that work in the free milling 
zone produced only a harmless dust, which could not 
cause silicosis.
In 1930 the medical profession, mining officials 
and the leaders of the gold mining industry were also 
proponents of this view.^*^ In supporting it, all of 
them committed themselves to perp'^tuating the fallacy 
that silicosis did not exist on the gold fields
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between 1886 and 1892. The endorsement by so many 
parties of a spurious rationale suggests a collective 
motive that bears scrutiny.
The world-wide indifference of health officers to 
chronic silicosis and to its cause, namely silica 
dust, has been amply demonstrated; and the prevalence 
o t  this attitude on the Witwatersrand was only 
“ogical. In contrast, health officers could not with 
similar casualness dismiss the occurrence of
accelerated silicosis with its markedly malignant and 
morbid ingredients. Indeed, its initial widespread 
manifestation on the Witwatersrand between 1901 and 
1902 certainly took doctors and mining officials by 
surnrise. Health officers conceded their ignorance of 
this form of the disease. With some justice they 
claimed that they were unaware of the danger residing 
in one of the disease's intermediary producers, namely 
the mechanised rock drill. But it was impossible for 
them to deny their understanding and knowledge of the 
aetiology of the disease. Indeed, they could
instantly identify its primary cause as being silica
dust 31
All the same, they did not take the admission to 
its logical conclusion. They would have been 
indicting their former colleagues for disregarding 
industrial hygiene, that aspect of preventive medicine 
to which they were professionaliy committed.®^ Both 
before and after 1892, the eariy-day health officers 
on the Witwatersrand, by failing to issue a single
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cautionary note or warning, condoned and permitted the 
existence of dust levels that were conducive to the 
incidence of chronic silicosis. Such omissions had 
serious implications. By default they iiad extenuated 
mining conditions under which respirable silica had 
proliferated, so providing the ideal circumstances for 
the spawning of accelerated silicosis.
The health officers and their allies in 1930 were 
undoubtedly well aware of their colleagues' oversights 
in rhe past. But their need during the 1930s to 
promote publicly the industry's battle against the 
disease, and their de'''""e to vindicate the industry's 
tarnished record, with respect to silicosis, prompted 
them to conceal the negative features of the history 
of the disease on the Witwatersrand. Clearly the 
collective motive of all the concerned parties was to 
exonerate the gold mining industry, including all its 
direct and indirect professional affiliates, from any 
blame initially attaching to the excessive incidence 
and pre'valence of accelerated silicosis.
The medical practitioners and their supporters 
achieved their objective in two ways. First, they 
negated the presence of dangerous dust and the 
occurrence of silicosis during the period 1886 to 
1'892. Second, when in retrospect they were obliged to 
admit that harmful dust had come into existence on the 
mines, that is during the period 1892 to 1899, they 
deflected attention from chronic silicosis by 
stressing the liablity of the respirable silica for
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provoking only accelerated silicosis. This, too., they 
could justi-fy and extenuate with a measure o-f 
plausibility; they pleaded ignorance and unawareness 
o-f the adverse implications inherent in the 
industrialisation of the gold mines after 1892.
These rationales created a myth which literally 
banished chronic silicosis from the gold fields during 
the entire period from 1886 to 1899. The myth 
exonerated the failure of the early—day health 
officers and management to institute remedial measures 
for obviating the incidence of both chronic and 
accelerated silicosis during the entire period before 
the Anglo-Boer War.
There can be no doubt that in the free milling 
zone from 1887 to 1392 mining conditions, haphazard 
and unscientific as they were, were conducive to 
silicosis in its chronic form. But if we are to 
understand the incidence of accelerated silicosis from 
1892 onwards, we need to examine the changes in mining 
techniques and organisation which caused increased and 
heavy dust concentrations in the confined space of the 
underground workings. This was the resulc of new 
developments in the industry; and it is to these that 
we must now turn.
The years from 1889 to 1891 were characterised by 
a lull in mining activities, for the industry was 
during this period in a precarious state.
At Johannesburg Cin 18903 some mills were
going, but many were silent. The boom had
-  200 -
passed and the blight had come. As the 
possibility and opportunity of speculation 
had uwindled, the crowd of irresponsibles 
who dubbed themselves brokers also dwindled 
till very few were left...At least one-third 
of the houses and stores were unoccupied and 
gloom was general. Families were leaving, 
offices were being closed, cheap sales of 
pianos ^and safes blocked the Market 
Square a:
On the gold fields themselves approximately 
seventy-three companies continued developing and 
producing; but as many as eighty-nine had closed down 
their operations.'" The reason for the end to mining 
activities and the "panic" was the virtual exhaustion 
of the rich surface zone. At lower depths the average 
grade of ore was falling and, if the excavation of 
gold was to continue, the "dreaded" pyritic zone had 
next to be tackled.Already the results of the few 
mining ventures in this zone were unpromising. Not 
only was the average grade of gold lower. Also, the 
pyritic ore - after crushing - resisted extraction. 
As mentioned earlier, in the banket of the weathered 
zone oxidation released the "free" gold particles, 
which then easily amalgamated with the mercury used in 
the simple extraction process. But a large percentage
O/.of pyritic ore was unamenable to this trejatment. 
Thus pyritic became a syrfonym for refractory. A mere 
55 per cent of the gold from pyritic banket was 
recovered, and the rest had to be dis-carded in the 
tailings.®^ Also, work was mere difficult and 
expensive in the pv'ritic zone;®® and as working costs
ppremained high, pro-fits were -further dimii'iished.  ^
These circumstances were a deter>"ont to fresh capital, 
both foreign and local, and discouraged the
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development o-f existing enterprises and the launching 
of new ones."^ ’^ The prevailing mood of pessimism was 
exacerbated by doubts regarding the persistence of the
Oigold-bearing deposits.
By 1892 the industry had not only recovered from 
the doldrums into which it had sunk; it was 
additionally infused with a strong .and now
sophisticated vigour. Two reasons were responsible 
for this transformation. The first was the
introduction of a successful extraction process for 
treating pyritic ore; and the second was the 
establishment of proof that the gold persisted at 
depth.
Between 1889 arid 1892 the cyanide process 
patented by John Stewart iiacArthur and his medical 
partners, the brothers Dr Robert and Dr William 
Forrest, was developed and proved. Its successful 
application to the tailings resulted in a 90 per cent
QOrecovery of the total gold mined. Even before the 
process had been modified and significantly improved, 
gold recovered from the tailings rose from 
40 000 ounces per month in 1890 to 100 000 ounces per 
month in 1892;'^ '^  and by 1893 it had become almost 
universal practice on the Witwatersrand to treat the
tailings and slimes with the cyanide process. 94
Barring other exigencies, mining of low grade and 
pyritic ore could now become a profitably 
proposition.
’02
Mining experience has shown that, once the
sur-face layers o-f gold deposits, geologically similar 
to those -found on the Witwatersrand, have been 
exhausted, triers is usually little prospect -for -future 
mining at depth. This is because either the gold may 
suddenly disappear, a common phenomenon colloquially 
called "pinching out”, or the grades may peter to 
unpayable lows.*^ '“' But neither ot these obstacles to 
deep level mining was present on the Witwatersrand. 
First, the gold did not disappear. Rather its
persistence on a gently sloping plane was established 
at depth. Although the dip at the surtace was steeply 
inclined at an average angle of forty-two degrees, it 
gradually flattened; and at a depth of 1 484 feet on
a L.the incline it was a mere twenty-nine degrees. 
Thereafter the reefs continued their sloping descent, 
but at an average angle of only one degree per 100 
feet.*^^ Second, the gold grades did not peter out. 
Although the average grades were low - the ore 
fluctuated between high, medium and low grades - the 
ore deposits wer-e more regular and uniform than in any
OOother auriferous . area in the world. As a
contemporary mining expert sagely observed: "Compared
with the Rand conglomerates, all other gold-mines are 
but sporadic little flukes.
These auspicious findings were made between 1889 
and 1395 by the sinking of deep, diamond-dri11 
boreholes. Boreholes were initially located on claims 
staked immediately south of the outcrop claims; but
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High temperature air in deep underground workings 
is caused by the natural heat o-f the strata. But 
underground temperature conditions on the 
Witwatersrand were comparatively moderates the mines 
were endovied with a relatively -flat geothermic
gradient, 106 At sea level the rock temperatures in
mines rose one degree fahrenheit per siKty feet of
verti;al 107depth. • Because of the elevation of the
highveld at 6 000 feet ab<ove sea level — and the-
absence of thermal springs — the gold fields of the
Transvaal were "marvellously well favoured in this
respect . 108
In mines at this high altitude underground rock 
temperatures rose more slowly than at sea level, a 
one-degree increase occurring every 20S -feet o-f 
vertical depth. Thus an "ordinary" underground
temperature at 2- 000 feet on the Wi twatersrand was a 
mere seventy degrees. This was relatively moderate 
compared to many overseas metal mines, and those of 
Cornwall in particular, where temperatures ranged from 
eighty to ninety—two degrees at the same d e p t h - O n  
the Witwatersrand the temperature of the rock rose to 
eighty degrees fahrenheit only when underground work 
commenced at 3 500 feet.^^^ This meant that miners on 
the Witwatersrand could work relatively more 
efficiently at the deeper levels than their 
counterparts elsewhere.
Yet another factor favoured deep level mining on 
the Witwatersrand. The inflow of water into the mines
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1  * i oat depth was less than in other mining centres. Of
course water did occur at depth. But the extensive 
use of Cornish pumps ensured that its presence did not 
hinder underground operations unduly. In one
notable instance, that of the Knights Oeep, excessive 
quantities of underground water compelled the mine to 
stop working. The mine, however, was sold at a profit 
and its subsequent owners were '•asily able to surmount 
the p r o b l e m . M o r e o v e r ,  the "fortunate"
accessibility of abundant and cheap coal made•
steam-powered operations, including pumping,
relatively cheap. The mineowners considered the
freight charges for coal excessive. Even so, before 
the Anglo-Boer War the cost of coal, including 
transport, accounted for only 11 per cent of the total 
working costs of the mines. Underground water was a 
relatively minor problem on the Witwatersrand gold 
mines.
Each of these geological conditions ravoured deep 
level mining; the relative ease with which reefs 
dislocated by faults or pierced by dykes could be 
relocated; moderate underground temperatures; and the 
relative cheapness of pumping out minimal quantities 
of underground water. But each had disadvantageous 
features with respect to the health of workers. Each, 
too, in its way aggravated the conditions conducive to 
silicosis; and these are discussed later."^^ Before 
the Anglo—Boer War health officers had no intimation 
of the inimical potential of these apparent
-  206 -
advantages. They, like management, would have viewed 
the specific and unique combination of these 
fortuitous circumstances on the Witwatersrand as 
minor, but still significant, reasons for optimism in 
the future of deep level mining.
The deep level claims — they were called block 
claims in Q u e e n s l a n d ^ - were staked immediately 
south of the outcrop claims. They occupied 
approKimately 12,5 miles along the length of the 
strike, this being nearly 40 per cent of the total 
east-west length of the reef-^^'^ The deep level mines 
were classified as first row, second row and third row 
deeps depending on how far south they were located 
from the outcrops. Thus the northern boundaries of 
each of the three rows of deeps were on average 
1 000 feet, 4 000 to 5 000 feet, and 6 000 to
7 000 feet respectively from the o u t c r o p s . .  - it is 
not possible to give an average working depth for each 
row, as differences in the angle of the dip along the 
Main Reef, the chief gold-bearing series mined during 
this period, resulted in shafts intersecting the
4 OObanket at enormously varied underground levels.
The fortuitous concurrence, round about 1892, of 
the cyanide process with proof of the persistence and 
payability of the gold reefs at depth, came as a 
"relief" to those speculators who had earlier staked
claims south of the outcrop boundaries 12: Also, their
1faith in the deep levels was vindicated. Therefore 
at the beginning of 1892 "scientific mining" was
- 207
introduced on the Witviatersrand. It must not be 
thought that scienti-fic mining was a term applied only 
to the deep levels, as some historians incorrec, £ly 
imply. Now that it was possible to extract 90 per 
cent of the gold from the pyritic zone, outcrop 
companies began systematically to exploit their claims 
using development and production techniques which were 
virtually identical to those I'.sed by the deep level 
mines.
"Deep level" when applied to the first row of 
deep level mines is a misnomer. The term has apt 
connotations only when used in a geographical sense to 
distinguish the first row of deeps from those situated 
on the outcrop claims. In a relative sense they 
were invariably not deep mines: in most cases their
shafts intersected the reef at under 1 OOC feet in 
vertical depth. For instance, the mean depth of the 
two vertical shafts on the Seldenhuis Deep, the 
original first level deep to come into production, in 
1895, was 680 feet; and the vertical shafts of the 
Rosa Deep, the Jumpers Deep and the Crown Deep, which 
had started producing by 1897, were only a little 
deeper - at 812 feet, 1 072 feet and 1 099 feet. 
Therefore their average vertical depths were
relatively shallow. As late as 1906 the main deep 
level mines of the Corner House were of "moderate 
depth" and averaged "about 1,200 feet vertical
Mines which were deep in the literal sense of the 
word comprised those mines classified as second and
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third row desp levels. Yet the term deep when
applied to mines in the second row was also relative;
many of them were also comparatively shallow 13: The
important point is that mines classs-ified as second and _ 
third level deeps were developed and became producers 
significantly later than the first r;ow of deep level 
mines. In 1902, by the end of the Angio-Boer War, 
only three of the ten companies on the second row had 
started developing - two of these were producing in 
1905 - while the remaining seven were just beginning 
to break ground. At the same time, that is in 1902, 
only two mines had been established on the third row; 
and both had only started shaft sinking. As late as 
1905, by which time r.iining production had regained its 
pre-war levels, a mere twenty of the sixty-seven 
producing mines were classified as deep level
companies. Only the first row of deeps is therefore 
relevant to the period prior to the Anglo-Boer War.
With respect to depth of workings the outcrop 
mines were similar to those of the first level deeps. 
In their deeper workings the inclined shafts of the 
outcrop mines cut the reef at 800 to 900 vertical feet 
from the surface. In some places outcrop mines were
worked at even deeper levels. The Ferreira had by 
1895, for example, reached 1 020 feet - the deepest 
vertical level then' being worked by any other outcrop
mine 137 While the impossibility of establishing
average depths needs to be recognised^'^® - depths were 
proportional to the breadth of the property from the
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outcrop to the down-dip - it can nevertheless be 
concluded that depth is not a criterion -For
distinguishing outcrop mines from the first level
deeps.
Some of S. H. Frankel's calculation for dividend 
yields from gold during the period 1887 to 1936 have 
been based on the working depths of mines. 
Therefore unless historians who make use of his
figures understand the similarity in vtorking depths of 
outcrop mines and first level deeps, they are in real
danger of undervaluing the contributions of the
outcrop mines to the total dividend yield, especially
in the period 1902 to 1914, 140 It should be stressed
again that in 1905, when the industry had regained its 
pre-war vitality, m<z>re than two-thirds of the 
producing mines were categorised as outcrop mines; 
and the majority of these were significant producers 
right up to World War 1. Therefore, if working
conditions at depth vjere conducive to silicosis, they 
applied equally to both outcrop and to deep level 
mines.
Ely failing to appreciate the scientific way in 
which the outcrop mines were eKploited after 1892, 
historians have fallen into a trap - that of 
attributing the incidence of accelerated silicosis 
solely to deep level mining practices. But as a 
mining expert correctly observed in 1897: "It is 
recognised that a deep level is nothing more, from the 
mining point of view, than an outcrop with vertical
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sha-fts. ” Therefore differences between outcrop and 
deep level mines on the Witwatersrand cannot be 
identified by using mining techniques as the 
criterion.
If one takes into account that a large number of 
outcrop mines and first level deeps were worked 
together as single enterprises, the distinction 
between outcrop and deep les'al mines becomes even more 
blurred. Of the thirty—seven producing mines in 1894 
only nine could be classified as "pure" outcrops: the 
remainder, excluding a handful of true first level 
deeps, were an amalgamation of outcrop and deep level 
mines. Such combinations were a characteristic 
feature of the East Rand where first level deeps did 
not exist as separate enterprises. First row, deep 
level claims were both owned and operated by 
contiguous outcrop companies; notable examples were 
the Simmer and Jack and the East Rand Proprietary 
Mi ne s .L ik ew is e, the City and Suburban, close to 
the town of Johannesburg, was categorised as an 
outcrop mine, although it worked a number of first
row, deep level claims too. 148
In 1965 Blainey claimed that the Jameson Raid in 
1895 was inspired by a conspiracy of deep level 
proprietors who formed a definitive group: it was 
distinct from the other defined party which comprised 
the ouccrop owners. Through his analysis of the 
structure of mine ownership, Kubicek later rejected 
Blainey's view; Kubicek convincingly showed that the
mineowners' interests in both kinds of mines 
over lapped. By demonstrating that many individual 
mines in 1395 could not be rigidly categorised as 
outcrops or deep levels, this study, therefore, 
supports Kubicek's argument. It should further be 
noted that 0eorge Farrar, one of the principal 
conspirators behind the Jameson Raid, was Chairman of 
the East Rand Proprietary Mines, which was a mxxture 
of outcrop and deep level mines. Consequently Farrar 
cannot be rigidly classified as a "deep level"
propr ietor 151
In summary we have established two important 
points. First, outcrop mines cannot be distinguished 
from deep level mines in terms of either ownership or 
mining techniques. Second, all the Witwatersrand 
mines and their owners were equally liable for the 
occurrence of both chronic and accelerated silicosis.
Towards the end of 1891 the mineowners 
systematically introduced scientific mining on the 
Witwatersrand gold fields. In contrast to the 
relatively low costs of their early haphazard mining 
enterprises, which had by this time exhausted the rich 
surface patches, the industrialisation of the mines 
involved high capital, development and working costs. 
These costs must be carefully examined because they 
are relevant to this study for at least two reasons. 
First, the industrialists' efforts to contain costs 
and to reduce, in particular, working costs led them 
to introduce underground methods which created
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exceedingly high dust densities. These harmful 
working conditions provoked both chronic and 
accelerated silicosis. Second, after 1902, when the 
devastations of silicosis had been established,
management's continued obsession with cost-cutting 
strategies was a major reason that effective dust 
controls were not implemented. Instead, the 
mineowners subordinated the health of underground 
workers, particularly of miners, to their financial 
priorities.
Before 1892 much gold mining capital came locally 
from entrepreneurs who had amassed large fortunes from 
the diamond mines in Kimberley. Overseas investors, 
particularly those from Britain, were initially
dubious about the prospects of the Witwatersrand; and 
the "shady" dealings of the promotors sharpened their
misg1 vings. But by 1892 an optimism in the
long-term future of Witwatersrand gold replaced the 
investors' former uncertainties. From now on most of 
the capital came from overseas, notably from Britain 
and from France and to a lesser extent from 
Bermany. Even so : until 1895 most of . the profits 
from the mines continued to be based on windfalls, the 
result of speculative dealings which had nothing to do 
with mining per
As the initial inflows of capital from overseas 
were inadequate, mineowners had to develop new mining 
strategies to strengthen and sustain investor 
confidence. Also, additional supplies of working
!13 -
capital were needed for expensive modifications to the
outcrop mines and the first level deeps; and
continuous supplies of development capital were 
crucial for the establishment of the second and third 
row of deep level mines. Accordingly, the mineowners 
employed "scientific mining men" to introduce sound 
methods of mining; and the mining of Witwatersrand
gold became an organised industry. 156
After 1895 profits mainly came from the 
performance of the mines. Such profits were
determined by the "pay limit". Although the demand 
for gold was unlimited, throughout this period the 
gold price was fixed. Consequently any increases in 
the cost of gold production could not be passed on to 
consumers. Mines had either to produce at a cost 
below the world price of gold or cease production, a 
problem which was compounded in that this era of 
mining expansion was characterised by a world-wide 
cycle of commodity price increases. The "pay limit" 
therefore hinged on two crucial contingencies, of 
which contemporary mining experts were well aware: the 
yield of gold per ton and working costs.
Had the average yields- of the Witwatersrand mines 
been twelve dwts per ton and thus comparable, for 
instance, to the gold mines of Australia and of North 
America, the mineowners' undertakings to the 
shareholders to make profits would have been far less 
difficult. But the average grade of ore on the 
majority of Witwatersrand mines was considerably less
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than even the "moderate" predictions of optimistic 
statisticians who in 1893 had forecast averages of
sixteen dwts per ton. 16v
If the mineowners had concentrated on mining only 
high grade patches of the reef and had "picked the 
eyes" of the mines, they would probably have generated 
profits relatively easily without finding it necessary 
to pare working costs to the bare minimum. But this 
would have meant abandoning vast reserves of unpayable 
low grade ore and facing the prospect of mines with 
relatively short lives. Instead, by pledging 
themselves to mining low grade ores, the mineowners 
committed them to working richer grade reserves in 
conjunction with much poorer o n e s . W h i l e  this 
decision could prolong the lives of the mines, it was 
nevertheless speculative.
The speculative features of the industry were 
more marked with respect tio the second and third row 
deeps to which enormous capital costs were tied, but 
with only long term expectations of return on 
capital. The first row of deep levels on average 
began producing only three and a half years after 
shaft sinking had first begun. But the development of 
the second and the third level deeps took very much 
longer, so delaying production further.^*^^
During the 1890s the mineowners tended to mine 
the reefs selectively; they mined relatively high 
grades of ore ranging from eight to eleven dwts per
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1 Aftton and avoided reserves of lower g r a d e s . B u t  after 
the Anglo—Boer War the Randlords changed their
policy. They were determined to mine at a profit 
reserves of only four dwts per ton. ^  This switch of 
policy, which coincided with the production stage of 
the second row deeps, had two results. First, to mine 
these lower grades profitably the Randlords
intensified their efforts to reduce working costs. 
Second, the lay public, in “misinterpreting" the 
industry's policy of mining lower grades, believed
that the grade o.f ore decreased with depth 170
Once the mineowners had committed themselves to 
the risks of mining low grade ores, they unduly 
stressed the costs of deep level mining. The 
mineowners' emphasis on the high development and
production costs of the deep level mines - indeed, it 
amounted to propaganda - led laymen, as we have noted, 
to believe that the mines got "poorer as they 
increased in depth". For the mining directors this 
was a convenient fallacy which they did not attempt to 
correct, unless they were directly challenged to do 
so. It should be noted that in both the outcrop and 
the deep level mines the grades of gold, even at
depth, ranged from high to low. The mineowners'
exaggeration of the higher working costs of the deep
level mines was a spurious attempt to conceal the
speculative nature of their undertakings.
Because of the speculative nature of gold mining, 
investors wanted higher returns on gold than on other
!16 -
ventures. They were satisfied with average returns of
3 to 4 per cent on secure investments, but expected 9
to 10 per cent on The research of R. A.
Lehfeldt and S. H. Frankel has shown that the average
yields on capital from the Witwatersrand's low grade
gold mining industry for the single period 1907—1926
1was a mere 6,2 per cent. Although returns on gold 
were higher than in other investments, gold returns 
did not always live up to investor expectations;“ 
and aftiv • a brief boom in the market following the 
close of the Anglo—Boer War, many overseas investors 
turned their backs on Witwatersrand g o l d . O n e  of 
the reasons for this Tall off of investor interest in 
gold was that the overall internal rate of return 
between 1887 and 1814, as Frankel has since
calculated, was a mere 2,1 per cent, 178
The relatively low dividend returns on gold 
explain why the mineowners constantly complained of 
the difficulties of raising fresh or additional 
capital, and were obsessional about the need to reduce 
working costs. If greed is a quality which can be 
attributed to the mineowners it was in respect of 
their determination to "get every ounce of gold which 
is in the ground out of It was not, as their
antagonists believed, that low dividend payments were 
the effect of an unduly high retention of profits by 
the mining houses.
Clearly the success of the mineowners' commitment 
to low grade, deep level mining depended on their
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ability to produce gold at minimal costs. As the
majority ot items attributed to capital costs were
fixed - only a few were capable of adjustment -
mineownes s had to make concerted efforts to reduce
working costs. The intensity of their efforts to
effect working cost reductions is illustrated by the
following quotation. Although it was written in 1906,
it expressed sentiments which applied equally in the
period before the Anglo-Boer War;
As is now well recognised, every shilling 
reduction in working costs brings into the 
sphere of practical mining hundreds of
thousands of tons of low“-grade ore which, 
without reduced costs, cannot be worked at a 
profit; and every shilling reduction in 
working costs means, if the reduction is not 
obtained at the cost of sound mining, a 
corresponding addition to dividends. 
Increased dividends would, no doubt, prove 
an effective argument with European 
capitalists, great and small, in favour of 
South African investment, and thus the money 
and minerals would be here for an enormous 
expansion in Transvaal industry - an 
expansion, the extent of v«hich will be 
determined only by the level to which 
working costs can be reduced.
Financial considerations prompted the
establishment in the lS90s of nine major gold mining
groups to v*Jhich the vast majority of the mines was
attached. Overtrading in shares and speculation in
both property and shares had caused investors to
1 P 4sustain huge losses during the period 1390 to 1891. 
Such losses damaged the stock market at a time crucial 
for the inauguration of scientific mining in 1892. 
Therefore one of the aims of the group system, 
pioneered by Rand Mines Ltd in 1393, was to stabilise 
the market for future investments, particularly in the
:18 -
deep level minee, and to attract outside -funds 
especially -from Europe. In the long term the group 
system e-f-fectively cushioned low returns from Its 
poorer producers. As average grades varied from mine 
to m t- some were on average rich, while others were 
poor - the group system enabled the richer mines of 
the holding company to subvent the "low-grade mines",
as the poorer mines were often generically termed 186
An additional aim of the group system was to 
rationalise management and administration. By 
providing their subsidiaries with a pool of
technological and administrative resources each group 
was able to secure savings in capital and development 
costs.Significantly, too, centralisation resulted 
in substantial reductions in working costs. As bulk 
buyers, the groups effected cost savings for each mine
1 QOunder their cohxrol.'^ Consequently both Rand Mines 
and Conso?iaated Gold Fields claimed in 1907 that 
their subsidiaries wc-re collectively worked at a lower
cost per ton than those of any of the other groups. 189
The policies of the groups were frequently shaped 
by the consulting engineers, whose influence and 
power is a neglected area of historical research. 
Also, the appointment of company consulting engineers 
forged an important communicative link between the 
mine managers and the mineowners. The important 
role that consulting engineers played in implementing 
preventive measures against silicosis needs to be 
stressed. For instance, in 1911 Richard Barry, the
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manager o-f the Nourse, had to obtain the approval o-f 
the consulting engineers of the Rand Mines before he 
was allov-Jed to institute his sy temat i cal ly designed
watering system, 19: Despite its success and government
commendations, neither the other mines in his group 
nor those of other groups adopted his system 
universally. The reason was its relatively high
installation and maintenance costs. 193
Likewise, in 1915 Barry encountered "personal 
abuse" from several consulting mining engineers, 
including James B. Lawn and Charles D. Leslie of 
Consolidated Boldfields. As a member of the Miners'
Phthisis Prevention Committes, Barry presented a 
report in which Ihe advocated the universal adoption on 
the mines of the single-shift system of blasting, 
namely blasting only once a day, at the end of the 
second shift, so enabling the dust to settle.
Although "75 per cent" of the committee agreed to 
cjbolish multi-shift blasting, because of the
considerable expense involved, the entire ind' stry, 
influenced by the consulting mining engineers, did not 
voluntarily implement the recommendation.
Eventually the measure was enforced by mining
regulations enacted in 1917-
The prime underlying reason for the
reconstitution of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines 
in 1889, cifter its weak start two years earlier, was 
also the containment of c o s t s . A l t h o u g h  its 
progress was disrupted by superficial divisions
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amongst the mining houses, by 1B97 the Chamber had 
successfully obtained the whole-hearted support of the 
major mining companies. The Chamber had no 
financial interest in any of the mines and its 
services were sustained purely by member 
subscr iptions. Similarly, the costs of additional 
Chamber ventures were often underwritten by its 
members on a pro rata b a s i s . T h e  Chamber always 
strove to achieve uniformity of employment conditions 
for the workforce of all its af f i 1 iates. But it 
could not enforce executive decisions on dissident 
members.'^ -'-' As Alan Jeeves has shown, the Chamber of 
Mines lacked the power to establish centralised 
control of Af; 'an labour recruitment; throughout the 
period 1902 to 1914 the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association - the WNLA - a subsidiary organisation of 
the Chamber, did not achieve the monopsony it 
sought.
Another instance of the Chamber's impotence in 
regard to the implementation of executive decisions 
was its failure to get full member compliance in 
introducing safeguards against silicosis. A prime
example was the rejection by most the Chamber's
affiliates, on grounds of costs, of its recommendation 
to disallow promiscuous blasting. In 1917 in-shift 
blasting was eventually abolished, but only as a 
result of state intervention and enforcement by mining 
regulation. °
The Chamber was there-fore not as powerful, as the 
public tended to believe. The government of the South 
African Republican, for instance, fearing that the 
Chamber would become an imperium in ivipe'rio, refused 
to allow it to become an incorporated organisation.-^ 
But the Chamber's non-interference with the managerial 
autonomy of the subscribing mines and its detachment 
on issues which might have prompted inter-mining house 
competi t i v e n e s s , promoted and sustained the popular 
support by its members. Its greatest strength, both 
locally and overseas, was in the sphere of public 
relations.-'^ The Chamber's propagandist role was, in 
fact,, one of the most useful services it performed for 
the mining houses to which it was responsible. And it 
did an excellent job.
It is therefore all the more surprising that
writers, who are -taken seriously, should still
misapprehend so fundamentally the Chamber's role.
Belinda Bosaoli in her study, The Political Mature of
a Ruling Class: Capital and Ideology in South Africa
1S90-I933, discusses, in A. Gramsci's terms, the role
of "the organic intellectuals":
Ctheir 1 task was to bridge the gap between 
economic interests and political and 
ideological realities; and to translate the 
abstract needs of capital into real social 
needs.^
In the Transvaal they ran the "media of capital" and 
"as journalists, speechmakers or writers, played an 
important intellectual role in guiding and leading
certain of the processes of class formation 
t h e m s e l v e s B o z z o l i  claims further, "As the mining 
revolution got under way, so its organic intellectuals 
took on the roles of strategists and ideological 
vanguard. they were the "policy-makers for the 
emerging bourgeoisie".
The facts controvert Bozzoli's argument. These 
people were not, in fact, the initiators of opinion. 
They were little more than propagandist hacks, who 
spoke and wrote as the Chamber wanted. Of their own 
independent role there was little sign. For instance, 
E. P, Rathbone, singled out by Bozzoli as the 
archetypal "organic intel1 actual" was a faithful 
punter of whatever happened to be the Chamber of Mines' 
current line. Rathbone regularly attended the monthly 
meetings of both the Transvaal Institution of Engineers 
and the Chemical, Metallurgical and Mining Society of 
South Africa. Therefore he reported in the media the 
prevailing policy and opinions of consulting engineers 
and mine managers.®’-'^ Also, he was a subscribing 
associate member of the Chamber.®’-'^
In implementing its decisions the Chamber had the 
support of the Association of Mine Managers, a 
powerful organisation whose influence has been 
insufficiently documented in the gold mining 
1iterature.Founded in July 1893, with time this 
body grew in strength. By the end of the 19th century 
the Association consisted of representatives of all 
the groups and most of the mines affiliated to the
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Chamber. Its close relationship with the Chamber was 
emphasised in 1898 by its inclusion o-f an additional 
constitutional objective: "To promote the interests o-f 
the Mining Companies represented by the Members. ^
The Association's monthly meetings were well 
attended; and the ejtecutive which met more frequently, 
often once a week, was highly efficient. The 
Association did not plan the day-to-day running of the 
mines, which was considered to be the prerogative of 
individual mine m a n a g e r s . ' Like the Chamber the 
Association's desire for general uniformity on the 
mines required the standardisation of many practices 
and procedures, a number of which were closely tied to
working costs. \
Decisions taken by the Chamber needed the 
ratification of the Association of Mine Managers for 
their successful execution. It should also be noted 
that many of the schemes which have been credited to 
the Chamber of Mines or to organisations under its 
direct control, such as the WNLA, were, in fact, 
initiated and planned by the Association of Mine 
Managers. For instance, in 1904 the initiative for 
improving the conditions under which black mineworkers 
were transported to the Witwatersrand came from the 
mine managers.Similarly, in 1908 the suggestion of 
the Association that a convalescent home for silicotic 
miners be established led to the Chamber's decision to 
build and maintain the Springkell Sanatorium - it was 
opened in 1911 - on land donated by the government.
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More often than not the Association's
undertakings, which subsequently received the 
Chamber's approval, were designed to cut working 
costs. Although, many of these cost-related plans may 
seem more staid than the Association's more grandiose 
schemes, invariably they had significant and often 
long-term implications. These projects, for instance, 
included the abolition of overtime rates for white 
mineworkers and the drawing up of wage scnedules for 
black mineworkers,^^^ In 1896 the mine managers' 
revised waged schedule, implemented in 1897, 
effectively reduced African workers' earnings by 33 
per nent.'^ '^ ° As the Association had no wish or power 
to interfere with the autonomy of mine managers, 
individual mines wer not obliged to carry out 
precautions devised by the Assiuiation for preventing 
silicosis. When mine managers neglected to introduce 
certain preventive measures, they often did so because 
their implementation would have involved their mines 
in additional working costs. Of course there were a 
number of indifferent mine managers, the so-called
O'*?"?" 1 aggards". But there were certainly also many
interested managers who were "prepared to do more in
O O Qthe spending of money" but who were caught in the
cross-fire between their governing boards and their 
own concern to observe both the spirit and the letter
oooof the mining regulations.*^ **^
We have now established that the different levels 
in the hierarchical structure of management - the
mineowners and directors, the boards of the groups, 
including the consulting engineers, and the mine 
managers — were concerned with and committed to 
cutting v-jorking costs. These sentiments were 
expressed through the collective, "powerful" and 
"authoritative voice" of the Chamber of Mines. This 
body through its public relations arm shaped these 
views and made them palatable to the public through 
the press, including its annual reports and the 
newspapers which it controlled or made deliberate 
efforts to court and influence."^
This study will show that, despite investors'
relatively long times of waiting for their return on
capital from the deep levels, the capital costs for
the outcrop mines were almost on a par with those of
the first and perhaps the second row of deep level
mines. Also, during this period the working costs of
both the outcrop and the deep level mines were
virtually identical. Accordingly. the following
analysis will help correct the fallacy that the deep
level mines, because of their higher working costs,
particularly in development, were more dangerous as
1dust producers than the outcrop mines. Both kinds 
of mines provoked equivalent amounts of silicosis, 
whether in their chronic and accelerated forms. This 
was because management's efficiency drives, which were 
linked to their cost-cutting exercises, created high 
silica levels on both kinds of mines. The outcrop 
mines generally had shorter lives than those of the
— 0 0 /
deep level mines. But until 1914, as we have shown, 
the outcrop mines continued to be significant gold 
producers.
From 1892, the year that saw the introduction of 
scientific mining, working costs were associated with 
the following processes in the cycle of gold 
production on the Witwatersrand: excavating and
removing the conglomerate, hauling it to the surface, 
breaking the rock and crushing it to powder and 
finally extracting the gold by the amalgamation and 
cyanide processes. In 1397 the principal items 
included under working costs were white labour, black 
labour, explosives and coal. Coal and explosives were 
the two smallest items: when combined they barely
constituted one-third of the total wage bill.'^ '"'"^
In its attempts to reduce these expenses
management focused its efforts far more on costs 
incurred in the underground operations of ore
excavation, its removal and haulage to the surf ace, 
than on the surface procedures of crushing, milling 
and refining the gold. Of course economies were also 
effected on the surface. These were achieved largely 
in two ways: first, by the process of sorting,
introduced during the late 1890s; and second, by the 
innovation in 1904 of tube mills. Sorting by hand 
labour took place after the gyratory crushers had 
broken the excavated rock in pieces; and in this 
procedure workers separated the banket from the barren 
rock so that only the gold-bearing rock would be
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subsequently crushed to powder by the mi 1 1 s . A - F t e r  
1904 the introduction o-f mechanised tube mills -further 
powdered the banket a-fter its initial mi 11 ir,-3. 
Consequently by 1905, according to mining directors, 
surface costs had been pared to the m i n i m u m . B u t  
throughout the period from 1892 until 1914 underground 
working costs remained high; and in management's view 
there was greater scope and flexibility for their
0"T“7reduction than in surface activities.'^'-" Another 
important reason that management directed its
attention to underground working costs was that they
were inflated by a number or nominal capital costs. 38
Shaft sinking was categorised as a capital cost. 
But after a mine had begun producing, further 
advancements in the one or two shafts were charged to 
other underground expenses and so included in working 
costs. This occurred more frequently with outcrop 
mines than with deep level mines. The vertical shafts 
of the deep level mines were sunk into barren ground, 
whereas the inclined shafts of the outcrop mines 
closely followed 'the reef. This meant that in the 
case of outcrop mines production could invariably 
begin as soon as ground had been broken. Profits were 
reinvested and paid for the advancement of the shaft 
and other development work at lower levels. This did 
not mean that inclined shafts were cheaper in the long 
run than vertical shafts."^ In fact, the reverse was 
true: it was cheaper to sink a vertical shaft than an
^ A 1inclined shaft. We can therefore conclude that both
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types o-F sha-rt sinking incurred short—term and 
long-term as well as direct and indirect financial
advantages and disadvantages. 242
Wor were deep level shafts necessarily longer and 
therefore more costly than the inclined shafts of the 
outcrop mines. Inclined shafts were frequently 
relatively lengthy and, in fact, often exceeded the 
length of the vertical shafts of the first and second 
row deeps. By 1897 the inclined shaft of the City and 
Suburban, for example, had already attained 2 000 feet 
and was being advanced yet f urther.
It has been incorrectly argued that the capital 
costs of the deep level mines were higher than those 
of the outcrop mines. One reason for this contention 
is the incorrect premise that the c ,.tcrop mines had 
fewer shafts than the deep level m i n e s . I n  fact, 
the opposite was common. Nor was each deep level mine 
obliged to possess a minimum of two shafts,'^ This 
was certainly not true even with mines worked at 
depths of 4 000 feet."^ In terms of regulations based 
on the precedent of coal mines in Germany, which the 
British administration retained in the Transvaal after 
the Anglo-Boer War, all mines were obliged to have not
two shafts but two outlets 247 Consequently, to
obviate the expense of sinking more than one shaft,
both outcrop and deep level mi as, wherever possible,
connected their shafts with those on adjacent 
248properties. Another form of capital-cost saving
relating to the deep level mines and characteristic of
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the Witwatersrand, was the construction o-f "compound'- 
shafts. These were located on the bcjundaries of
adjoining properties and the expenses of such joint 
shafts were shared by two separate companies,
Shafts were considered to be permanent fixtures of 
the deep level mines and constituted a portion of the
icapital account, .Unlike outcrop mines, which often 
began producing before their shafts had been completed; 
this rarely occurred with deep level mines.
Consequently management concentrated on locating, 
planning and constructing their shafts with care to 
reduce the capital costs. But later modifications in 
the size and direction of the vertical shafts were
frequent and c o s t l y . S u c h  expenses, as in the case 
of outcrop mines, were then charged to working costs.
Development costs, including those for drives and 
cross-cuts, were also nominally capital costs.®®* As 
with shaft sinking the policy of the mineowners was to 
amortise these development costs as soon as possible. 
Therefore after a mine had ber in producing, 
development costs were also charged to working
costs,®®* Clearly the development of a mine did not 
stop after it had begun producing, as several
historians incorrectly state.®®® Development and 
production took place simultaneously on both the 
outcrop and the deep level mines. ®®^ As i^ ith the 
outcrop mines, it was essential for the deep level 
mines to reach the production stage as soon as
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possible. Hwnce once the vertical shafts had been 
sunk, invariably only enough development work was 
completed to allow ore excavation to start. But the 
commitment of the mineowners to keep their mills at 
full capacity, obliged them to open up more and yet 
more production faces,-^ "-^  which demanded maximum 
additional development during the initial prodi,iction 
phase.
This frenzied form of "speeding up", as we shall 
later see, was a major source of complaint to miners, 
who claimed that too little development work was done 
before production started. They contrasted this form 
of "hustle", with its accompanying high dust levels, 
with the more leisurely conditions which prevailed in 
development on metal mines elsewhere."^ But in the 
context of working costs it is important to note that 
all these extra development costs were charged to the 
mine's working account. Consequently management, in 
attempting to reduce working costs, also had to cater 
for a large share of development costs, which were the 
direct result of the industrialists' expedient system 
of capital costing.'^
The nominal capitalisation of the first and 
second row deeps was undoubtedly higher than that of 
the outcrop mines: shaft sinking and initial 
development costs, rather than expenses for plant and 
equipment, account for these cost disparities. But 
this does not mean that the real capital costs for the 
same two major items were lower in the case of the
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outcrop mines. It is beyond the scope o-f this study 
to make an in-dejpth comparison of the capital, 
development and working costs of the outcrop mines and 
the first and second row deeps. It may be added, 
however, that if the his :al materialists wish to 
sustain their arguments about the complicity of 
certain mineowners and groups in promoting the Jameson 
Raid and the Anglo—Boer War, they would be better 
served by the rigorous use of similar quantitative 
data, rather than by the more impressionistic evidence 
which they have thus far provided. For our 
purposes, however, these economic data clearly 
indicate that the mineowners' policy of amortising 
capital and development costs greatly increased the 
working costs of both these kinds of mining 
enterprises on the Witwatersrand.
' From the start of scientific mining the problem 
of working costs was crucial for management. In 1897 
the four principal items, as has been noted, 
constituted the wages for black and white mineworkers 
- each was a discrete item - at appro;-:ir.'.ately 27 per 
cent and 28 per cent, the cost of dynamite at 12 per 
cent, and the cost of coal, including carriage 
charges, at 11 per cent."^ As dynamite and freight 
chargewere monopolies,'^ management, in frequent 
memorials to the Kruger government and in' oheir 
evidence to the Industrial Commission of 1397, 
justifiably contended that the price of dynamite and
coal could be reduced by aopro;;imately 50 per cent
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The Volksraad assented only to the lowering of railway 
■freight rates. But as these charges minimally reduced 
the price of coal, this concession did not mollify the 
mineowners. The Republican government's consistent 
refusal to terminate the dynamite monopoly, even after 
the Industrial Commission had supported their views in 
recommending its abolition,'^ also reinforced the 
Randlords' g issatisfaction.
As management could not curtail the prices of 
coal and dynamite, it took steps to reduce wage 
costs. Barring social and economic constraints, these 
cost items appeared more amenable to management's 
control. Although in 1897 black mine employees 
outnumbered whites by approximately six to one, their 
separate wage bills were almost on a par,-^“ a 
phenomenon which we will discuss later when we analyse 
the patterns of labour organisation. In 1897 the 
reduction o-f Africans" wages by one-third in the 
revised schedule was successful in depressing the 
wages of this section of the workforce in the long 
term.
But cutting the wages of black mineworkers was 
only one blade of management's shears. The other 
cutting edge was improved white worker productivity. 
In attempting to prune its wage bill management 
invoked oth blades. The measures were integral to 
each other,, as Hennen Jennings, consulting engineer
•For Rand Minas, explained:
What we require -from both black and white 
labour is greater efficiency, which, if 
readily obtained, renders rate of wages a 
secondary consideration... Of course we 
desire to get the unit of wage as low as is 
consistent with the contentment of 
labour.
The competence with whicn management mobilised the 
efficiency of its white underground workforce, 
particularly miners, by the practice colloquially 
known as "speeding up" successfully offset the high 
wage bill o-F this segment of mineworkers. But the 
miners paid a heavy price for their increased 
productivity. The exchange for "speeding up" was the 
increased prevalence of chronic silicosis, which was 
more rapidiy progressive than elsewhere, and the 
occurence of accelerated silicosis, an even more 
serious form of the disease. Contemporary health 
officers with typical insensitivity Justified this 
sacrifice of miners' health by their paternalistic 
attitude; they claimed that miners were "ignorant" of 
the risks attached to mine work-'^
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CHAPTER 5
THE INDUSTRIAL YEARS 1892-1899
"Undoubtedly the -formation of companies with 
very big capitals for development of deep 
underground levels has affected the working 
of the miners.. . A process of 'speeding up' 
has been instituted in order to keep the 
mills going and earn sufficient profits to 
pay the promised dividends. In American 
factories "speeding up“ has increased the 
number of accidents, and it has probably had 
the same effect on the mines. There is no 
time to take adequate precautions. The men 
have to work at express speed and their 
health suffers. The policy operates from
top to bottom."---T. Bottomley, 1904 1
"Jt is needless to point out that this 
industry Cthe Witwatersrand gold mines! in 
the past has been built up by the employment 
of unskilled native labour in combination 
with skilled white labour, in the ratio of 
approximately nine natives to one white
man. 'Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 1901
In 1893 an article in the Minirig Jotirnal 
enthusiastically endorsed the widespread introduction 
C!-f mechanised rock drills on the Wi twatersrand mines. 
In commending the mineowners for their "series of 
achievements" the journalist singled out the
251
"extensive employment o-f power transmission". This 
had facilitated "the general displacement of manual 
labour by rock drilling", a step which he considered 
as important as the general adoption of the cyanide 
process."^ But during fhe 1890s, when fhe proponents of 
mechanised drilling applauded the increased productive 
power of rock drills, they were apparently oblivious 
of the machines' capacity to harm their operators. In 
retrospect they stated! "The story of the drills 
covers a good deal of the story both of our output of
rock and our output of silicosis, I A-
This chapter examines the introduction of rock 
drills on tlie WitV'jatersrand and traces their history 
and use until 1899 in both the outcrop and in the deep 
level mines. In so doing the study shows the enormous 
scale of mining on the Witwatersrand and the 
accelerated pace of the output of rock.^  The 
development and production methods caused heightened 
dust levels with an accompanying increase in the 
incidence and prevalence of both chronic and 
accelerated silicosis.
Three ' factors account for the revenue of 
Witwatersrand mines: first, the grade of ore otilled; 
second, the price of goldii and finally, and most 
significantly in this context, the quantity of ore 
hoisted and milled.^ The mineowners soon realised that 
they would have to work their mines on a very large 
scale to make the low grade ore pay.*^ Consequently 
mass production became their target. Mass production
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was partly -Facilitated by the introduction of rock 
drills. But the mineowners also achieved their 
objective by their methods of mooi Using the
underground workforce. This chapter therefore 
analyses the labouf— saving strategies and the
labour— intensive practices of the mineowners, both of 
which contributed to the occurrence of the disease 
which we are studying.
Mass production on the Witwatersrand gold fields 
is usually associated With the period from 1902 to 
1914, When most of the second row of deep level mines 
became fully operational. During this period the 
mineowners did, indeed, intensify their efforts to 
mass produce; they widely publicised their strategies 
in order to procure their capital requirements. But 
it is important to stress that the foundations and 
structures of mass production had been solidly laid 
and built before the Anglo-Boer War began. Unless 
this fact is grasped, the huge crude prevalence of 
silicosis, which became manifest in 1901, will remain 
incomprehensible. During the days of Kruger's 
republic the "speeding up" of mine development and ore 
production generated enormous dust densities which 
provoked the occurrence in the underground workforce, 
and amongst white miners in pa'"ticular, of this 
slow-developing lung disease in both its chronic and 
accelerated forms.
The productive propensity of the industry was 
measured by its tonnage, that is the amount of ore
o
- 253
daily broken, hoisted and milled. It will be shown 
that the use o-f rock drills in dr -'lopment, in 
particular, enabled the Witwatersre. ro mines to 
generate their huge tonnage, which brought them 
world-wide acclaim. We shall -first analyse the 
mechanisation o-f development on the mines, which was 
>^ ne of the routes management took in order to achieve 
mass production.
Management saw no practical need for using 
pneumatic, or air-driven, powev- drills to mine the 
soft friable bankejt in the free milling zone. But 
once pyritic rock had been struck, management 
seriously considered the advantages of rock drills.^ 
Towards the end of 18S9 the Jumpers Gold Mining 
Company pir leered their introduction on the 
Witwatersrand, and soon afterwards the Robinson and 
the Langiaagte Estates followed suit.® The initial 
rock drill units were modest in size. Each unit 
consisted of a small air compressor which ran one? to 
four drills and cost approximately £3 563.^ Once their 
efficacy had been proved, larger compressor plants 
which could handle eight to twenty drilling machines
'-•-J
were installed 1 0
Even so, between 18S9 and 1892 machine drills 
were imported on a very small scale, although most 
producing mines installed mills during this period.
By 1892 less than lO per cent of approximately 140 
registered companies owned rock drill plants. These 
companies included former producing mines, which had
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brsn liquidated or had temporarily stopped working 
becauj. of the slump, as well as mines which were
current producers 12
Towards the end of 1892, after the systematic 
exploitation of the pyritic zone had begun, mechanised 
drills became standard equipment on developing and 
producing mines. By 1895 over 90 per cent of working 
mines owned rock drill plantsj^'^ some of the 
compressors were large enough to run forty rock drills
at X t i m e . A l s o ,  the number of operational rock
drills continued to grow: for the years 1896, 1897,
and 1898 the number of rock drills in average annual
use was 1 013, 1 351 and 1 850
It should be st-'essed that the extensive use of 
rock drills not result solely from the development, 
from 1892, of the first level deeps, as numerous 
historical accounts incorrectly s u g g e s t . T h e  
prosperity of the outcrop nines was equally dependent 
on them.
Apart from their high capital costs, rock drills 
were expensive to maintain. Also, their working 
costs, in terms o' their power supply and their 
consumption of explosives, were far higher than those 
of hand drills manned by black w o r k e r s . B u t  the 
extra development which rock drills accomplished both 
offset their additional costs and promoted the 
profitability of the mines.
-
The mineowners viewed the need for the rapid 
development of both the outcrop and the deep level 
mines in the pyritic zone as being exceedingly 
important, as development paved the way for the 
excavation of the banket. Through development, that 
is the driving of horizontal and vertical tunnels 
through barren rock^ the ore—bearing reefs were 
exposed. The places at which the underground tunnels 
exposed the pyritic reef were called the faces. The 
faces were then drilled and dynamited]; and the next 
stage of the cycle was hauling the tons of broken ore 
to the mills.
Management on the Witwatersrand quickly learned 
that development by hand labour did not supply 
sufficient faces quickly enough for ore production to 
match the capacity of the huge mills. Therefore both 
before and during production rock drills were 
extensively deployed on both the outcrop and the deep 
level mines to expedite development. Their use in 
development ensured that more and more ore-bearing 
rock was laid open underground so that it could be 
speedily excavated and milled.
From 1892 until the outbreak of the Anglo—Boer 
War in 1899 the demands of the mills grew. In 1894 
over two thousand stamps were continuously dropping. 
In 1394 the crushing of more than 2 375 000 tons of 
gold-bearing banket yielded approximately two million 
ounces of gold, which had an estimated value of
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£7 000 0 0 0 . This single—year production was
equivalent to one-third of the total output of the 
preceding six-year period, from 18S7 to 1Q93. As a 
gold producer in 1892 the Transvaal, after Australia, 
the United States and Russia, was ranked fourth in the 
w o r l d . I n  1S94 the production from approximately 
fifty mines raised the Transvaal to third place in the 
world ranking and to first place in the following 
year.^^ In 1895 the Witwatersrand, as the world's top 
gold producer, yielded one-fifth of the globe's total
rf~>annual output.
The Witwatersrand did not attain its primacy as a 
producer solely because of it geography, namely the 
concentration of so many gold fields in a single 
region. A less obvious reason, but an equally 
important one, was management's institution of 
particular mass-production techniques which caused 
development and production on the Reef to be more 
rapid than in any other hard rock mining r e g i o n . B y  
September 1899, on the eve of the Anglo—Boer War, the 
6  OOO working stamps^*^ of seventy-eight producing 
mines'^ '-^  were, on average, pounding approximately 
28 000 tons of ore per day.''^ '^  Tourists to Johannesburg 
were astounded by the noisiness of the stamps; and one 
such visitor observed;
Beyond the town are the mines from which 
there comes an increasing murmur, growing on 
nearer approach to a dull roar, as of the
sea, the sound of the batteries crushing the 
ore.
Mineworkers would have disagreed with the tranquil
•J
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connotations of the writer's simile; even at night the 
"incessant roar" of the mills disturbed the wc'^kers. . 
For miners, in particular, the thundering stamps 
epitomised -rhe "speeding up" effected on the mines.
The daily milling in 1899 of so many thousands of 
tons of banket depended, as we have seen5 on the 
development of enough faces for the encavation of 
gold-bearing rock. Management could not have achieved 
this magnitude of production, since 1892, in so short 
a period, without the large scale deploymenv-, of rock 
drills in development.
To meet the demands of the mills the pace of 
production was also quickened. In fact, the average 
tonnage excavated and hauled to the surface exceeded 
by 16 to IS per cent the tonnage finally milled. 
This was due to a proportion of the waste rock being 
discarded in the cost—saving surface procedure of 
sorting. Hand sorting took place before crushing in 
an attempt to provide the mills with only gold—bearing 
rock.^*^
Management, for many cost—related reasons, 
preferred to use hand labour rather than machine 
drills in ore exccivation, or stoping."^ But during 
1894, when there was a shortage of African workers for 
manning the hand drills, management used rock drills 
to supplement hand drills in the stopes in order to
TOmaintain production levels.
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Irrespsctive of the width of the reef ., stoping 
was always intricate, as each stope had "an 
individuality of its own".'^’^ But machine drills of the 
19th century were unsuited to the complexities of the 
narrow reefs that predominated in the Witwatersrand 
m i n e s . A l s o ,  when used in narrow stopes these rock 
drills proved to be far more costly and hazardous than 
hand drills.'^ '^  Management therefore always insisted
that the substitution of rock drills for hand drills
Ain the stopes was only a temporary expedient?’-''^ and it
clung to this view until 1910.'^^ But throughout the 
period before the Anglo-Boer War African hand-drill 
labour always fell short of the demand,'^® so obliging 
management to increase the numbers of machine drills 
in stoping. Indeed, in 1393 the State Mining Engineer 
of the South African Republic stated in his annual 
report that machine drills had become the chief means
of stoping.'
This did not mean that hand drilling had been 
discontinued entirely; at least 2 0  per cent of stoping 
was still done by hand, particularly in selected 
narrow reefs which had a high gold content. 
Therefore despite its additional costs and other 
work-related disadvantages5 by 1899 "speeding up" had 
become the norm in production too. As in development, 
by 1900 production , by machines v*jas also responsible 
for provoking the occurence of accelerated silicosis, 
a feature which many medical historians tend to
overlook or play down. 41
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Many popular historians are also responsible for 
perpetuating fallacies concerning the WitwatBrsrand 
gold mining industry. In romanticising the industry's 
pioneers, such historians praise their foresightedness 
in mechanising the industry, but fail to mention the 
adverse implications inherent in the mechanisation 
process. Likewise, many official mining-house 
histories are simply public relations exercises. 
Although such surveys purport to be based objectively 
on mining-house archival records, they do, in fact, 
invariably suppress data which are inconsistent with 
their writers’ predetermined view of the industry's 
upward and smooth technical progression. They gioss 
over or ignore entirely, as do most popular histories, 
one of the disfiguring historical features of the 
industry - the mortality of miners from silicosis.
In contrast, the autobiographical and subjective 
narrative of the industry by William Taylor, the 
diamond and gold mining pioneer, does not suffer from 
this defect. In 1932, in reviewing the role of rock 
drills in the growth of the VJitvmtersrand gold mining 
industry, Taylor, the brother of one of the early gold 
mining house directors, James B. Taylor,'^'^ explained 
both their significance and malignance to the 
industry;
Sixty miles of the reef resounded with the 
constant rat-ta-tat of machine drills, and 
the hard conglomerate ore; melted, like ice 
if, .he spring, before the weapons which 
science had brought into play against it.
Unhappily the new methods at first exacted a 
ghastly price in human sufferings and death
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•from the speeding-up they brought. With 
each rapid stroke ot the machine—dri 1 1  th6?re 
was thrown into the air an impalpable 
powder, largely consisting of infinitesimal 
but shcirp fragments of silica. This dry 
dust pervaded the mines, coated the walls of 
the drives, the trucks and the woodwork, 
coloured the faces and clothes of the
workers, and entered their lungs. It
produced a fell disease Camong white miners! 
isnown by the name of Miners' Phthisis or
Si 1icosis 44
Taylor's identification of the occurrence of 
silicosis has several important implications. In 
brief, his chief arguments are: first, rock drills 
caused silicosis; second, by implication the incidence 
of the disease was highest among rock drillers; third, 
all stoping was dons by rock drills; and fourth, white 
miners, rather than African migrant mineworkers, 
contracted the illness. Taylor's review of the growth 
of the gold mining industry does not shirk detailing 
the morbid consequences of rock drill work. But his 
analysis of the causes of the disease and the liable 
intermediary instruments is based on the 
generalisations of contemporary commentators during 
the early years of the 20th c e n t u r y - A s  stereotypes, 
Taylor's Insights, therefore, have a number of 
inh$?rent fallacies.
Let us examine his first premise. Taylor, like 
many other analysts, blames rock drills for producing 
silicosis. E-iut dust, not the machines, causes the 
disease. We must therefore avoid the pitfall of 
transferring the liability for silicosis to rock 
drills, so incorrectly promoting machines as disease 
producers. If we are to understand why rock drills 
became dust producers we need to examine carefully the
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way they were operated and the conditions in the 
mining zones where they were handled.
In certain respects Taylor's second observation 
is valid. He correctly shows that rock drillers were 
more vulnerable to silicosis than other underground 
workers. This was confirmed in 1937 by reliable 
statistics based on incidence data which had been 
compiled since the inauguration of the Miners' 
F^ 'hthisis Medical Bureau in 1916. Despite the 
industry's growing vigour, particularly after 1916, in 
implementing important dust precaution measures, the 
;1937 figures showed that 70 per cent of the current 
silicotic victims had been machine drillers.'^^ But, as 
this 1937 statistic also illustrates, nearly one—third 
of the incidence of silicosis could not be accounted 
for by the use of rock drills. Additioncil factors 
must, therefore, be analysed to explain why such a 
relatively large proportion of the underground 
vjorkforce, who had not operated rock drills, 
nevertheless contracted the disease,,
Taylor's third argument that machine drills were 
exclusively used in stoping is incorrect Tor the 
period before World War 1; his simile "and the hard 
conglomerate ore melted, like ice in the spring" 
contains too much poetic licence. As we have seen, by 
the time of the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War machine 
drills accounted for approximately 80 per cent of 
stoping. After the war, and particularly between 1904 
and 1910, the ratio of machine-dr i 1 j.ed faces to
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hand-drilled -faces droppeds during this period at 
least 30 per cent to 40 per cent of stoping was done
by hand 47
Between 1902 and 1912 the number of machine 
drills in use did, indeed, increcise in absolute 
t e r m s . B u t  wherever it was practicable, mananement 
used hand drills in stoping.Apart from a brief 
period of scarcity of African contract labourers, from 
I'^ Ol until 1904, which the introduction of indentured
Chinese workers alleviated, from 1904 to 1914 there
50was virtually no shortage of non—white mineworkers. 
They were available in sufficient numbers to wield the 
less costly hand drills, which now replaced machine 
drills in many of the stopes. Also, after 1904 
managemei c deployed hand drills in reserves which it 
had developed before the Anglo-Boer War, but had not 
mined then, because of cost. Such reserves included 
both reefs which were complex and narrow and those 
which had exceedingly low g r a d e s . A l t h o u g h  hand 
drills replaced machine drills in many stopes, during 
the period 1905 to 1912 the number of rock drills used 
in both production and .development was sufficient to 
sustain the high prevalence of accelerated si.Iicosis.
To promote a better understanding of the 
weaknesses in Taylor's arguments the organisation of 
the workforce must be analysed. Such analysis will 
clarify the role of machine drills as dust producers 
and help explain why rock dri?i.lers engaged in 
development were more prone to silicosis than their
J
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counterparts in stoping. It will also show that 
additional categories o-f underground mineworkers and 
other kinds of miners, including hand stopers, also 
contracted the disease. By unravelling these 
complexities we will be in a stronger position to 
assess objectively Taylor's last proposition. It 
followed the consensus of contemporary medical
opinion, which asserted that "the incidence of 
uncomplicated silicosis is very decidedly lower in the 
native than in the European labour force". Such a 
medical view seems to be incongruous. But its 
apparent absurdity can be better understood if we 
examine the origins, composition and deployment of the 
workforce on the Witwatersr*. d gold fields.
When systematic mining was inaugurated on the
Wi twatersrand, the deployment of labour, as
contemporaries observed and as historians have since 
confirmed, largely followed the precedents of "deep 
diamond mining" at Kimberley.'-^’-’ Many Kimberley mining 
directors provided both the bulk of the initial 
finance capital and the original management for the 
gold mining industry. Following their successful 
experience at Kimberley the Randlords applied to the 
gold mines a labour system which had already proved 
effactive-
This transfer of labour patterns from the one 
industry to the other was not an automatic decision 
based on the coincidence of mutual capital and 
ownership: engineering and economic principles were
■^J
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equally important in governing the industrialists' 
choice. Both the underground diamond mines and the 
outcrop and deep level gold mines were designed 
according to univeral underground vein-mining 
practices. There-fore both at Kimberley and on the 
Witwatersrand the mines had similar labour 
requirements. Also, in both these mining centres the 
labour arrangements, which so closely resembled one 
another, were economically shaped by the composition, 
costs and availability o-f the labour resources in 
southern Africa.
By 1SS7 the original alluvial diamond diggings, 
established during the early lS70s, at the four 
Kimberley mines, had altered radically. Under the 
monopoly of the De Beers Consolidated Mines they were 
transformed into an underground mining industry with 
expensive mechanised equipment. This was not a 
sudden development. After alluvial quarrying had been 
largely abandoned, there was a relatively lengthy 
transitional period; from 1875 to 1384 open deep-pit 
mining predominated; and later, from 1934 to 1837, 
these open-pit mines co-existed v>jith a small number of 
underground mines.
At Kimberley one of the basic requirements for 
both the deep pits and the underground mines was a 
skilled labour force. As South Africa had only a 
small pool of artisans and a tiny complement of 
professional miners, the diamond industrialists 
offered high wages to attract skilled mineworkers from
‘ j
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overEsas*Trained artisans were required to install, 
operate and s'.rvice the machinery; and the expertise 
ot pro-fessional miners was needed -for the more 
sophisticated development and production requirements 
o-f the new -forms o-f mining. Most o-f these skilled 
minaworkers came -from the United Kingdom. In contrast 
to the artisans who came -from all parts o-f Britain, 
the miners emigrated largely from Cornwall and 
Cumberland, where tin and iron—ore mining was
declining. S6
Unlike the case of artisans, the initial demand 
for miners was small; they were required only as 
timbermen to shore up the walls of the deep pits.'-'^  
The demand for miners increased during the early 
1830s; some of the industrialists increased production 
in the deep pits; and from 1884 others started to 
construct more complex underground mines. It must be 
stressed- that the increased demand for miners was 
barely influenced by the application of technology; 
until the late 1890s at Kimberley the mechanisation of 
the mining processes themselves was minimal. Apart 
from a handful of rock drills used for driving 
tunnels, both development and production in the 
underground diamond mines were almost entirely labour
intensive. 53
The money wages of the skilled mineworkers, which 
ranged from £6 to £3 per week, were substantially 
higher than those paid in Britain. But because of the 
high cost of living in Kimberley, in real terms these
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wages were barely sufficient for the subsistence of 
married men.^"^ Also, the wages of skilled white 
workers were markedly higher than those of .unskilled 
African mineworkers: in the late 1880s the wages of 
recruj ted black labourer's averaged between 13s. and 
£ 1  1 0 s. per week.^*^
It could be argued plausibly that the wage 
disparities between white and black mineworkers at the 
Kimberley mines was the white mineworkers' possession 
of skills. But this was not consistently so, as the 
case of the white overseers illustrates. The 
overseers, most of whom were former claim holderrs,^^ 
•played an important role in production at the quarries 
and in the open pits.^^ When the numerous diamond 
claims became concentrated in the hands of a few 
owners who pursued capitalist methods of production, 
the former independent diggers were from economic 
necessity obliged to become wage-earners. As the 
vast majority of diggers lacked artisanal or mining 
skills, unskilled work on the mines was their only 
alternative.^*^ But they were not employed afs unskilled 
labourers. Instead, they were promoted to supervising 
black labourers who performed the unski 1 ,led physical 
v>Jor k .
As employers ^ the diggers had been prepared to 
perform unskilled physical tasks in the company of 
their black employees. The white prospectors did not 
regard the concept of unskilled physical work per se 
as being distasteful. Rather, they viewed manual work
■^J
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as being "degrading" only wWen they performed it as 
Msge-earners. In this capacity they regarded their 
standing as having been reduced to a level which they 
considered suitable only -for non-white people, whom 
they perceived as being biologically and racially 
inferior to themselves. Also, the unskilled wage 
rates, customarily paid to non-white labourers, did 
not enable the former diggers, to conform to 
socio-economic standards, which social convention j.n 
South Africa held tc? be appropriate for whites. Such 
views were 'tot peculiar to the diggers. Indeed, they 
were shaped by, and so conformed to, the value systems
of most contemporary wliite South Africans- 67
A tangled mesh of psychological and 
socio-economic variables accounted for the prejudice 
of white unskilled wage-earners towards executing 
unskilled physical tasks in the same workplace and in 
the company of unskilled n o n - w h i t e s . W h i l e  the 
economic. competition of non-white workers was an 
undeniable threat to these white workers, many of whom 
were of low socio-economic status, it was not the sole 
reason for their prejudice. Displaced aggression and 
personality needs carried equal weight in shaping 
their prejudice, as did the need to conform to 
existing social norms.Consequently former claim' 
holders - and later Afrikaners, who had been 
disposessed of their small farmholdings - in adjusting 
to their changed status from independent entrepreneurs 
to unskilled wage-earners, clung tightly to customary
■J
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white value systems which disdained the performance by 
whites of menial wage-earning tasks. But the 
pretensions of whites to superior categories of work 
and to standards of living higher than those of 
non-whites needed justification; and a simplistic 
version of Social Darwinism, which had become the 
conventional wisdom in the 19th century, provided them 
with a suitable rhetoric.
The idea that whites were different from and
socially and economically superior to non-whites had
gradually taken root in South Africa: the idea was
part of the legacy of the 17th century Calvinist
doctrines and of the Cape's relatively lengthy
eKperience as a slave-owning colony. After the middle
of the 19th century notions of white racial supremacy
were further bolstered by the pervasiveness and
influence of Social Darwinism, a socio-cultural theory
of evolution, with its rider of biological
determinism. Its attachment to natural- laws,
associated with Darv-jin, gave it a spurious
legitimacy. This enabled its contempior ary - and
present-day^'^ - proponents to support class
stratification based on colour and to justify racial
discrimination on the grounds that these inequalities
7 1were scientifically determined.
Also, the resort to Social Darwinist rhetoric by 
the , diamond mining magnates - and later by the 
Randlords - enabled the industrialists to justify the 
disparities in their employment and treatment of black
-J
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and white minaworkers. To a considerable degree the'/ 
were also able to sa’-is-fy the British Colonial 0-f-fice 
that many of the exploitative practices inherent in 
the cheap black labour system did not run counte? to 
the British state's avowed principles of dut'/ and 
trusteeship towards the African societies under its 
g o v e r n a n c e . T h i s  accord between the British 
government and the mining industrialists is not 
surprising: ironically, the ostensibly commendable
aims of the Colonial Office also had strong social 
Darwinist connotations that were used to justify the
■7‘^rBritish state's imperialist policies."'^
Management, particularly on the gold mines, had 
many reasons for preferring to employ cheap black 
labour rathe."- than cheap white labour on the mines, 
and these are discussed later= But had management 
been explicit about these reasons, it would probably 
have harmed the industr'/'s image amongst many of its 
professed and potential supporters, including 
s h a r e h o l d e r s . A l s o ,  such frankness would have 
further intensified the hostilit'/ of the industr'/'s 
antagonists, including white mineworkers. Instead, 
management placated public opinion hy resorting to the 
plausible theor'/ of Social Darwinism, The remarks in 
1904 of Hennen Jennings, the London—based consulting 
engineer of H. Eckstein and Compan'/, illustrate the 
soothing impact of this theory's rhetoric on persons 
of white descent:
The history of this country Cthe Transvaall, 
as well as that of others where white and
uj
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black are thrown together, clearly proves 
that the white is the superior race
mentally. and that the black should
recognise it. In other words it’ is the 
natural at’titude o-f the white man to feel 
his superiority, and relegate to the black 
the lovjer grade of manual work. . .
Thus, to obtain the maximum popula’ion, 
intelligence and contentment, work among the 
whites must be confined to skilled 
departments where brain tells, and the mere 
muscular work apportioned to races willing 
to be considered inferior, and to work 
cheerfully for wages far be’*-**’ the scale 
required by the white populai to support 
their families in the condition of affairs
I’cbtaining in this country 76
Management on the diamond fields did not employ 
unskilled ’Whites as manual labourers. Instead, it 
promoted them to be overseers. But these actions, 
which appeared to be consistent with their professed 
Social Darwinist views and so also with contemporary 
white social norms, overshadowed the industrialists' 
economic motives. One of the employers' major
problems was to minimise, if not to eliminate, diamond 
thefts which led to profit losses. A the
industrialists held 'whites, particularly former claim 
holders, to be innately more trustworthy than 
b l a c k s , a  notion entirely compatible with Social 
Darwinist thinking, they placed unskilled white
workers in charge of production in the quarries and in 
the open pits.^® In this capacity each white overseer 
supervised approximately ten black manual labourers
'70who dug up the blue rock with picks and shovels.'' 
Ostensibly the overseers ensured that the black
labourers performed their work. But this was not the 
overseers' main function. Rather, they acted as
policemen guarding against diamonds being stolen SO
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Even though the jobs they supervised had no skilled 
content whatsoever, the overseers were paid a 
semi-skilled wage,®^ na.'T'ely appro>timately two-thirds 
of the earnings of skilled mineworkers. Clearly the 
high earnings of skilled wo'-kmen from overseas 
strengthened the established wage differences between
black and white wage-earners 82
After management had modified its methods of 
production, the redeployment of unskilled whites as 
nominal semi-skilled overseers continued, but in 
different kinds of work in which racially 
discriminating theories again reinforced economic 
self-interest. By the late 1870s many open-pit mines 
were being worked at depths of 300 to 400 feet.®'^ 
Therefore to speed up and cheapen production, 
customarily accomplished by laborious pick and shovel 
methods, a few industrialists introduced drilling and 
blasting techniques.®'^ As the overseers lacked these 
skills, they could not supervise African hand 
drillers. Instead, some overseers were redeployed as 
supervisors of Africans engaged in shovelling and 
other ore-removal jobs. Like their previous tasks, 
these new supervisory jobs also had no skilled 
content. Even so, this reduced body of overseers 
continued to be paid at semi-skilled wage rates, 
presumably because employers v<jere reluctant to offend 
cctmmon prejudice by employing whites at non-white 
rates.
ij
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The significance of the overseer arrangement 
needs to be stressed br cause the supervisory system 
was transferred to the professional miners, but n.t to 
the artisans. This occurred first at Kimberley, with 
the introduction of the techniques of ore drilling and 
blasting in the open pits and in the underground 
mines, and later on the Witwatersrand, where miners 
were required to supervise '^'^ fricans who operated hand 
and rock drills, Eiut the promotion of miners to be 
supervisors, ironically, jeopardised their claims to 
exclusiveness as a skilled class of workers. Through 
supervising drilling the skill content of the miner's 
task was fragmented. As a consequence both his job 
classification and his skilled wage packet were 
threatened by the encroachment of newly qualified 
semi-skilled black drillers who commanded unskilled 
wages. Likewise, the job security of the nominal 
semi-skilled overseers - they, like miners who 
supervised hand drills, were called gangers on the 
gold mines - was also precarious owing to the 
competitive threat posed by the black workforce.
On the Witwatersrand both kinds of supervisors 
we^ 'e caught in a similar pincer-like movement. They 
felt threatened by their industrialist employers, who 
naturally wished to reduce their wages, and on the 
other hand by the potential competition of lower-paid 
Africans.
■^J
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Clearly professional miners had an identity of 
interests with the unskilled overseers on the diamond 
mines and the unskilled gangers on the gold fields, 
one which historians exploring worker consciousness on 
the South African mines have failed to identify= The 
precarious job security of both these categories of 
underground white workers is one of the reasons that 
skilled miners collaborated with the overseers, and 
not with the artisans, in forming a short-lived trade 
union on the diamond mines in 1SS4.®*^ Afterwards on 
the gold mines, when both these categories of workers 
shared yet another danger, that of contracting 
silicosis, they once again joined forces - in the
p“7industrial-wide miners' strike of 1907. '
The supervisory system was crucial to the 
deployment of the underground labour force of the 
Witwatersrand gold mines. But as has been 
established, its origins were on the Kimberley mines. 
Its initiation was made possible chiefly by the 
composition of the workforce. Another reason that 
professional miners could be promoted to be 
supervisors hinged on the nature of mining in 
underground vein mines, such as those that-existed in 
Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand, A brief 
description of the general design of an underground 
vein mine will further an understanding of the 
essential features of supervision. Also, once we have 
a knowledge of such a mine's layout, we will be able 
to assess later why some underground tasks and sones
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had a greater liability -for silicosis than others.
On a mining property one or two shafts were sunk 
to intersect the ore at depth. In the case of outcrop 
mines inclined shafts followed the lode, whereas the 
vertical shafts of the deep level mines were directed 
at striking the ore on its underside.^ From the 
shafts, at levels of approximately 150 feet, 
horizontal tunnels, called drives, were drilled and 
blasted through barren rock to reach the mineral. The 
drives were then connected with one another at 
intervals of approximately 300 feet by yet another 
group of underground passages called winzes.
Winzes can be likened to underground shafts and, 
likewise, two of their functions were to prepare the
poground for excavation and to provide ventilation.^ 
Winzes were vertical or inclined tunnels; and the ore 
was frequently mined on either side of them in an 
upward or downward direction until the next level was 
reached.'^ *-’ Winzes could be dropped from the upper to 
the lower drives, a-procedure called sinking; and when 
they were elevated from the lower to the upper levels 
they were termed "raises". By blocking out the mine in 
these development operations the ore was exposed at 
the face enabling it to be excavated.
Production of the ore-bearing rock ,then began. 
The sites where the tunnels intersected the reef were 
called the stopes; and during stoping, the operation 
used to cut steps or notches in the face, the
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ore-bearing rock was released. This process was 
e-ffected by boring holes with hand tools or machine
O 1drills which were then blasted. But once production 
had begun, development did not stop. Blocking out 
continued to lower and lower depths to facilitate as 
many faces as possible being worked simultaneously.^-^ 
After stoping, the broken ore was shovelled into 
trucks - as late as 1946 draught animals were also 
occasionally used on the Wi twatersrand gold mines'^ '-^  - 
which conveyed it along the drives to the shafts, a 
procedure called t r a m m i n g . O n  reaching the shafts 
the ore was shovelled or tipped into containers, or
oerbins, which were then hauled to the surface.^'* In 
brief, stoping and the removal of the ore to the 
shafts comprised the production processes.
Shaft-sinking was probably the most taxing task 
for a miner as it required his all-round ability and 
ingenuity. But after this stage in mine development 
had been completed, the skilled miner still had to 
display his prov^ess in other development procedures 
and in stoping. Apart from performing unskilled 
physical tasks, including tramming and shovelling in 
the drives, winzes and stopes, he applied himself to 
•the semi-skilled manual jobs of drilling and 
blasting. Also, he did mechanical semi-skilled tasks: 
he ran the pumps; he fitted water pipes; he laid the 
plates for the tramming trucks; and he timbered the 
shafts, drives, winzes and stopes.*^^ By the time a 
miner had mastered all these skills he could, indeed,
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be regarded as an expert or as a skilled miner; and 
most overseas metal miners, with sufficient 
experience, could lay claim to this title.
As the underground mine of De Beers at Kimberley 
was based in 1887 on a design used for the mining of 
haematite in Cumberland,’^® the following 
representation of iron-ore mining in Lancashire is 
apt. James Coward describes the laborious process 
through which he acquired his skills as a miner and 
also shows the complexities of his calling. In one 
respect, however, the haematite miner's job differed 
from those of diamond and gold miners. Because the 
country rock in the British haematite mines was more 
friable than the hard rock at Kimberley and the gold 
m i n e s , t h e  iron-ore miner was obliged to do far more 
timbering, as Coward notess
I had to learn, in the first place, what 
they call tramming in this country. In the 
□ Id Country it is termed "bogeying"... When 
they see that he is quite efficient and a 
robust young fellow, they take him out of 
the bottom levels and put him in the upper 
workings. When he goes to the upper 
workings he is generally out on shovelling, 
and he has to fill the cars up above and tip 
them into the box for the trammers below. 
When he has no iron ore to fill, he has to 
get hold of a pick, the same as his partner, 
and he has to help to get some more iron ore 
loose. I want you to understand that mining 
in the Old Country is altogether different 
to what it is in this country. It is not 
solid rock they have to deal with. If you 
are not careful you would be buried in five 
minutes, and have the whole concern on top 
of you. You have to timber there every 18 
inches! that is, there are side sticks, what 
we term in Lancashire "two forks" and a 
"head tree". When you have got your head 
tree up, you have to lag it, and when you 
have got sufficient ahead for another set of 
timbers, you must put it in. When you
111 -
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strike water in this iron ore, it comes in 
■from all directions, not only -from the top,
but you must look to the sides and lag, and
in many cases it will blow your bottom up by 
the continual rise of the water coming out 
of the iron ore. There is none o-f that 
here. We have perfectly solid rock...Now I 
would like to give a case, an instance in 
rising C"raising"! in the Old Country. We
perhaps we have 100, 200,
rise right up from the
it all there with pickwork
We may come across some 
hard substance that we have
drive there, and 
or 300 feet to 
surface. We do 
in loose ground. 
rock or clay or
got to blast. 1 want you to understand 
these rises are 7 feet 6 inches or 8 feet by 
4 feet 6 inches. We have continually 
periodical rises. If the ground begins to 
run in on you lcol lapses 3, you have to keep 
your timbering close, and all the time it 
must be kept close until you get it 
timbered.100
Although drilling and blasting were two
accomplishments of a haematite miner, he seldom had to
use them in stoping, as Coward corroborated. But the
hardness of both the country rock and the lode in the
Cornish tin mines made drilling and blasting a daily
necessity in production as well as in development.
These skills were acquired during a lengthy, but
informal, period of training, as the following
description illustrates;
They start their training generally on the 
surface, either in connection with the 
machinery, or if on metalliferous mines they 
start on the dressing floors. They go from 
the dressing floors to tramming and 
shovelling, and while they are underground 
they start in their spare time a little work 
for the miner until they are put on as 
helpers. Generally with hand labour a young 
man is put on with an old miner. He learns 
to use the mallet and probably does a good 
deal of the work with the hammer, and the 
old man turns the jumper, which is for 
double-handed work. For single-handed work 
we do the same thing. The young man takes
the hammer and drill and he starts in the 101same way. •
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Because black mineworkers almost exclusively
performed hand drilling in South Africa, many
contemporaries and historians have tended to regard
this job as being unskilled, requiring no mental
application and with average physical demands. As a
consequence they have, perhaps unwittingly, caused the
skills required for this task to be denigrated.
Alfred John Bregory, the retired Medical Officer of
Health for the Cape, was a perceptive doctor 'who
refused to accept this stereotyped version of hand
drilling. In 1913 he argued:
You must remember that the work of the 
underground boys, whatever may be said to 
the contrary, is very hard, especially hand 
drilling. One boy, having the knack, will 
do the task of boring thirty-six inches with 
ease, but to the average boy, it is 
exceedingly hard labour. I have spent some 
time underground, and have watched them’ 
working.
Cornish miners would certainly have endorsed Brecjory's 
contention concerning the physically taxing demands of 
hand drilling. But they would also have stressed its 
skilled requirements, which the Cornabian proudly 
noted in 1901 in its description of double-handed 
drilling;
This requires long months of practice before 
one can become adept...One man holds the 
steel drill and another strikes it with a 
nine-pound sledge hammer, one-eighth of a 
turn being given between each blow, a 
mis-hit meaning sometimes a smashed finger 
or a wrist; but the miners become such 
adepts, despite the faint light at hand that 
accidents are rare.^ '"*^
In single-handed drilling the miner directed a 
pointed solid steel rod, the "borer" - known on the
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Witwatersrand as the "jumper" - at the -face. He
struck it with a heavy hammer, withdrew it a short
distance to free it -from the broken chips, gave it a
slight twist so as to maintain the round shape o-f the
hole, and continued these procedures until he had
drilled the hole to its required depth in readiness
for blasting. To remove the chips of rock the miner
threw water into the hole where it formed a sludge,
1which he periodically removed with a wooden stick.
The hand driller required skilled co-ordination and
physical strength to strike with the one hand "many
thousands of deliberate and heavy blows" on the end of
the borer, and simultaneously with the other hand to
1 HAsteady and twist it.-^‘
Initially on the Witwatersrand, as in Cornwall,
management permitted both double-handed and
single-handed drilling amongst its African
workforce, But as management raised the productive
output of its black underground labour complement,
single-handed drilling became the norm on the gold
fields. Double-handed drilling in a single shift
1produced a hole sixty to sixty-six inches; in depth.
But in single-handed drilling each black labourer was 
required daily to bore a hole thirty—six to forty-two 
inches in depth.
Over and above the possession of dexterity and 
the physical strength required for such arduous manual 
work, performed in near darkness and in cramped 
conditions, hand drillers needed appropriate mental
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skills. This knowledge, which was also informally 
acquired through experience, manifested itself in the 
expertise with which drillers placed the holes, the 
direction in which they bored them and in their 
assessment of explosive quantities* Overseas miners 
considered this understanding so important that they 
would not allow a youngster of eighteen or twenty "to 
attempt to put a hole in unless the elder men of the
party were present". When blasted, misdirected
holes could distort .the shape of the stopes resulting 
in costly alterations, including retimbering; even 
worse, they could cause rock falls with accompanying
loss of life. 113
Nor were overseas novice miners allowed to do 
blasting. They were required to have at least four 
years' underground experience before being allowed to 
assist with the exp losi ves. ^  Blasting also required 
the miner to apply his mental faculties to this task; 
ill-fired holes could cause costly damage or loss of 
life through weakening the hanging wall- In this 
process dynamite cartridges, furnished with a 
detonator and a fuse, were thrust to the bottom of the 
holes. After lighting the fuses for the many holes 
which were simultaneously blasted, the blasters 
retreated speedily to escape the explosion of the 
charges which shattered the rock. The .acquisition of 
these mental skills - ones which African mine 
labourers also gained at an early stage-^ '^ '-' — was an 
additional prerequisite for a dri1ler-cum-blaster to
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be considered an expert.
After rock drills had been introduced in the late 
1360s in Cornwall, "it was only a short step to the 
good combination that is miner and machine man".^^*^ 
This adage was true -for metal miners all over the 
world, By the mid-'19th century, Victoria in 
Australia and mining centres in North America had been 
established for a sufficient length of time for the 
institution of traditional training methods, As 
their introduction became more widespread, in these 
far— flung corners of the globe both local and roving 
miners had little difficulty in learning to operate 
the rock d r i l l s , W h e n  rock drills were originally 
introduced, they were provided with water .jets to cool 
the machines and to preserve the boring edge of the
cutting tool 120 But as management and miners
considered the provision and use of water jets to be 
costly and time-consuming, hosing was abandoned
world-wide, and water was used as wetting only for 
121sludging.
The rock drills of the 19th century v*<ere made of 
solid steel and were fitted on a cradle. The end of 
the piston, which projected beyond the end of the 
machine, vjas enlarged into a "chuck" in which a solid 
steel drill, or jumper, was inserted and d a m p e d .  
Activated by compressed air the rock drills worked on 
a reciprocating principle: the piston rod of the 
macnine drove the jumper against the face of the rock 
with great force and speed, rotating it between
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blows. As the machines, which weighed 200 to 300 lbs, 
wrwre extremely heavy, two men were required to rig 
them; smaller machines at a weight of 175 lbs, which 
were later designed for stoping, werta only a trifle 
less'cumbersome.
Two men also had to operate the smaller rock
drillsj one controlled the air supply and regulated
the movement of the drill; and the ctther changed the
jumpers at regular intervals. Dri11-changing was a
laborious and tedious operation. The blunted jumper
had first to be loosened and removed before it could
be replaced by its successor, which in turn had to be
tightly fastened into the chuck. Despite the time
taken to rig, shift and adjust the machines, and the
frequent and lengthy intervals which changing the
jumpers made necessary, a single machine manned by two
operators could drill four holes each six feet deep in
a single shift. Such holes, which were deeper and of
greater diameter than hand-drilled holes, i^equired
more explosives. Even so, the labout— saving
capacity of the rock drill, particularly in
development, outweighed its capital, maintenance and 
1working costs.
The abi’ity to operate a rock drill fortified the 
skilled miner's store of accomplishmenfcs. As a hand 
driller, the all-round miner already possessed the 
requisite ki ^wledge for positioning and directing the 
holes for the rock drill. Therefore he needed only a 
short period of training as a chuckman to equip
''■J
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himself with the mechanical skills necessary to take 
hol'^ ' of the drill handle.. With this additional
expertise he met all the requirements necessary to. 
qualify as a skilled miner according to fnarsagemen t' s 
def: (I i .. of the term; "Cne who can do any practical
work Oemanded from the collar of the. shaft to the 
bottom.
Practical all-round miners were not, however, 
required at Kimberley. Instead, the overseas miners 
used only one of their numerous accomplishments in a 
specialised capacity. When the jobs of skilled 
artisans are similarly fragmented, it is usually the 
result of advances in technology. The introduction of 
improved mechanical appliances occurred in numerous 
19th century - and 20th century - crafts and trades. 
In the printing trade, for instance, the handicraft 
skills which the compositor laboriously acquired were 
not needed for operating ■ the late 19th century 
mechanised linotype* A worker with a brief period of 
specific training could operate it. The assignment lOf 
the linotype to semi-skilled printers diluted the 
compositor's monopoly of skills and .30 rendered part
\ .
of his craft redundant- 126
At Kimberlev the jobs of professional miners were 
fragmented, but in quite a different way. The miner's 
job was not fragmented, or deskilled, as the process 
is often less precisely referred to, by the 
introduction of labour— saving machines. Instead, this 
process occurred through management's employment of
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low-paid black labourers who were, in practice, human 
machines. Although many oi the Africans' jobs were, 
indeed, semi-skilled. the African mineworkers 
continued to be paid at unskilled wage rates, which 
they were prepared to accept, given their lack of 
alternatives.
All the overseas miners were classified as 
skilled mineworkers. But by segmenting underground 
wc»rk into distinctive categories, management on the 
diamond mines used only one or two of the miner's 
all-round skills at a time. Consequently miners 
almost ejiclusively performed discrete jObs as 
semi-skilled operators. As wage-earners, who worked 
continuously underground, .they were collectively 
referred to as miners. But their designations as
developers, stopers, stope-timberers, plate layers, 
pump minders, and pipe fitters more specifically 
accorded with their tasks. Like the artisans who
worked at the margins of the open pits or on the 
surface of the underg'~ound mines, a tiny category of 
miners were assisted by two or three unskilled black 
helpers. This grcop of miners, known as the 
specialist pitmen, included timbermen, plate layers, 
pump minders and pipe fitters. Like the skilled 
artisans, the specialist pitmen were not supervisors 
in the same sense as developers and stopers clearly 
were.
As supervisors, most miners were in charge of 
gangs of twenty to thirty blar.,k workers in shaft
2B5
1 "^ r isinking, driving, winzing and stoping. * Besides 
handling personally the explosives and lighting the 
-fuses, the all-round miners were called upon to use 
their knowledge of boring and blasting in only one 
other way: they demonstrated the position and
direction of the holes which their black charges 
drilled. "Our duty is to read rocks and split them," 
was the sage comment in 1902 of a supervisor, or 
ganger, on the gold mines. When miners at Kimberley 
were employed under contract they supervised their own 
ore removal. But miners on day's pav' were not
responsible for these unskilled tasks. Tramming and 
shovelling were entrusted to the overseers who, as we 
have seen, received semi-skilled wages, which were 
approximately one—third ..as than those of the 
professional miners. The overseers, like the 
miners-cum-supervisors, were in charge of gangs of
black workers of similar size. 134
The gangs of African mineworkers constituted a 
large portion of the total black workforce, which 
consisted mainly of migrant labourers who worked for
relatively short contract periods. Migrant labour
1was not new in African societies. !".or was it
determined solely by~ the industrialisation of the 
diamond mines. Long before diamonds had been 
discovered in the 1870s at Kimberley, Africans from 
virtually all the societies south of the Zambezi had, 
as migrant workers, been offering their labour to 
white employers in the South African colonies and
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